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This dissertation focuses on the making of the U.S. housing market.  In the United States, 
a flourishing housing market depends upon and reproduces the “American dream” of 
homeownership.  Homeownership is a multivalent institution. It can provide shelter, be a 
mechanism of wealth accumulation, a measure of economic achievement, a driver of local, 
national, and global economies, a status symbol, an American dream.  But as the U.S. mortgage 
crisis and global recession that racked economies, markets, and households a decade ago 
revealed, ever-increasing homeownership also creates financial instability and perpetuates 
inequality.  I argue that homeownership’s position as a source of social value and economic 
growth is precarious; it requires the work of multiple actors and agencies to be produced, 
naturalized, and sustained.    
I use a historically grounded, mesoscale ethnography of differently positioned housing 
stakeholders active in the post-crisis housing market recovery in Chicago, Illinois to understand 
how homeownership’s hegemony endures in spite of its pitfalls.  Attention to the interstitial 
actions that knit together the gaps between global financial markets, national political agendas, 
local real estate markets, and individual household needs allows me to zero in on a key driver of 
the housing market’s cycles of booms, busts, and recoveries: the homeownership complex.  The 
homeownership complex is a nexus of actors and agencies that support and perpetuate 
homeownership as a cultural ideal and an economic good. This dissertation includes an analysis 
of the complex’s constitutive parts, including government housing agencies, mortgage lending 
and real estate professionals; real estate investors, policymakers, and not-for-profit organizations 
that focus on meeting community housing needs. 
 
 iii 
The participants of the homeownership complex and the people, properties, and capital 
they bring together form a kind of housing value chain. At each phase in a property’s movement 
from one link in the chain to another, value can be imbued and extracted, but that value is neither 
universally visible nor accessible.  Through their participation in the U.S. homeownership 
complex, these diverse stakeholders make a housing market that sustains and naturalizes 
inequality rather than ameliorates it. Yet they experience “the market” that they help construct as 
self-perpetuating force over which they exercise little control.  Because a homeownership-driven 
housing market offers opportunities to generate value for those stakeholders with the financial 
and social capital to access it, they help perpetuate the idea that the institution of homeownership 
is a universal social and economic good even after the ravages of the U.S. mortgage crisis of 
2007-2009. Through an ethnographic analysis of the actors and agencies in the homeownership 
complex, this dissertation illuminates the work behind homeownership’s framing as a universal 
and enduring “American dream” and pushes for the U.S. housing market’s reconfiguration.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
[Homeownership] is the principal mechanism of wealth accumulation in [the 
United States]. And you look at a homeowner—average net worth is $200,000. 
You look at a renter—average net worth is $5,000.  So obviously it’s a worthy 
goal to get to, but if you put somebody in a house they can’t afford, you’re not 
doing them any favors because they lose their house, they lose their credit, and 
they lose their future opportunities…[Now we] have an opportunity to learn from 
those mistakes by exuberant people who perhaps didn’t really think things 
through…[The role of the Department of Housing and Urban Development] is to 
provide affordable, safe, decent housing for the people of the United States and 
also to create a market that encourages the development of our people 
economically, as well as in every other way.  
—Secretary for the Dept of Housing and Urban Development Ben Carson, 20171 
 
But it is the loss of a home, the most tangible symbol of a family’s social status, 
that is truly the watershed event in the life cycle of downward 
mobility…Homeownership is America’s most visible measure of economic 
achievement. Adults who have lost their homes –to foreclosure or distressed 
sales—have truly lost their membership to the middle class. 
—Katherine Newman, 19932 
 
This dissertation examines the making and remaking of the U.S. housing market.  In the 
United States, a flourishing housing market depends upon and reproduces the “American dream” 
of homeownership.  Homeownership is a multivalent institution: it can be a form of shelter, a 
mechanism of wealth accumulation, a measure of economic achievement, a driver of local, 
national, and global economies, a symbol of class and status. These multiple resonances can 
make it a challenge to study ethnographically. Here, I take on the challenge through an analysis 
of the work of housing stakeholders, including government housing agencies, mortgage lending 
professionals, real estate brokers, housing investors, policymakers, and community organizers.  I 
see these stakeholders as active participants in a complex of material and ideological investment 
in the institution of homeownership. This complex is shaped by and sustains the U.S. housing 
                                                 
1 From HUD Secretary Ben Carson’s interview with CNBC Squawk Box, June 12, 2017.  
2 From Falling From Grace: Downward Mobility in the Age of Affluence (Newman 1993: 102) 
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market.  But housing stakeholders participates in it for their own ends—ends that often 
perpetuate housing inequality. In order to grasp how homeownership became and continues to be 
a hegemonic institution in spite of the disparities it generates, we must deconstruct the 
homeownership complex and better understand the actors and agencies that construct it and 
operate within the housing market.  
 
Origins 
I did not initially set out to study housing stakeholders or to focus on the remaking of 
homeownership. I applied to graduate school in the fall of 2009, a year after the most dramatic 
days of the U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2009.  In September 2008, I was a twenty-three year old 
paralegal working in the bankruptcy and commercial litigation departments of a large law firm. I 
saw the crisis and the recession that followed from the vantage point of the bankruptcy attorneys 
I worked for, who were eager to capitalize on a dramatic uptick in Chapter 11 commercial 
bankruptcy filings.  But I also witnessed it as a low-level employee at a firm that was terminating 
employees and cutting benefits, ostensibly because their corporate clients were scaling back their 
legal needs.  This was my first recognition of the simultaneity of economic crisis and 
opportunity.  While the law partners I worked for in the bankruptcy group ordered Chapter 11 
“pitch binders”3 for new and existing clients so they could tap into the value-laden opportunities 
that the financial crisis generated, long-term secretaries packed up their desks, and the new 
attorneys fresh out of law school kept their heads down.  The crisis brought new business, new 
                                                 
3 A compilation of legal research and marketing materials that attorneys used in support of 
presentations they made to new and existing clients to demonstrate their preparedness to address 
a particular legal issue on the clients’ behalf.   
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justifications for instituting public and private austerity measures, and new economic 
opportunities for those positioned to seize upon them.   
 In my family’s life, too, I saw the simultaneity of crisis and opportunity.  As I applied for 
graduate school, a cousin of mine living in Northern California was in the midst of a drawn-out 
foreclosure proceeding.  While she was not the victim of predatory or subprime lending, her 
husband and she were, like many other households, overconfident in the sustainability of debt-
financed homeownership.  They bought a new suburban home just as my cousin’s husband 
launched a new electrical contracting business that never found success. They stopped making 
mortgage payments in 2008, after all sources of bailout money from friends and family had been 
exhausted.  In 2009, my cousin left her husband and moved into her brother and sister-in-law’s 
home with her two children.  She did so because after leaving the workforce years earlier to raise 
children, she could not afford to pay for a rental apartment of her own in the high-priced Bay 
Area housing market. My cousin struggled in her new circumstances, and she was diagnosed 
with breast cancer in the spring of 2010. Meanwhile, her estranged husband lived housing cost-
free,4 but besieged by creditors, in their family home. The bank finally repossessed the property 
in the winter of 2011. According to public sale records, the bank-appointed trustee who sold it 
after the foreclosure was finalized did so for $300,000 more than what my cousins had paid.  The 
next owners held the property for three years before reselling it for almost $350,000 more than 
what they had paid for it.  In a fourteen-year span that included a housing boom, bust, and 
recovery, my cousin’s former home more than doubled in value. But their financial and familial 
                                                 
4 Once a home goes into foreclosure, homeowners stop making mortgage payments. Even if they 
were in a position to pay, banks, their lenders often stop accepting money unless the full balance 
owed is paid. During the worst years of the housing crisis, this sometimes meant that foreclosed 
homeowners could live rent-free for years before their foreclosure was completed and the house 
was finally repossessed.   
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crises meant that they could not reap the benefits of this increase.  Instead, their misfortunes 
allowed the investor who owned their mortgage to repossess a valuable asset and facilitate a sale 
in which the home became a new, well-capitalized owner’s value-making opportunity.    
In 2011, the summer after my first year of graduate school, I began preliminary 
ethnographic research eager to understand the plight of homeowners like my cousin. I assumed 
that the vast numbers5 of households experiencing foreclosure would alter the cultural and 
economic significance of “home” in the United States.  I was inspired by Katherine Newman’s 
insight in that the loss of homeownership is “the watershed event in the lifecycle of downward 
mobility” (1993: 102).  I supposed that if enough people experienced the loss of their homes, 
homeownership as an all-but-universal aspiration could not remain the same.   
But, despite the ravages of the mortgage crisis, I found that the allure of homeownership, 
and the political and financial apparatuses that sustain and promote it, endured. By 2011, the 
community development agency in Chicago, Illinois where I conducted research with housing 
counselors was moving resources and staff away from foreclosure prevention work and back 
toward home pre-purchase classes and counseling.  In 2012, the housing rights activists whose 
foreclosure defense work I studied in Oakland, California were grappling with foreclosures, a 
resurgent local housing market driven by the booming tech economy in nearby Silicon Valley, 
and fast-moving gentrification processes. And by the time I returned to Chicago to conduct my 
dissertation research in 2014, there was a widespread sense that the housing market was well on 
its way to recovery, even if large swathes of the city’s South and West sides remained in dire 
straits.  Many of the realtors and mortgage lenders I interviewed were optimistic about the future, 
real estate investment schemes were once again popular, and I found that most not-for-profit 
                                                 
5 Between 2007 and 2016, banks foreclosed on 7.5 million homes (Boesel 2017). 
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housing agencies that had been devoting resources to foreclosure had shifted to housing market 
recovery and neighborhood renewal initiatives that prominently featured the promotion of new 
homeownership.   
Initially, homeownership’s endurance and the housing market recovery it allowed 
surprised and bewildered me.  Instead of the mortgage crisis functioning as a watershed event, as 
I imagined it would, I found that the housing collapse had been refashioned as a site of 
opportunity to, as HUD Secretary Ben Carson put it, learn from “exuberant people’s mistakes” 
and realize the institution’s dual purpose—the development of markets and people (2017).  Long 
before the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the ideology that real estate will always increase in 
value had become so embedded in U.S. cultural and economic life that homeownership, no 
matter when, where, or how it occurred, was taken for granted as natural, normal, and right—part 
of what Pierre Bourdieu terms doxa (1977: 164). Homeownership continues to hold cultural and 
economic appeal even after the financial crisis because of its real and imagined power to create 
and extract financial value and serve as a status marker, a driver of macroeconomic growth, and 
a pathway to securing and building household wealth in so doing. This dissertation illuminates of 
the complex of actors and agencies that have made owning a home doxic in the United States and 
continue to ensure its perpetuation.  In so doing, I hope to deconstruct the complex and create 
space for a rethinking of the kinds of opportunities the U.S. housing market generates and 
forecloses and for whom. 
 
The Homeownership Complex 
To understand how homeownership can continue to be productive —even when its 
central premise as an institution that generates and sustains value has been called into question—
 
 6 
I use the concept of a “homeownership complex” as both an analytical and organizational 
framework. The homeownership complex is a nexus of actors and agencies whose interests and 
practices support and perpetuate homeownership as a cultural ideal and an economic good. The 
complex includes: (1) government agencies and the pro-ownership policies they deploy in 
response to a host of complex social and economic problems; (2) mortgage lending and real 
estate professionals that seek to profit from the universal promise of homeownership;  (3) real 
estate investors and property owners who buy into and benefit from the opportunities 
homeownership sometimes offers; and (4) not-for-profit organizations who use the promise of 
homeownership to attract resources and clients and sustain their organizational missions. The 
participants of the homeownership complex and the people, properties, and capital they pull in 
and bring together form a kind of housing value chain. Much like the commodity value chain 
that Anna Tsing (2013) describes for the harvesting, pricing, shipping, and selling of 
mushrooms, value can be imbued within and extracted from this chain, but it is neither 
universally visible nor accessible (Rothstein 2017).   
The homeownership complex is a useful analytical frame because it draws attention to 
the constructed nature of homeownership.  The complex, and the value chain it brings into being, 
also highlight where construction takes place: in a middle space betwixt and between “the 
market” and “the household.” This space, and the mesoscale analysis6 it demands, is an under-
theorized dimension of sociocultural and economic inquiry. But it is a useful way to get at the 
connective tissues of global and local domains.  Mesoscale analysis allows national and global 
processes, ideas, and goods to be analyzed ethnographically without limiting one’s scope to local 
                                                 
6 Several scholars have used the mesoscale to explore the connections and frictions that exist 
between local actors and institutions and national and global ones (cf. Orta 2018, 2013; Scott 
1998; Tsing 2005).  
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“particulars” (Tsing 2005: 2). Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of a social field in which 
actors both take positions and are constrained in relation to the position takings of others (1993: 
30), the housing stakeholders whose work I track in this middle space are empowered as 
mediators between households and markets.  But they are also constrained by the prevailing 
conditions of the market, the limits of their capital, understanding, and power, and the desires 
and capacities of the households whose interests they serve.  Their perspectives and practices 
contribute to the nature and trajectory of the market in which they participate and also shape how 
their customers experience and interact with market forces.  Attending to the mesoscale and to 
the homeownership complex operating within and across it allows me to reveal the value chain 
that stretches between and knits together disparate fields and actors. 
The complex that supports and facilitates homeownership emerges out of a century-long 
investment of economic, social, and cultural capital in residential property ownership as a 
universally desirable and beneficial institution for individual households, communities, and the 
nation.  This long history of pro-homeownership policies, which I trace in Chapter 2, Inequality 
in U.S. Housing Policy from 1870 to the Present, have cemented homeownership’s status as a 
hegemonic institution in the United States. According to Pierre Bourdieu, “every established 
order tends to produce…the naturalization of its own arbitrariness” (1977: 164).  Because 
homeownership has become a natural, normal part of the pursuing the “good life” (Berlant 2011) 
in the United States, even those who are not likely to access or benefit much from it remain 
deeply invested.7 By examining the mid-range actors and actions that co-construct and reproduce 
                                                 
7 This is because homeownership appears to offer a unique opportunity: a family can save for a 
down payment, buy a modest home, economize and make improvements, and, thirty or forty 
years hence, pass it on to the next generation.  That this does not always happen, particularly for 
the lower-income families who are most reliant upon their home’s success as a wealth-building 
vehicle, does not undercut or diminish homeownership’s promise as a vehicle of transformation.  
 
 8 
homeownership as an American Dream, I hope to strip the homeownership complex of its status 
as the common sense solution to every housing problem and as the ideal driver of national, local, 
and household-level flourishing in the United States. To deconstruct the homeownership 
complex, as this dissertation seeks to do, requires a recognition of the gaps between what the 
complex promises and what it actually produces on the ground for differently positioned housing 
market participants.  It also demands an analysis of who mediates, obscures, and benefits from 
those gaps so that the dream of homeownership can endure.  
 
The Complexities of the Complex 
In using the term “complex” in conjunction with homeownership,8 my analysis of the 
nexus of economic, ideological, public and private investment in private property ownership in 
the U.S. owes much to Angela Davis, who used the term “prison industrial complex” to critique 
the “masked racism” that created a society in which   
Imprisonment has become the response of first resort to far too many of the social 
problems that burden people who are ensconced in poverty. These problems often 
are veiled by being conveniently grouped together under the category "crime" and 
by the automatic attribution of criminal behavior to people of color. 
Homelessness, unemployment, drug addiction, mental illness, and illiteracy are 
                                                                                                                                                             
Instead, those who fail to achieve or sustain homeownership are criticized and condemned for 
not being financially responsible enough to extract value from the housing chain (Joseph 2014).   
 
8 In their recent book Singlewide: Chasing the American Dream in a Rural Trailer Park (2017), 
Sonya Salamon and Katherine MacTavish describe a “mobile home industrial complex—a term 
[they] coined to capture the interlocked markets that make up this relatively misunderstood but 
commonplace rural housing form.  For the mobile home industrial complex entrepreneurs, 
trailers and trailer parks represent high lucrative investments…Key to the investment 
attraction...is that the homeowners bear a personal risk—greater than that borne by the 
entrepreneurs who control the various enterprises that families encounter when they buy a 
mobile home” (14). My use of the complex differs from theirs and follows Angela Davis and 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, however, in that I include government policy as a constitutive part of the 
complex.   
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only a few of the problems that disappear from public view when the human 
beings contending with them are relegated to cages. [1998] 
 
Davis, in turn, borrowed the term from President Dwight D. Eisenhower who referred to the 
dangers of a “military-industrial complex” in his farewell presidential address in 1961.  In that 
speech, Eisenhower warned that,  
In…government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, 
whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for 
the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let 
the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We 
should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can 
compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of 
defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may 
prosper together. [1961] 
 
Both Davis and Eisenhower use the idea of a complex to index the pernicious, self-perpetuating, 
and myopic nature of policies that not only do not solve the social problems they target, but also 
tend to obfuscate their root causes, making alternative approaches difficult to fathom.   
Hugh Gusterson’s work on nuclear weapons research and anti-nuclear activists in 
California provides us with an ethnographic illustration of how the military-industrial complex, 
and the massive weapons research and development field that fed into and was fueled by it, was 
sustained and contested during the Cold War period and beyond (1996, 2004). Gusterson’s 
analysis highlights the extent to which military ideology and culture came to permeate both 
national and local understandings of insecurity and how to create security. He analyzes how 
differently positioned actors, including nuclear weapons scientists, politicians, private defense 
contractors, and the U.S. military, co-created a “nuclear complex” that expanded even as the 
geopolitical climate and national defense needs evolved and changed.  
One of the key characteristics of a complex is that it can shape-shift and endure even 
when the impetus for its formation changes or disappears altogether.  This characteristic helps 
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explain why a nuclear industrial complex continues even after the Cold War ends.  “As my 
research continued into the 1990s[,]” Gusterson writes, “…the Soviet Union collapsed, nuclear 
testing ended, bipolarity gave way to globalization, and rogue states replaced the Soviet Union as 
the locus of nuclear threat.  Throughout these changes the nuclear complex…endured and 
adapted” (1996: xvi). The end of the Cold War could have negated the need for nuclear arsenals. 
Instead, a new justification for the weapons was produced: the threats posed by rogue states and 
terrorists.  “As Lawrence Korb, a former Pentagon official in the Reagan administration put it, 
‘The Cold War is over and the military-industrial complex has won’” (Gusterson 1996: xviii).  
Many people in the United States now take the need for massive military spending as a given, 
even when doing so involves cuts to other programs.9 Gusterson’s work reveals how the 
military-industrial complex turns the conditions of the contemporary moment, whatever they 
may be, into more justification its continued existence and power.  
The capacity of a complex to regenerate, no matter what the prevailing political, social or 
economic conditions may be, is also evident in the U.S. prison-industrial complex. The United 
States incarcerates more people per capita than any other country.10  Social scientists have 
followed in Angela Davis’s footsteps and sought to analyze and critique the ways in which rising 
crime statistics in the 1970s and ‘80s, themselves symptomatic of much deeper economic, social, 
and environmental inequalities, helped create and sustain a prison industrial complex and 
brought into being a prison pipeline that facilitates the incarceration of 2.2 million Americans 
(fifty-nine percent of whom are people of color) even as crime rates fall and new information 
regarding the social and financial costs and inefficiencies of mass incarceration have come to 
                                                 
9 A 2017 Pew survey found that only 8% of Republicans and 27% of Democrats supported cuts 
in U.S. military defense spending (Gramlich 2017). 
10 According to a States of Incarceration in Global Context 2016 report, 693 people per 100,000 
are incarcerated in the United States (Wagner and Walsh 2016).  
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light. The endurance of nuclear arsenals, criminal justice systems that fuel mass incarceration, 
and material and ideological support for homeownership suggest that the capacity for reinvention 
and self-perpetuation in the face of transformation may be a complex’s hallmark trait. 
Because creating the conditions for rising homeownership rates requires the efforts of so 
many different actors and agencies, it is difficult to pinpoint who or what to blame when things 
do not proceed according to plan, just as it is challenging to anticipate what alchemy will lead to 
a flourishing housing sector.  In the same vein, arguments are made for and against minute 
aspects of national security policy, and support waxes and wanes for new ways of approaching 
law enforcement and incarceration, but the broader complexes of which they are a part is never 
up for consideration for most members of U.S. society.  They simply exist.  Perhaps they are 
lamented, perhaps they are supported, but they are too embedded in the cultural and economic 
common sense of the United States to be imagined away entirely. 
The mortgage crisis of 2007-2009 could have been read as a fatal flaw in the housing 
market and the financial system in which the homeownership complex flourished.   Such a 
reading might have determined that ever-increasing homeownership rates are not only 
unsustainable but also dangerous for homeowners, renters, and for the global financial system as 
a whole (Sufi and Mian 2014).  That is not what happened. Much as Gusterson described the 
continuation of the nuclear-industrial complex after the Cold War ended, the U.S. housing 
market collapsed, but the homeownership complex lived on. As Anne Shlay notes, in spite of 
widespread consensus that housing (and particularly housing finance and securitization practices) 
were the root of the financial crisis of 2007-2009, “reports of the death of global capitalism 
proved to be greatly exaggerated” (2015: 561).   
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The entanglements of residential property with political agendas, economic development 
plans, real estate investment strategies, the real estate, mortgage lending, and construction 
industries, and global financial markets mean that homeownership generates too much value for 
too many entities to be dismantled. Evidence of the homeownership complex’s failings, such as 
the displaced people, vacant homes, and struggling communities left behind by the housing 
market’s collapse can be ignored or explained away. In the United Sates, the “promise” of 
ownership promises to create too much value for too many powerful stakeholders to be easily 
deconstructed and reconfigured, even in the aftermath of a potentially transformative housing 
crisis.  
 
Situating Homeownership in Cultural Context 
 While the institution of homeownership is formed and sustained by the work of 
differently positioned actors and agencies invested in its perpetuation, it is also resonates with 
key ideas and deeply held beliefs in the United States. This, too, is part of its enduring power.   
 
Crisis and Value 
A crisis, such as the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, also called the Great Recession, 
mortgage crisis, foreclosure crisis, subprime crisis, and housing market crash, is never an 
isolated or aberrant event. It may stand out as the culmination of a series of events that in 
retrospect are understood as precipitating it. But a crisis is not a moment that is wholly separate 
from what came before and after (Mirowski 2013).  In order to understand the implications of the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009 on the U.S. housing market and on the ideal of 
homeownership, it is imperative that we grasp the production of crisis as a social phenomenon 
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embedded in a longer history, as well as understand what a declaration of crisis may produce and 
foreclose.   
As geographer Neil Smith notes with respect to Hurricane Katrina, “there is no such thing 
as a natural disaster. In every phase and aspect of a disaster – causes, vulnerability, preparedness, 
results and response, and reconstruction – the contours of disaster and the difference between 
who lives and who dies is to a greater or lesser extent a social calculus” (2006).  In the case of a 
hurricane, tornado, earthquake, or spate of wildfires, social commentators can critique both the 
human actions and decisions that intensify or even cause a crisis to occur, from global warming 
to oil drilling and unsafe building techniques.  They can also point to disasters’ disparate social 
effects, such as when, during Hurricane Katrina, television news anchors and audiences across 
the United States were shocked to see what they considered to be “third world” conditions in the 
aftermath in a U.S. city (Dominguez 2006).  But what else can a “crisis” do, besides describe a 
series of events or give a name to a suddenly painfully visible disparity?   
In Anti Crisis (2014), Janet Roitman critiques the category of crisis itself.  She writes, “I 
suspend judgment about the expert claims to crisis so as to see how those very (expert) claims 
and (lay) accession to those claims serve not as radical change, as expected with crisis, but rather 
the affirmation of longstanding principles, thereby precluding certain thoughts and acts” (6).  It is 
not that Roitman disputes the existence of terrible events, but rather that she sees assigning the 
“crisis” label to them as a way to claim a state of exception that may constrain the array of 
possible responses to the crisis’s root causes and its social effects.  Sometimes, the declaration of 
a crisis is used as justification that nothing can be done at all.  This inaction might look like 
failure, or the retreat of the welfare state. But as Roitman and others have observed, sometimes 
doing nothing and letting the supposed root cause of the crisis event—whether it be a natural 
 
 14 
disaster, a market crash, a disease, or a violent conflict—take its course generates new forms of 
value for those who label and intervene upon it.   
For example, the crisis designation produces and necessitates experts, who in turn can 
legitimize certain forms of intervention.  Each new crisis allows them to demonstrate their value 
by managing its deleterious effects and sometimes making emergency preparedness and 
prevention plans to prevent catastrophe from recurring (Adams 2013; Ho 2009).  The rise of the 
crisis expert and manager occurs even when the same people who rush in to fill these roles have 
a hand in creating the very conditions that helped produce the crisis event or make its effects 
more dire.  I observed this pattern in the real estate industry, when brokers sought credentials and 
marketed themselves as “distressed property experts” and advertised themselves as professionals 
that could handle even those most challenging aspects of a housing market, and homeowners, in 
crisis mode.   
In Liquidated (2009), Karen Ho suggests that this cycle, in which market crisis and 
opportunities for expert intervention are caught in a mutually-reinforcing relationship, is part of a 
larger shift in the way that economic value has come to be understood, measured, and created.  
As shareholder value has risen to the fore as the primary metric by which a company’s 
performance and management is assessed, Ho details how investment bankers and consultants 
emerge to help companies produce value for their shareholders even if it comes at the expense of 
their long-term stability and success.  She argues that the coterie of experts who are her 
interlocutors have successfully remade corporate definitions of value and success in their own 
image, creating an environment in which previous metrics of crisis, such as layoffs and 
downsizing, are refashioned into normal, desirable, and routine ways for companies to increase 
their stock price.  From this perspective, economic crisis becomes a moment of opportunity to 
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create and demonstrate value.  It allows managers and financial experts to reconstitute corporate 
organizational structures, employment contracts, and future plans.  In the case of the law firm 
where I worked, it gave managing partners an opportunity to lay-off support staff and other less 
valuable employees and cut benefits under the cover of crisis, even as they themselves profited 
from providing new kinds of legal services to other entities who were in “crisis mode” as well.     
Economist Philip Mirowski notes how crisis declarations can lead to more of the same, 
and he questions the usefulness of crisis for fomenting radical change in economic thought, 
policy, and practice.  In Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste (2013), Mirowski notes that 
despite the opportunity that the global financial meltdown of 2007-2009 provided for a 
revolution in economics, most economists and the national governments that rely upon their 
expert advice have redoubled their commitment to the same ideas and values that led to a 
financial meltdown in the first place. We can see the effects of this enduring reliance on certain 
kinds of market experts and the economic agendas they produce in the U.S. housing market. As 
this dissertation addresses, the widespread foreclosures that might have signaled a need for a 
radical revision of homeownership have, instead, been used as a platform to promote and 
facilitate more homeownership.  Yesterday’s devalued, foreclosed homes are tomorrow’s 
investment opportunity.    
Value also emerges in relation to homeownership because becoming a homeowner or 
facilitating the property ownership of others through real estate brokerage or mortgage lending 
services, can increase and enhance multiple forms of value.  Participation in homeownership, 
either for oneself or in support of someone else, promises to increase appraised property value, 
perceived community value, household wealth, and inculcate a broader economic flourishing at a 
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community level and a national one.  But how does one engage with and analyze these multiple 
forms of value in relation to homeownership? 
Economic anthropologists and sociologists have long been interested in analyzing the 
social roots and lives of things, even when they are bought and sold as commodities without 
history or connection (Appadurai 1986; Caliskan and Callon 2010; Zelizer 2011).  In noting that 
things have a life or “career” that exceeds the economic transactions in which they participate, 
scholars have argued that we cannot understand exchange, consumption, and value without 
attending to histories, cultural meanings, and the dense web of relationships that encircle the 
things we buy, sell, and own.  Rather than suggesting that this social dimension exists in a 
parallel universe to the coldly economic, economic sociologists and anthropologists insist that 
“the social” is integral in the creation or dissolution of what we take to be things’ “pure” market 
value (Graeber 2011; Granovetter 1985; Zaloom 2005). As such, homeownership, and the 
housing value chain that it brings into being, makes for an ideal site to examine the ways in 
which different forms of value coalesce, conflict, undermine, and intersect with one another and 
are rendered accessible or illusive for the differently positioned actors and agencies who pursue 
them.    
 
Risk and Opportunity 
Risk, like crisis, can be economically productive for those who are well-positioned to 
make use of it.  In Against the Gods (1996), investor Peter Bernstein asserts that “[t]he capacity 
to manage risk, and with it the appetite to take risk and make forward-looking choices, are key 
elements of the energy that drives the economy forward” (3).  This is because risk presupposes 
an opportunity to turn uncertainty, and the possibility of loss, into a source of financial gain.  In 
homeownership, risk and opportunity are concurrent.  Property ownership entails risk, but 
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ownership also promises opportunities for wealth building, both for home buyers and the housing 
professionals that support their transition into ownership.  Mortgage lenders, real estate brokers, 
real estate investment gurus, and housing policy makers manage individuals’ expectations and 
understandings of risk and opportunity in housing to position themselves as market experts, 
mediators, and gatekeepers, as well as to present the act of buying a home as a space of upward 
mobility and transformation.   
Risk assessment and management, in particular, is a key aspect of mortgage lending 
professionals’ work as housing market mediators that connect individual households with global 
financial capital.  The belief that the risks of the housing market can be accurately measured and 
managed is what allows homeownership to be such an appealing investment opportunity for 
individuals, communities, and lenders.  But in Discriminating Risk (2005: 5), Paul Langley 
cautions against the assumed effectiveness of risk management practices in mortgage lending, 
noting that  
The language of financial risk is an economic language, imbued with the legitimacy of 
‘formal rationality,’ but the risk criteria used to decide who gets a mortgage and who 
does not lose their ‘formal’ patina when one investigates their origins and the way they 
are implemented.  Their origins show that contemporary decision-making rules are a mix 
of rules of thumb, accepted norms, and theoretical assumptions imposed on reality.    
 
The “formal patina” and “rationality” that we trust is at work in financial risk management allow 
individuals and institutions to engage with and assume risks without fearing that a catastrophe 
lies behind every corner.  The willingness of households and financial institutions to make 
themselves party to thirty-year mortgage loan agreements speaks to the ways in which risk can 
be transformed into an opportunity to act and reap benefits in so doing.  But, as Chapter 2, 
Inequality in U.S. Housing Policy from 1870 to the Present, reveals, the thirty-year, self-
amortizing mortgage loan is the product of a particular set of historical events, economic 
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circumstances, and political priorities in the United States.  This confluence did not eliminate the 
risks that mortgagees and mortgagors assume when they enter into a legally binding contract to 
facilitate homeownership, but it did allow those risks to appear more manageable, commonplace, 
and worth assuming.   
  In the aggregate, the actions taken by differently positioned housing market participants 
on the basis of their confidence in effective risk management can, in turn, create greater risks.  
As Paul Langley (2008) and Donald Mackenzie (2006) both articulate with regard to risk 
management in mortgage lending and hedging practices, respectively, market actors’ lack of 
understanding of the ways in which their individual decisions come together to produce 
“systemic risk” and “correlation default” may be a key factor in market failure.  MacKenzie 
details the fall of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a respected and successful hedge 
fund that started employing a new risk management technique to better balance its portfolio.  
What the managers and traders of LTCM did not foresee was the extent to which their respected 
position within the market would lead other hedge funds to adopt similar risk management 
tactics, eventually transforming their strategy to manage risk into one that compounded it 
(MacKenzie 2006).   
Paul Langley describes a similar kind of market performativity at work in mortgage 
lending, in which a set of widely held “calculative devices,” including “credit reporting, 
securitization, and interest-only and adjustable rate mortgages came into being…” (2008: 472), 
legitimized risk-based pricing,11 and made subprime lending seem like a rational, financially 
sound form of market expansion. Echoing the concerns of Janet Roitman and others with respect 
                                                 
11 Risk-based pricing is a lending model that serves financially diverse borrowers, but charges 
higher interest rates and fees for borrowers who are seen as less creditworthy (due to credit 
history, score, income, etc.).   
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to the use of the crisis label to turn the culmination of a series of practices, values, and beliefs 
into a culturally aberrant, unpredictable event, Langley disputes the popular belief that subprime 
lending practices were the root of the mortgage crisis.  He notes that subprime lending cannot be 
separated from the larger trajectory of the calculative devices that allowed them to arise in the 
first place.  This resonates with the experiences and perceptions of the market that mortgage 
lending professionals offer in Chapter 3, Financing Dreams: Managing Mortgage Risk and 
Regulation.     
As Miranda Joseph notes in Debt to Society: Accounting for Life Under Capitalism 
(2014), key site for the intensification of household financial risk, “in addition to retirement 
savings invested in a volatile stock market, is of course the housing market, or, maybe more 
precisely, the mortgage market” (298).  The financial risks and legal entangments assumed when 
purchasing a property are weighed against a longstanding idea that, in the long term at least, 
“real estate always goes up.” But even if this were always the case in the aggregate, it does not 
mean that owners may not sometimes be faced with liquidity problems that require that they sell 
their assets at a time of price depreciation.  Nonetheless, in the world of real estate investment 
seminars that I explore in Chapter 5, Opportunity and Crisis in the U.S. Housing Market, 
seminar presenters use the belief that real estate always goes up in concert with the opportunities 
to buy distressed residential properties that the financial crisis provided to lure prospective 
investors into the real estate market.  They suggest that if real estate always goes up eventually, 
buyers will be able to take advantage of the market’s cyclical ups and downs, purchase properties 
at a discount, and then reap a profit when the market, inevitably, goes up again.  
In real estate investment seminars, one person’s housing crisis can become another 
person’s housing opportunity.  But notions of risk and opportunity go hand in hand across social 
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and economic life.  Consider such aphorisms as “nothing ventured, nothing gained” and “no risk, 
no reward.”  In the United States, the presumed simultaneity of risk and opportunity in the 
economy becomes a proving ground for those individuals with enough drive and confidence to 
“seize the day” and “make their own luck,” and “take the bull by the horns.”  In order to become 
prototypical “self-made” men and women and tap into the housing value chain, one must first be 
willing to assume some level of risk.  Real estate brokers and mortgage lending professionals do 
not only encourage current prospective homeowners to participate in housing market risk by 
facilitating the purchase or sale of property.  They, too, assume risk when they choose to work in 
real estate.  But this works allow them to tap into the housing value chain. However, their access 
is contingent upon their level of social and financial capital and where and when they enter the 
housing market.  They can only extract value from the chain if they can fashion themselves into 
market mediators, gatekeepers, and middlemen in others’ risk-taking, and do so when the 
prevailing market conditions are good.  As this dissertation will reveal, while homeownership 
and the housing value chain that encircles it appear to be an accessible way for mortgage lenders, 
realtors, real estate investors, policymakers, and home buyers and owners to access and generate 
economic wealth and human flourishing, housing market participants must assume and 
effectively manage risk in order to access it.  
 
Freedom & Autonomy 
 In the United States and elsewhere (cf. Hartman 2017; Murphy 2015; Zhang 2011), the 
appeal of owning one’s own home is often linked to notions of freedom and autonomy.  This 
connection relates to the bundle of legal rights that ownership provides, including possession, 
control, exclusion, disposition, and quiet enjoyment. Homeowners can use their homes as they 
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see fit, keep others from accessing them, and lease, sell or pass them on as they wish. These are 
the rights that allow homeowners to feel that they are kings and queens of their castles and able 
to exercise sovereign power over their properties.  As I will discuss in Chapter 2, Inequality in 
U.S. Housing Policy from 1870 to the Present” this dimension of ownership was particularly 
appealing to recently arrived immigrant and working-class households in the United States who 
had few opportunities to exercise control over other domains of their daily lives (Garb 2005). It 
was also used to lure settlers into new parts of the nascent United States through the Homestead 
Act, which promised land ownership to anyone willing to move to the frontier, claim land, and 
render it “productive” through farming and other capitalist value-generating endeavors (Bratt 
2013).   
Ideals of freedom and autonomy also permeated the descriptions that real estate brokers 
and mortgage lenders gave me of their reasons for choosing to work in their respective fields.  As 
independent contractors, real estate brokers’ compensation is directly tied to their ability to buy 
and sell homes for their clients at prices and volumes high enough to generate a steady stream of 
commissions.  And while some mortgage-lending professionals have base salaries, most of them 
rely upon transaction-based commissions and fees for the bulk of their remuneration.  While 
commissions-based compensation can render workers vulnerable to market ups and downs 
without a salary or benefits to fall back on, it can be repackaged as an opportunity to exercise 
autonomy as prototypically “self-made” men and women and “companies of one” (Lane 2011).  
In Chapter 5, Opportunity and Crisis in the U.S. Housing Market, I describe and analyze how 
real estate seminar speakers frame residential property investment as a way to achieve “financial 
freedom.” This framing is all the more powerful because the speakers insisted that such freedom 
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would be nearly impossible for audience members to achieve through the traditional paths of 
upward mobility: hard work, education, and thrift.   
 
(I)nequality 
Achieving homeownership, like pursuing a college education or gaining U.S. citizenship, 
is often framed as an effective, do-it-yourself socioeconomic equalizer.  In the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) secretary Ben Carson’s comments in the epigraph, we 
see this understanding of homeownership’s equalizing power at work.  HUD supports 
homeownership, according to Carson, because homeownership supports “the development of our 
people economically and in every other way” (2017).  According to this logic, expanding 
homeownership can be used as a tool to combat existing social and economic inequality, since 
becoming a homeowner will allow an individual to tap into a secure, enduring form of asset-
based wealth while also providing their household with shelter and the social and psychological 
benefits of a secure place to call their own.   
But expanding homeownership requires unequally distributed social and financial capital 
to access it, and more of the same to produce increasing home values. Policies aimed at 
increasing homeownership do not diminish inequality but rather ensures that homeowners are 
better off than their renting counterparts (Desmond 2016).  Further, recent studies counter the 
truism that “real estate always goes up” and that owning a home improves the lives and financial 
trajectories of all owners (Salamon and MacTavish 2017; Shlay 2015).  As I address in Chapter 
6, Homeownership as a Cure for Housing Vacancy, accessing property ownership requires 
different forms of capital in different locales, but it also provides owners with different 
opportunities to extract value from their housing investments.  In an area with appreciating 
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property values but many homes in severe states of disrepair, for example, housing prices may be 
cheap, buyers may only be able to enter the marketplace if they can pay cash upfront.  This limits 
the number of households who can access homeownership and possibly reap the benefits of 
buying low and selling high. In an area with low or depreciating home values, buyers may face 
similar challenges obtaining financing, and they may not reap any financial benefit from owning 
versus renting, as their home’s value may not appreciate enough to cover the costs they incur 
when they decide to sell.   
Still, as I explore in Chapter 2, Making the Market: U.S. Housing Policy from 1870 to the 
Present one of the key pathways of the homeownership complex, government housing policy, 
has framed homeownership as a universal path to household stability and economic flourishing. 
In my research I found that while homeownership may be a good investment and a powerful 
mobility tool for some households (in particular geographic contexts and times in larger global, 
national, and local economic cycles), it is by no means a universally beneficial or equalizing 
force. The institution of homeownership is predicated on and reproduces inequality. It creates 
opportunities for those who can invest and participate in the housing value chain and perpetuates 
disparities between renters and owners, rich and poor, and white and minority households 
(Desmond 2016; Jefferson 2013; Patillo-McCoy 1999; Shlay 2015).   
 
Orientations 
 As I mention above, I initially set out to study the household-level effects of foreclosure 
and downward mobility after the mortgage crisis.  But after conducting preliminary research on 
foreclosure prevention work in Chicago, Illinois in 2011 and Oakland, California in 2012, I 
noticed that the ways in which homeownership and the housing market were being talked 
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about—in the media, by the housing not-for-profit staff I encountered, and by current and 
prospective homeowners themselves—did not match what I had anticipated. Homeownership 
was resurgent, and it seemed as if few people cared about foreclosures and foreclosed 
homeowners anymore.  Instead, the housing stakeholders I encountered were committing 
themselves to facilitating and creating opportunities for the next crop of homeowners.     
 I followed the remaking of homeownership as a cultural ideal and economic good 
through my research methodology and choice of interlocutors. Even before I conceived of a 
homeownership complex or a housing value chain, I saw the reproduction of homeownership as 
an economic and cultural project that requires the work of multiple actors positioned at different 
points within a larger field (Bourdieu 1993).  Instead of focusing on individual homeowners, I 
decided to spend time with people whose livelihood depended upon selling homeownership: real 
estate brokers, mortgage lenders, housing policymakers, not-for-profit staff and community 
organizers, and eventually, real estate investment seminar speakers. My project radiated out from 
the connections I made in my first few months in the field.  I also took a real estate licensing 
course and became a real estate broker during my fieldwork, which placed me alongside aspiring 
real estate brokers as they planned for and attempted to launch new or re-establish past careers in 
real estate.   
My decision to focus on the making (and the makers) of a housing market that relies on 
homeownership’s cultural and economic value in the United States  follows in the footsteps of 
Constance Perin’s 1977 book, Everything in Its Place: Social Order and Land Use in America, 
which focuses on real estate developers, property owners, government officials, and city planners 
active in the shaping of real estate zoning laws, norms, and values in the United States.  In the 
years since Perin’s book was published, several other anthropologists have turned their attention 
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to market-making processes. These ethnographies often focus on the making of financial markets 
(Fisher 2012; Ho 2009; Preda 2017; Riles 2011; Zaloom 2005) and attend to the entanglements 
of objects, people, and practices that traverse different regimes of value as they construct and tap 
into different kinds of value chains (Orta 2013; Thrift 2006; Tsing 2013, 2005).  This dissertation 
also draws inspiration from classical and contemporary anthropologists and sociologists’ 
approaches to the imbrications of economic and social value (Graeber 2011; Granovetter 1985; 
Malinowski 1984[1922]; Mauss 2000) and market performativity (Callon 1998; Callon and 
Caliskan 2010).   
 My study of homeownership’s multiple dimensions and stakeholders took place over the 
course of several years. First, I studied foreclosure prevention work in Chicago, Illinois and 
Oakland, California in the summers of 2011 and 2012, respectively.  My research in Oakland 
was funded by the University of Illinois Department of Anthropology. I then conducted fifteen 
months of dissertation fieldwork in Chicago, funded by the National Science Foundation, 
between June 2014 and September 2015. After the formal end of my dissertation research, I have 
continued to track the twists and turns of U.S. homeownership in the midst of a resurgent 
economy and housing market through housing industry publications and listservs, intermittent 
news from interlocutors, and informal monitoring of Chicago’s housing market trends. 
My research methods included participant observation, open-ended interviews with over 
eighty housing stakeholders, shadowing housing agency staff, realtors, and mortgage lending 
professionals, and textual analysis of real estate and mortgage lending education materials, trade 
publications, and accounts of the housing market in the popular press.  Because of my 
involvement with the Program for Community Revitalization (“PCR”), a localized housing 
market recovery initiative that I describe in Chapter 6, Homeownership as a Cure for Housing 
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Vacancy, I spent time with PCR “sister” agency staff who worked in not-for-profit organizations 
in neighborhoods across Chicago’s south and west sides, which allowed me to see how the same 
pro-homeownership policies were put into practice at the local level. My preliminary research on 
foreclosure prevention counseling and activism, as well as the relationships I developed with 
PCR participants, also gave me a window into the not-for-profit organizations that are the foot 
soldiers of government housing initiatives and agendas.  My interviews and shadowing with 
realtors, mortgage lenders, and real estate investors brought me into other geographic, social, and 
economic orbits.  Some of the people I encountered were successful and able to dictate where in 
the city they worked and with what types of clients.  But many housing professionals I met were 
struggling to find their feet, either because they had just entered the field (as was the case with 
most of my real estate licensing classmates) or because they were finding it difficult to hold onto 
their careers in a changing, post-crisis marketplace.   
 I approached my research subjects as someone who was enthusiastic about the housing 
market and the future of homeownership, but by no means expertly informed.  Following 
longstanding traditions of ethnographic fieldwork, I adopted the position of a novice eager to 
learn how the world worked from expert interlocutors (Malinowski 1984 [1922]; Searle 2016).  
Whenever possible, I embodied this status as a kind of research intern/volunteer, helping not-for-
profit housing agencies with mundane tasks or assisting realtors with staging and open houses.  
Although I was twenty-nine when I began my research, I used my student status and self-
presentation as a way to position myself as a non-threatening, curious, and respectful presence 
when I conducted participant observations in real estate transactions, mortgage lending 
processes, and housing market recovery initiative meetings and training sessions. I also used this 
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status to deflect real estate broker and mortgage lenders’ occasional attempts to sell me on 
becoming a homeowner myself.   
 Still, in spite of my best attempts to be unobtrusive and unobjectionable, my own gender, 
racial, and class identities in a highly segregated city occasionally came to the fore.  As a married 
white woman, my husband’s position as an attorney at a large law firm allowed me to live in one 
of the most affluent neighborhoods in Chicago during the course of my fieldwork. When my 
interlocutors asked where I lived, I was honest, but always quick to say that we rented and that 
we had gotten “a really good deal.”  Still, my attempts to conduct participant observation in 
housing markets throughout the city was sometimes met with skepticism, such as when I 
volunteered to assist with a vacant property survey in Davis Park, an experience I describe in 
Chapter 6. But there were other times when my racial and class privilege were useful in gaining 
the trust and confidence of white, middle-class housing policymakers, lenders, and realtors who 
felt free to speak openly about what they took to be the racial and class dimensions of widening 
homeownership opportunities and the roots of the mortgage crisis.  I felt ambivalent about the 
times when aspects of my identity gave me easy access to people whose political and social 
views I did not share.  But at the same time, as Laura Nader pointed out in her groundbreaking 
article on studying up in 1972, if we want to confront and dismantle inequality, we need to study 
the powerful and the privileged to do so.   
Although I spoke with housing professionals with different racial, class, and ethnic 
identities and different political and market orientations and agendas, I mostly felt that I could be 
an empathetic audience for the trials and tribulations of all of my interlocutors, even if I did not 
agree with them.  Over time, the training and insider knowledge I absorbed through classes, 
meetings, workshops and shadowing sessions helped me ask informed questions and grasp, to 
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the best of my ability at least, “the [housing market] native’s point of view, his relation to life, 
his world” (Malinowski 1984[1922]: 25).  However, as with all studies of human beings, the 
worlds I grasped were partial.  For example, because I focused on professional practices, values, 
and ideas, it was sometimes difficult to ask about and integrate personal information gathered in 
the course of my research with interlocutors’ professional personae.  Like Martha Kirchner,12 a 
mortgage loan underwriter I feature in Chapter 3, I often felt that my dissertation research and 
analysis has been predicated on “searching for errant threads” and trying to stitch them together 
in a way that accurately reflects part of the underlying story of homeownership in the United 
States.   
 
Framing Homeownership as a Cultural Phenomenon 
 Anthropologists study all dimensions of the human experience, and housing and the 
institutional apparatuses that bring it into being are undoubtedly part of that mosaic. And yet, 
until recently, relatively few anthropologists have made homeownership a central focus of their 
research (cf. Hartman 2017; Jefferson 2013; Murphy 2015; Stout 2016; Zhang 2010).  To a large 
extent, housing questions in the United States have been ceded to policy-oriented urban planners, 
political scientists, economists, and to historians (Ball 2009; Garb 2005; Hornstein 2005; Jackson 
1985; Rohe and Watson 2007; Satter 2010; Stuart 2003).  These scholars have produced 
insightful work on the inner workings of housing finance and real estate, immigrant, minority, 
and white homeownership experiences, and the design and implementation of U.S. housing 
policy. I draw on much of this work throughout this dissertation.   
                                                 
12 To product the privacy of the people who agreed to participate in my study, all interlocutor and 
agency names are pseudonyms.   
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But the ways that homeownership is valued, produced, and practiced is also culturally 
specific.  As Edward Murphy notes in his study of the contested formalization of residential 
property rights in For a Proper Home: Housing Rights in the Margins of Urban Chile: 1960-
2010 (2015), “far from being a mere legal contract, property is a relationship that comes together 
at the intersection of domains generally treated as wholly separate: the social, the economic, the 
political, the cultural, and the spatial” (25).  The particular version of property ownership that 
emerges out of this nexus is dependent upon the local context.  In Latin American countries such 
as Chile and Mexico, enshrined constitutional rights to housing mean that citizens explicitly 
connect property rights to citizenship and use these connections to lobby their governments for 
housing access and ownership (Hartman 2017; Murphy 2015). In China, expanding private 
property ownership and its limitations indexes national and local struggles over who can achieve 
social and economic mobility under socialism (Zhang 2010).  And in the United States, property 
ownership has been taken as evidence of good political and economic citizenship (Dudley 2000; 
Jefferson 2013; Perin 1977), moral discipline (Stout 2018) and as Katherine Newman and Ben 
Carson assert, respectively, a primary marker of “membership [in] the middle class” (1993: 102) 
and the key to “development of our people, economically and in every other way” (2017). 
In The Vanishing Hectare: Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania, Katherine 
Verdery points out that property relations can be “about everything: power, practices, 
institutions, land, the transformation of value, social relations, privatization, class formation, and 
so on” (2003: 32).  Given residential property’s connections to multiple domains of social and 
economic life, it is an ideal subject for anthropological examination.  But when I explained my 
disciplinary background to my interlocutors, or my project to friends and acquaintances in other 
fields, I was often met with surprise. Perhaps housing’s associations with public policy and 
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planning, economics, and demography make it seem better suited for other disciplinary 
approaches. Maybe those who own homes, however precariously debt-financed that ownership 
might be, are thought to be, by and large, too financially secure to warrant ethnographic 
championing.  And although interest in economic practices and beliefs as cultural phenomena 
has been longstanding in anthropology, perhaps homeownership has been viewed as too 
pedestrian for the growing coterie of scholars interested in studying up the economic hierarchy 
with financial elites (Fisher 2012; Holmes 2013; Miyazaki 2013).   
The problem with studying homeownership might be even more basic than that, however.  
As Katherine Verdery addressed in her assertion that property relations can be “about anything,” 
homeownership might just hold too many meanings, and have become too much a part of the 
doxa of the United States and elsewhere, to be taken up as an object ethnographic inquiry. While 
I share Verdery’s recognition that property relations involve and invoke a host of social, 
political, economic, and cultural questions, and believe that homeownership is deeply embedded 
in the cultural and economic life in the United States. I contend that homeownership is too 




This dissertation is organized into seven chapters that are separated by three “frames” 
that introduce the theoretical and historical context for the chapters that follow them. In Frame I, 
Making the Market, I give an overview of the importance of history for understanding how, 
overtime, U.S. housing policy contributed to the formation of a homeownership complex and 
facilitated the creation of a particular version of homeownership and kind of housing market.  In 
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Chapter 2, I use this historical lens to analyze key moments when a pro-homeownership agenda 
both responded to and shaped the social and economic landscape of the United States. These 
moments reveal how homeownership has long been promoted and used as a cure for a host of 
social problems, including overcrowding and disease, financial crises, low consumer confidence 
and spending, poor housing conditions, uneven economic development, and racial and ethnic 
inequality. Tracing the history of housing policy also reveals the ways in which homeownership, 
and the value it generates for some, is interconnected with racial, ethnic, and class-based 
inequality in the United States.  
 In Frame II, Market Makers or Market Made, I lay the groundwork for an analysis of 
mortgage lending professionals and real estate brokers as both active participants in the creation 
of homeownership and the U.S. housing market and constrained by the same. Chapter 3, 
Financing Dreams: Managing Mortgage Risk and Regulation, focuses on the experiences and 
perspectives of mortgage lending professionals and Chapter 4, Selling Dreams: Realtors as 
Market Mediators, does the same for real estate brokers.  I see mortgage lending and real estate 
professionals as market mediators, gatekeepers, and middlemen who forge connections between 
different regimes of value and social action when they connect individual home buyers, sellers, 
and owners to one another and integrate them within the housing value chain.  At the same time, 
I take my interlocutors’ experiences of constraint seriously, acknowledging the ways in which 
they experience “the market” as both a space of autonomy and opportunity and a force that 
shapes their professional lives and the economy as a whole.  
In Frame III, More Ownership!, I explore how and why creating  new homeownership is 
put forward as a response to housing problems and economic crisis more generally in different 
settings.   Chapter 5, Opportunity and Crisis in the U.S. Housing Market, and Chapter 6, 
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Homeownership as a Cure for Housing Vacancy, analyze two arenas where residential real estate 
is framed as a source of household and community-level economic growth and opportunity: real 
estate investment seminars and a federally-funded, locally managed housing market recovery 
program.  In both arenas, property ownership is held up as a site of potential opportunity for 
greater levels of autonomy, freedom, financial wellbeing, and revitalization. Little attention is 
paid to the effects of local context or to the ways in which different amounts of financial and 
social capital influence just how beneficial property ownership will be for individuals and 
communities.  
The dissertation concludes with a discussion of what might lie ahead for U.S. 
homeownership in Chapter 7. It includes an analysis of the pitfalls of the current version of the 
homeownership complex, as well as a few lay recommendations for ways to better align the 
interests of the professional housing stakeholders with interests of households who need the 
shelter, stability, and opportunity that homeownership can provide.  In the current moment, the 
homeownership complex is bent on producing new owners, not sustaining households or 
supporting community flourishing. But that does not mean we cannot create a framework that 
would make safe, affordable, and secure housing more accessible to all.   
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FRAME I: MAKING THE MARKET 
 
The history of U.S. housing policy illuminates how longstanding disparities of class, race, 
national origin, religion, and ethnicity in the United States have undergird a universally 
promoted, but not universally achievable, dream of homeownership. While the United States 
achieved a dramatic rise in property ownership over the latter half of the 20th century,13 not all 
households could participate in it equally. As Chapter 2 will show, this disparity in access to 
homeownership and the benefits it provides has been baked in through decades of biased 
policymaking and practice.   
Whatever its stated intentions and goals, U.S. housing policy legitimized the redlining 
and abandonment of urban communities in favor of suburban growth and development (Gans 
1967; Jackson 1985); allowed for non-existent, discriminatory, and predatory lending practices 
in immigrant communities and communities of color (Immergluck 2010; Satter 2010); and 
sanctioned, through inaction, the abysmal rental housing options available low-income and poor 
households who can not afford to become homeowners (Desmond 2016). All the while, the 
federal government has framed its interventions in the U.S. housing market as for the benefit and 
security of all households and in the interests of the economy as a whole. At certain times and for 
certain kinds of households, the promise of homeownership has delivered—but not always, and 
never for all. 
As both instrumental to and a symbol of the “American Dream,” homeownership has 
become a cornerstone economic, cultural, and political institution in the United States. Despite 
the financial and legal entailments it demands, it has also been framed as a path to freedom, 
                                                 
13 The homeownership rate climbed from 43.6% in 1940 to a high of 69% in 2006, according to 
the U.S. census and the Federal Reserve Banks, respectively.  
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autonomy, and opportunity.  As I laid out in the introduction, the existence of a homeownership 
complex has played an integral role in creating and sustaining homeownership’s promise and 
power in the United States.  In the chapter that follows, I focus on one key dimension of that 
complex: U.S. housing policy and the network of federal and local institutions that create, enact, 
and enforce it.  By tracing the political, social, and economic dimensions of pro-ownership 
policies and their uneven effects over the last century and a half, I will provide a cultural history 
of homeownership’s hegemony in the United States.  I will also account for the ways in which 
national political goals have intersected with economic imperatives in ways that have profoundly 
shaped what homeownership means, and what material and ideological effects it produces, in 




CHAPTER 2: INEQUALITY IN U.S. HOUSING POLICY FROM 1870 TO THE 
PRESENT 
 
That our people should live in their own homes is a sentiment deep in the heart of 
our race and of American life. We know that as yet it is not universally possible to 
all. We know that many of our people must at times live under other conditions. 
But they never sing songs about a pile of rent receipts. To own one's own home is 
a physical expression of individualism, of enterprise, of independence, and of the 
freedom of spirit. 
—U.S. President Herbert Hoover, 193114 
 
Today, all across the country, I say to millions of young working couples who are 
just starting out: By the time your children are ready to start the first grade, we 
want you to be able to own your own home.  All of our country will reap 
enormous benefits if we achieve this goal. Home ownership encourages savings 
and investment. When a family buys a home, the ripple effect is enormous. It 
means new homeowner consumers. They need more durable goods, like washers 
and dryers, refrigerators and water heaters. And if more families could buy new 
homes or older homes, more hammers will be pounding, more saws will be 
buzzing. Homebuilders and home fixers will be put to work. When we boost the 
number of homeowners in our country, we strengthen our economy, create jobs, 
build up the middle class, and build better citizens.  
–—U.S. President Bill Clinton, 199515 
 
Long seen as instrumental to and a symbol of the “American Dream,” homeownership is 
a cornerstone institution in the United States. Despite the financial and legal entailments it 
demands, it has also been framed as a path to freedom, autonomy, and opportunity.  As I laid out 
in the introduction, the existence of a homeownership complex has played an integral role in 
creating and sustaining homeownership’s promise and power in the United States.  In the chapter 
that follows, I focus on one key dimension of that complex: U.S. housing policy and the network 
of federal and local institutions that create, enact and enforce it.  By tracing the political, social, 
and economic dimensions of-pro-ownership policies and their uneven effects over the last 
                                                 
14 Address to the White House Conference on Home Building and Homeownership, December 2, 
1931 
15 Remarks on the National Homeownership Strategy, June 5, 1995 
 
 36 
century and a half, I provide a cultural history of homeownership’s hegemony in the United 
States.  I also account for the ways in which political goals have intersected with economic 
imperatives in ways that have profoundly shaped what homeownership means, and what material 
and ideological effects it produces, in different epochs.  
 
Homeownership and Citizenship in the Late 19th Century 
While homeownership may now be taken for granted as an economic good and cultural 
ideal, its current position as the ideal form of physical shelter, vehicle for financial investment, 
and source of familial stability, and thus worthy of government support, was not inevitable.  As 
historian Kenneth Jackson notes, “although housing involves the largest capital costs of any 
human necessity, for the first three centuries of urban settlement in North America the provision 
of shelter was not regarded as an appropriate responsibility of government” (Jackson 1985: 
191).16 Even before direct government support for homeownership, however, some groups 
                                                 
16 This is not to argue that property ownership was unimportant in North America prior to the 
20th century. Legal ownership over native lands on the basis of its “unproductive” status was an 
essential goal and ideological and material colonization strategy for European settlers and later, 
for citizens of the rapidly expanding territories of the United States (Bratt 2007; Locke 1993 
[1689]).  Beyond the encouragement and bankrolling of New World explorations and the 
exploitation of native peoples and lands that followed them, early U.S. government involvement 
in promoting land ownership took the form of grants and rewards for veterans and others who 
were willing to settle and farm in the United States’ expanding Western territories.  Under the 
Homestead Act of 1862, for example, citizens were awarded ownership rights over up to 160 
acres of land west of the Mississippi River if they settled and cultivated it (Vale 2007). In 
addition to motivating white Americans to move into areas of the country where Native 
Americans were still prevalent and establish dominance there, the 1862 Act and the 1866 
amendment that followed it were aimed to disrupt plantation-style land tenure and establish 
smaller farms that were not reliant upon slave labor. Similar to later government initiatives that 
promoted and facilitated property ownership, the Homestead Acts provided key opportunities for 
autonomy, upward mobility, and prosperity for some Americans.  Although the Acts were open 
to African American applicants, for example, discrimination in the awarding of lands made it far 




prioritized owning homes of their own.  In the 1870s, when immigration, industrialization, and 
urbanization processes brought more people into cities to live and work, owning a home became 
an important economic survival strategy and part of a claim to full U.S. citizenship.  Historian 
Margaret Garb attributes this to working-class immigrant households’ tendencies to use their 
housing productively—by renting out extra rooms to boarders, growing large vegetable gardens 
in their backyards, taking in laundry and sewing, and using the house and land itself as collateral 
for multiple short-term loans that, in turn, facilitated sustained ownership.  Such subsistence 
strategies were especially important given the job insecurity that many experienced when they 
moved to growing U.S. cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.    
Garb illustrates the importance of homeownership for working-class immigrant 
households by analyzing an instance of working class, inter-ethnic solidarity that emerged in 
relation to housing rights after Chicago’s Great Fire. In 1872, men of German, Scandinavian, and 
Irish descent gathered to protest against the city council’s proposed prohibition against wood 
construction17 homes within Chicago’s city limits. 
Without assurances that that the men could rebuild in wood, many, unable to 
afford new houses of brick, believed they would find home ownership beyond 
their means.  Home ownership, the men argued, secured their economic autonomy 
in the industrial city and signaled their hard-won status as independent 
Americans.  European immigrants, ironically, were among the first Americans to 
claim urban home ownership, property rights in a single-family house set on a city 
lot, as the symbol of the ‘American standard of living,’ as the American Dream. 
[Garb 2005: 11]   
 
In the late 1800s, homeownership served multiple purposes for Chicago’s working classes. It 
provided security against layoffs and economic downturns by offering opportunities to augment 
household incomes; it gave the household a sense of independence and status that industrial labor 
                                                 
17 Proponents of the ordinance cited that wooden homes were more likely to catch fire, but Garb 
points out that banning wooden homes was also a calculated attempt to undercut working class 
immigrant households’ abilities to own property and raise their families in the city.   
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relations did not afford them; and it represented the equality of opportunity that many had left 
their home countries to pursue. But purchasing property was not an easy or straightforward 
process. Households that aspired to own property had to borrow from building associations, 
relatives, and moneylenders who charged high interest rates to purchase a small house that easily 
cost two to three times their yearly earnings.  And in order to make loan payments on their 
properties, families often ended up with a lower standard-of-living than they would have 
experienced as renters.  They made homeownership work by finding additional income sources, 
such as by renting out rooms and sending their children into the workforce early, or by forgoing 
basic household maintenance and making do without indoor plumbing facilities.   
While many working-class immigrant households prioritized ownership despite these 
high costs and sacrifices, urban middle class households did not share their fervor.  According to 
Garb, late 19th century Chicago was 
‘not a city of homeowners and America was not a nation that touted home 
ownership.  In northern cities in the years following the Civil War, as 
manufacturing replaced land property as a source of wealth and housing competed 
with corporate stock and government bonds for capital investments of aspiring 
entrepreneurs and striving professionals, home ownership rates hovered around 25 
percent in Cincinnati, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Chicago.  
Of course, residents needed shelter. But underlying the decision of whether to rent 
or own, or move to a multifamily apartment building or a single-family house, 
was the question of where and how to allocate household resources, whether 
putting significant portions of household income into residential property in the 
form of a down payment on a home would yield economic and social benefits for 
the household. [2005: 16-17]  
 
Garb’s description illustrates the constructed nature of homeownership’s cultural and economic 
value in the United States. While owning a home eventually became a cornerstone of middle 
class status and household wealth building, in the 19th century, property ownership was only 
appealing to households if it would yield “economic and social benefits” not attainable 
elsewhere.  Many middle class households preferred to spend their housing dollars on rental 
 
 39 
properties and furniture, and invest excess income in businesses or the stock market.  With less 
social and financial capital and more of a need to establish themselves as citizens through 
property, homeownership provided more benefits to working class households than it did to more 
affluent families.   
The transformation of homeownership from an immigrant, working class priority that 
was tied up with aspirations for financial security, autonomy and citizenship to a prerequisite for 
middle class status began with a new level of cultural concern with the social and physical 
effects of urban life in multifamily dwellings.  Beginning in the 1880s, reformers in the nascent 
fields of social work and public health began promoting the benefits of single-family homes for 
household organization, cohesion, and physical wellbeing, contrasting them with the multifamily 
dwellings where working class, immigrant, and non-white households lived. Tenement-style 
multifamily housing, in particular, was portrayed as overcrowded and riddled with disease.  
This new equation of single-family dwellings with healthful living conditions dovetailed 
with currents of xenophobic alarm at the rapid industrialization of American cities and the influx 
of immigrants and domestic migrants that accompanied it. New public health-driven housing 
policies disproportionately affected the working class and immigrant households who were most 
likely to use their homes intensively by renting out rooms, adding on, and doubling up with 
extended family members to lessen expensive housing costs, as well as least able to afford indoor 
plumbing. In the framing of public health and hygiene crusaders, multifamily living 
arrangements that allowed households to make ends meet, care for their families, and 
incrementally improve their economic and social positions came to be seen as pathological. 
Reformers claimed that such conditions were damaging to the moral fabric of the family (due to 
the lack of privacy and the frequency with which poor and immigrant women and children 
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worked outside of the home) and dangerous to the public (because this type of housing was often 
seen as a fire-prone incubator of disease). 
While the Tenement and Factory Ordinance of 1881 was ostensibly designed to better 
protect workers at home and on the factory floor, it was never implemented in an industrial 
context due to pushback from Chicago’s business community.  Its unequal implementation in 
housing, however, contributed to the legitimacy of class, ethnicity, and housing tenure 
hierarchies in the city.  For example, the ordinance empowered Chicago’s new sanitary police to 
enter and inspect any multifamily residential building between sunrise and sunset, and to remove 
individuals they believed were suffering from (and contributing to) communicable diseases 
against their will.  They had no parallel authority over single-family housing, where more 
affluent, native-born families tended to live. 
The association of substandard housing with the ethnic, racial, and class identities or 
perceived cultural deficiencies of its occupants has a long history in the United States and 
elsewhere (cf. Fennell 2016; Hirsch 1998; Lewis 1961; Murphy 2015; Satter 2010).  Akin to 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s deterministic use of a “culture of poverty” theory in his 1965 policy 
report on the plight of African American households, which in turn drew on anthropologist Oscar 
Lewis’s ethnographic analysis of poor households in the United States and Mexico (1961; 1968), 
the hierarchical ordering of where and how people of different racial, national or class 
backgrounds live is part of the foundation of disparity upon which the homeownership complex 
was built.  In 19th century Chicago, the primary distinctions drawn were between native-born 
Chicagoans and different waves of emigrant arrivals.  For example, in Chicago Health 
Commissioner DeWolf’s housing framework, 
Native-born Americans lived in ‘well-furnished’ flats; Germans tended to occupy 
tenements that were ‘comfortably built, but having less of the so-called modern 
 
 41 
conveniences.’  That native-born and German workers tended to congregate in 
higher-skilled and better-paying jobs, thus enabling them to afford more 
comfortable housing, did not apparently occur to DeWolf.  Instead, DeWolf 
blamed the inferior quality of the tenements occupied by Italian, Polish, and 
Bohemian immigrants on a mix of custom and biology.  ‘There are a great many 
buildings in this city which are unfit for habitation by civilized people,’ he wrote. 
‘yet they are inhabited, and generally by Italians, Poles, Bohemians, and others, 
who, in their trans-Atlantic homes have been accustomed to live in crowded 
quarters, in close proximity to their domestic animals, which in this city are not 
allowed to kept in premises used for human habitation.’  De Wolf added that it 
was difficult to enforce tenement-housing ordinances ‘against such habitual and 
hereditary insanitary modes of living.’  Since immigrants rarely understood health 
departments’’ regulations, they required ‘constant watching’ by sanitary 
inspectors.  [Garb 2005: 78-79] 
 
DeWolf’s linkage of housing conditions with people’s standing in the U.S. ethnic 
hierarchy was not unique to Chicago.  In both the 1901 New York Tenement House Law and in 
two subsequent publications, New York-based housing bureaucrat and reformer Lawrence 
Veiller attempted to “‘promote the health, safety, and welfare of the people by regulating the 
light and ventilation, sanitation, fire protection, maintenance, alteration, improvement, and use of 
dwellings’” (Vale 2007: 18) in three classes: (1) private dwellings; (2) two-family dwellings; and 
(3) multiple dwellings.  Through this hierarchical classification, he sought to “…encourage the 
erection of private dwellings and two-family houses and to discourage the erection of tenement 
houses and other forms of multiple dwellings by making provisions relative to the latter more 
stringent than those affecting the former classes’” (Ibid.18). Veiller used zoning codes and 
building requirements to promote one form of housing, the single family home, over another.  
Given that most of the occupants of the housing stock he found so distasteful were working class 
and foreign-born, there was undoubtedly a segregationist logic of exclusion at work in this 
particular housing vision—a thread that has run through many subsequent attempts to address 
U.S. housing problems in the decades since.  
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Veiller’s plan had social and geographic effects. In the face of the increasing valorization 
of homeownership as a sign of one’s social status and moral and physical hygiene and the 
economic turmoil of the 1870s that made other forms of investment appear more risky, middle-
class households became more interested in investing in homeownership, particularly in areas 
removed from, but still accessible to, the downtown areas of American cities. At the same time, 
new tenement laws and social hygiene policies undercut working class families’ access to 
homeownership as a form of shelter, an economic survival strategy, and a bastion of their right to 
autonomous citizenship.  This combination of local housing policy changes, cultural shifts, and 
economic trends helped begin to create the now familiar version of U.S. homeownership as a 
middle-class institution.   
 
The Federal Government Enters the Housing Market 
While local ordinances targeting tenements and multifamily housing helped begin the 
consumer and producer-driven push for more single family, owner-occupied housing in urban 
and suburban areas, it was not until after World War I that the federal government began to take 
on a greater role in the housing market. Federal support for owner-occupied housing was, from 
the beginning, intertwined with U.S. commercial and ideological interests.  Politicians, business 
leaders, and real estate men packaged homeownership, and the economic and social stability it 
afforded households, as a key defense against the threat of Communism sweeping into the 
United States via the labor union movement.  Selling ordinary Americans on the virtues of 
private ownership was promoted as a way to keep their interests aligned with a capitalist system.  
The 1919 Own-Your-Own-Home Campaign, initially housed in the Department of Labor, was 
modeled after the National Association of Real Estate Board’s 1917 “Own your own home” 
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commercial crusade. While the campaign predated federally funded home finance programs by 
more than a decade, its goal, to make homeownership accessible for every family, speaks to an 
early governmental recognition of the role that widening homeownership might play “as a means 
to promote civic, social, and business betterment” (Vale 2007: 20).   
When Herbert Hoover became Secretary of Commerce in 1921, he inherited the Own-
Your-Own-Home agenda and connected its political dimensions with a pro-development and 
pro-homebuilding platform.  Homeownership increased by more than three million households 
during the 1920s, buttressed by the pro-ownership propaganda of Hoover and others in concert 
with lobbying of the increasingly powerful homebuilding and real estate industries.  During his 
tenure as commerce secretary, Hoover signed on as president of the “Better Homes in America” 
movement, which issued millions of how-to pamphlets for Americans interested in locating, 
financing, purchasing, and building their own homes, and he actively promoted homeownership 
in numerous oral and written presentations.  As illustrated in his address to The White House 
Conference on Home Building and Homeownership quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
Hoover saw homeownership as a manifestation of deeply held American values of  
“individualism, of enterprise, of independence, and of the freedom of spirit.” To promote 
homeownership was to facilitate the “physical manifestation” of these same values.   
With Hoover’s support, the Better Homes campaign grew to include 7,200 local and 47 
statewide committees.  In 1931, the campaign published the Better Homes Manual, which linked 
the household-level economic benefits of homeownership with the creation of strong familial ties 
and moral values that would, in turn, support a flourishing American economy and social life: 
A family that owns its own home takes pride in it, maintains it better, gets more 
pleasure out of it, and has more wholesome, healthful, and happy atmosphere in 
which to bring up children.  The homeowner has a constructive aim in life.  He 
works harder outside of his home, he spends his leisure more profitably, and he 
 
 44 
and his family live a finer life and enjoy more of the comforts and cultivating 
influences of our modern civilization.   A husband and wife who own their home 
are more apt to save.  They have an interest in the advancement of a social system 
that permits the individual to store up the fruits of his labor.  As direct taxpayers 
they [partake] of the finest instincts and aspirations of our people (Halbert 1931: 
3, cited in Vale 2007: 24).   
 
In this framing, as in the linkages between homeownership, familial wellbeing, and national 
economic growth and prosperity in the quotes from President Bill Clinton and Herbert Hoover in 
the epigraph of this chapter, we see how government policymaking in support of homeownership 
has become naturalized as tantamount to the government support for the flourishing of individual 
households, communities, and the nation.   
The treatment of ownership as the foundation for the individual and collective 
advancement of people living in the United States apparent in the government-supported Better 
Homes campaign aligned with similar claims being made by the National Association of Real 
Estate Boards (NAREB), a national organization of real estate professionals founded in 1908.  
As I’ll discuss in Chapter Three, real estate brokers, and their professional organizations, 
including the NAREB and the National Association of Realtors, have also played a significant 
role in the homeownership complex, shaping the priorities, policies, and the trajectory of the 
U.S. housing market.  In NAREB’s 1922 pamphlet, A Home of Your Own, they asserted that the 
decision to purchase a home was “‘A QUESTION OF LIFE ITSELF’ because, as ‘the most 
valuable of all material possessions…[i]t has greater influence over life and character and greater 
effect upon success and happiness than any other single thing that can be bought with money.” 
Such messages marked homeownership as not just a sound financial decision but also a “social 
and moral milestone” (Vale 2007: 26).  It is this duality of significance that allowed the tentacles 
of the homeownership complex to spread across commercial, political, and cultural domains in 
the United States with unprecedented ease.   
 
 45 
In spite of the enthusiasms of Herbert Hoover, the NAREB, and public-private 
collaborations such as Better Homes and the Own-Your-Own-Home campaign, homeownership 
did not reach the heights that housing boosters envisioned for it in the 1920s. But the Great 
Depression was a watershed moment for  U.S. homeownership. Widespread foreclosures and a 
hard hit construction industry sapped homeowners and workers of their wealth and sense of 
wellbeing and stirred up political and social unrest.  In response to these problems and building 
upon the linkages housing boosters had already made between increasing homeownership and 
economic growth, the federal government took on a much greater role in the housing market in 
the 1930s.  That expanded role has endured well beyond the crisis moment of the Great 
Depression.  It has shaped how, when, where, and why people living in the United States choose 
to make a homes and it has played an integral role in the creation and perpetuation of the 
homeownership complex.   
 
Linking Homeownership to Economic Recovery and Prosperity 
In 1931, a year that saw a then-record-high 193,800 non-farm foreclosures, President Hoover 
convened a home building and homeownership conference where he introduced plans for a 
national recovery driven by an expanding private housing market. Hoover suggested that “‘the 
predicament of the real estate and construction industries was acting as a drag on the rest of the 
economy’ that homeownership was ‘both the foundation of a sound economic and social system 
and a guarantee that our country will continue to develop rationally as changing conditions 
demand’” (Jackson 1985: 193).  Explicitly connecting the country’s economic recovery to 
expanding homeownership, he made four recommendations: “(1) the creation of long-term, 
amortized mortgages; (2) the encouragement of low interest rates; (3) the institution of 
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government aid to private efforts to house low-income families; and (4) the reduction of home 
construction costs.” (ibid.194). While most of these recommendations were not successfully 
implemented during his presidency, Hoover’s plan laid the groundwork for much of the housing 
legislation successfully implemented by his successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”).   
Early on in his presidency, FDR recognized the need to tackle the nation’s housing, 
unemployment, and growth problems simultaneously. Much like the more recent housing and 
financial crises of 2007 to 2009, the problems themselves were related.  The stock market crash 
of 1929 and its fallout decimated the future-oriented building trades, unemployment in the 
construction industry was especially high, and many people who experienced financial distress 
due to unemployment and loss of wealth also experienced home loss due to foreclosure. Several 
key pieces of housing legislation and institutional frameworks were established under his 
leadership, including the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) the Federal Housing Act of 
1934, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Federal National Mortgage 
Administration (FNMA, or “Fannie Mae”).  These initiatives continue to powerfully shape the 
housing market into the present.  
 
HOLC, Property Appraisal Practices, and the Reproduction of Housing Inequality 
Founded in 1933, HOLC was designed to prevent foreclosures by refinancing mortgages that 
were in danger of or already in default.  It did so by acquiring over a million mortgages and 
offering protections to almost twenty percent of U.S. homeowners.  Prior to such programs, most 
homes were financed with short-term (five-to-ten year) loans that were not amortized—meaning 
that interest payments were due upfront instead of gradually tapering off as the borrower’s level 
of equity in the property increased as is the case with most mortgage loans now, and that 
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borrowers had to pay off the full remaining balance of their loan, which was mostly principal, at 
the end of the loan term.  Similar to the variable interest rate and interest-only loans18 that 
plagued homeowners during the mortgage crisis of 2007-2009, these products only worked if 
homeowners were able to refinance and extend their loans prior to the end of the loan term or 
had somehow gained the capital to pay off their loan in full when it came due.  HOLC was 
revolutionary because it extended the standard mortgage loan term to twenty years, making 
combined monthly interest and principal payments feasible, and it “introduced, perfected, and 
proved in practice the feasibility of the long-term, self-amortizing mortgage with uniform 
payments spread over the whole life of the debt.” (Jackson 1985: 196). Through its capital 
injections and refinancing efforts, HOLC is credited with helping preventing foreclosures in ten 
percent of all owner-occupied non-farm residences.  However, over a million foreclosures still 
occurred after its creation, matching the million completed foreclosures that occurred during the 
first years of the Great Depression.   
HOLC also had an impact on the ways in which property values were appraised by 
lenders.  Prior to HOLC’s standardization criteria, real estate appraisal was an idiosyncratic 
process that made it difficult to uphold uniform building codes and standards and to evaluate the 
underlying value of the assets for which buyers were seeking mortgage loans from banks.  
HOLC’s new requirements for appraisals reduced banks’ risk when extending loans, which freed 
up and encouraged residential real estate lending at a time when confidence in the housing 
                                                 
18 Variable-interest rate loans, unlike fixed-interest rate loans, have interest rates that adjust, 
usually in alignment with a well-known index, such as the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR).  Variable loans often begin with a lower interest rate than fixed rate products and 
sometimes combine an initial fixed rate loan term of 1-10 years that is then followed by variable 
or “floating” interest rates for the remainder of the loan term.  Interest-only loans begin with a 
period in which the borrower only pays “interest” on their loan without reducing the principal.  
After that initial period, a large “balloon” payment is often due and the borrower has to pay both 
interest and principal from then on.   
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market was at an all-time low. But the new appraisal standards were to have mixed social effects.  
Under HOLC, trained appraisers “divided cities into neighborhoods and developed elaborate 
questionnaires related to the occupation, income, and ethnicity of the inhabitants and the age, 
type of construction, price range, sales demand, and general state of repair of the housing 
stock…The ultimate aim was that one appraiser’s judgment of value would have meaning to an 
investor located somewhere else.” (Jackson 1985: 196).  But in the process of developing this 
new, standardized ranking system, HOLC initiated the practice of redlining, formalizing racial 
and geographic hierarchies and legitimizing existing lending discrimination.    
HOLC’s new appraisal methods relied on a uniform numerical and color-coded ranking 
scheme to assess the “quality” of the neighborhoods in which the housing to be appraised was 
located.  HOLC based its ranking on the age and condition of neighborhood buildings and the 
proximity of commercial and industrial zones and other more or less desirable types of 
infrastructure, but it also considered, and heavily weighted, the surrounding area’s racial and 
ethnic homogeneity.  New housing in residential areas that were inhabited by white, professional 
men and their families received the highest number and letter grades (first and green), while 
older neighborhoods that had even a small number of non-white families were consistently given 
the lowest possible grades (three and fours and yellows and reds).  As Jackson notes,  
HOLC assumptions about urban neighborhoods were based on both an ecological 
conception of change and a socioeconomic one.  Adopting a dynamic view of the 
city and assuming that change was inevitable, its appraisers accepted as given the 
proposition that the natural tendency of any area was to decline—in part because 
of the increasing age and obsolescence of the physical structures and in part 
because of the filtering down of the housing stock to families with even lower 
income [who also were more likely to be non-white.] The Home Owners Loan 
Corporation did not initiate the idea of considering race and ethnicity in real estate 
appraisal.  Bigotry has a long history in the United States, and the individuals who 
bought and sold houses were no better or worse than the rest of their countrymen. 




While Jackson is correct to point out that the bureaucrats responsible for HOLC’s 
appraisal ranking systems and texts did not create racism in the real estate market, like the 
crafters of the first anti-tenement (and de facto anti-immigrant) housing laws in the 19th and early 
20th centuries, HOLC was in a particularly powerful position to make manifest those racist and 
xenophobic ideas on the American landscape.  Drawing on the work of prominent University of 
Chicago sociologists Homer Hoyt and Robert Park regarding neighborhood change, which 
theorized that area property values would automatically and precipitously decline when lower-
status residents entered a neighborhood, HOLC guidelines dictated that race and ethnicity be 
considered even more important than a building’s condition and structure in the appraisal 
process. This governmental application of prevailing beliefs and academic theories regarding the 
importance of maintaining segregated communities to preserve property values meant that new, 
supposedly neutral real-estate-appraisal practices had the effect of institutionalizing racist 
housing policies and logics on a grand scale.   
Ironically, HOLC itself did not discriminate against lower-graded neighborhoods in their 
mortgage refinance lending practices. They even noted better loan repayment rates in low-
income and non-white neighborhoods than in more affluent areas.  The social and economic 
damage came through “the influence of [HOLC’s] appraisal system on the financial decisions of 
other institutions” (Jackson 1985: 203).  In a questionnaire they circulated in the late 1930s, 
HOLC found that many lending institutions refused to lend to C and D areas altogether.  In 
addition, the Federal Housing Administration, a government agency that did engage in 
discriminatory housing practices and pressured other market actors to do the same, adopted 
HOLC’s appraisal methods and color-coded maps.  
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HOLC’s efforts to standardize the real estate appraisal process may have been rooted in 
attempt to diminish risk and uncertainty in the mortgage lending and home buying process by 
ensuring that both lenders and borrowers had a clear picture of what a given property was worth.  
But the appraisal system’s underlying assumptions about the nature of housing value and 
neighborhood change laid the groundwork for decades of housing discrimination and 
disinvestment in neighborhoods with non-white residents.  The long-term consequences of those 
profoundly social and cultural processes remain.  Non-white households’ inability to obtain a 
mortgage from a bank because the properties that tended to be available to them were “devalued” 
by their association with other non-white households and thus ineligible for a government-
backed mortgage loan, when coupled with racist covenants, attitudes and real estate practices, 
left many minority households out of the government-facilitated post-war homeownership boom 
and suburbanization process (Brooks and Rose 2013; Rothstein 2017).  Further, it made them 
vulnerable to predatory mortgage brokers, property developers, landlords, and money lenders, 
and left the few neighborhoods where they were able to live bereft of the benefits of consistent 
commercial and residential property investment.  
 
The FHA and Homeownership For Some 
 HOLC and its appraisal standards were not the only products of New Deal housing 
legislation that were to have an inequitable impact on the shape and trajectory of the U.S. 
housing market, and with it, U.S. economy and society as a whole.  Another major piece of 
housing legislation that passed during the Roosevelt administration, the National Housing Act of 
1934, established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which continues to play a 
substantial role in the private housing market by insuring mortgage lenders against the risk of 
 
 51 
borrower default.  This government guarantee made banks more willing to lend to borrowers 
without demanding a large down payment.19 By substantially lowering the down payment 
needed to purchase a property, the FHA put homeownership within the reach of lower-income 
households.20  It also facilitated earlier entrances into homeownership, as families no longer had 
to save such substantial amounts to become owners. After WWII, this government intervention 
dovetailed nicely with the demographic explosion known as the “baby boom,” which reversed 
Depression-era demographic trends of delaying marriage, household formation, and childbearing 
due to financial constraints. 
 In 1938, the government created the Federal National Mortgage Administration, known 
as Fannie Mae, which allowed it to intervene directly in the private housing market by 
purchasing mortgage loans that had been originated by private financial institutions. Fannie 
Mae’s loan purchase program gave banks a steady injection of revenue designed to allow them to 
extend more loans than they would have been able to place on their balance sheets otherwise.  
Initially, Fannie Mae and its sister agencies, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae, merely purchased and 
held onto mortgage loans to free up the banks’ balance sheets and reduce the amount of market 
risk they carried.  Beginning in 1970, they began to bundle the mortgages they acquired and 
issue mortgage-backed securities for them.  This practice, initially a pragmatic means to facilitate 
capital flows into housing finance in a way that private investors felt comfortable with, was to 
                                                 
19 The average down payment requirement fell from 50%, on average, to 20% although now the 
required amount has fallen to 3% for an FHA loan and 0% for a VA loan.   
20 The FHA and VA’s willingness to extend loans with lower and lower down payments from 
home buyers has also come under criticism, particularly in the wake of the mortgage crisis of 
2008, when lower down payment requirements sometimes correlated with higher rates of 
mortgage default.  Further, much like HOLC’s appraisal standards influenced the requirements 
and valuation schemes of other government and private housing finance entities, lower down 
payments for government-backed FHA loans influenced the creation of lower down payment 




have an enormous impact on the nature of housing finance and homeownership in the United 
States.  By facilitating a housing value chain between individual homeowners and their 
properties and the private investors who purchased Fannie Mae-issued mortgage-backed 
securities, the U.S. government had made the fates of homeowners, financial markets, and the 
economy as a whole more inextricably linked than ever before.    
 It is worth exploring whether and how the prevailing social and cultural norms in support 
of homeownership changed during the Great Depression, a period that, much like the Great 
Recession, eroded the kind of public and private promulgation of homeownership that 
characterized the 1920s.  While booster organizations such as the Better Homes in America 
campaign did temper their advocacy for homeownership in response to the massive waves of 
foreclosures during the Great Depression, issuing a “Financial Aspects of Homeownership” 
bulletin in 1936 that asserted that “‘a house which a family cannot afford will never be a home’” 
they never suggested that Americans forgo property ownership altogether.  Rather, they advised 
that home buyers consider purchasing smaller, more affordable properties (Home Information 
Service 1936, cited in Vale 2007: 35-36).  Other voices were slightly more critical, but still 
suggested that the pitfalls of foreclosure could be avoided through financial prudence and 
foresight.  An outlier in the midst of this tempered, but still supportive homeownership rhetoric 
was John P. Dean’s book, Homeownership: Is it Sound? (1945).  In it, Dean analyzes what he 
refers to as “‘the ideology of homeownership,’ observing that…‘For some families some houses 
represent wise buys…but a culture and real estate industry that gives blanket endorsement to 
ownership fails to indicate which families and which houses.’” (Dean 1945, xiii, 7, 12, 13, 18, 
cited in Vale 2007: 37-38).   
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While acknowledging the powerful psychological pull that owning one’s own home had 
for Americans steeped in long-standing traditions of rural property ownership, Dean suggests 
that the arguments in favor of ownership put forth by the real estate and building industries 
amounted to “propaganda” that treated any negative ownership experiences as “‘unfortunate 
individual exceptions to a general rule’” (Dean 1945, 14-17, cited in Vale 2007: 38). The book 
identifies three dimensions of the homeownership ideology: cultural tradition, business self-
interest, and government encouragement.  As homeownership has become even more enmeshed 
in the national and global economy through a housing finance system that depends upon global 
financial market investment, his critical analysis of reasons for widespread public, private, and 
consumer support for owner-occupied housing has only become more prescient. 
 
 Whiteness, Inclusion, and Exclusion in U.S. Housing Policy and Practice 
 As Margaret Garb notes (2005), the “American Dream” of homeownership as we know it 
was first and most keenly felt by working-class European immigrants eager to establish 
themselves as legitimate, wholly independent citizens of their new country. Legal property rights 
were important to foreign-born households because they represented a departure from the 
longstanding, exploitive landlord-tenant relations in which many had been ensnared in their 
home countries (Ignatiev 1995) as well as a measure of their improved (although still precarious) 
status as industrial workers whose wages enabled them to become property owners (Walley 
2013).  For a time, they also had a socially integrative function, as immigrants from different 
parts of the European continent intermingled with native-born U.S. citizens in working-class 
neighborhoods with little distinction on the basis of country of origin or occupation.   
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While residential property rights sometimes functioned as socioeconomic equalizers, 
anthropologist Karen Brodkin details the ways in which housing tenure hierarchies have 
reflected, reinforced, and created racial and ethnic hierarchies, as well.  In How Jews Became 
White Folks and What That Says About Race in America (1995), Brodkin describes how her 
parents’ ability to move out of New York City and become homeowners in 1949 and buy a home 
in Valley Stream, a historically white suburb of New York, stood as both a symbol of their new 
identities as white Americans (as opposed to the Eastern European, Jewish identity of their 
parents’ generation) and a means of solidifying that status during a period of shifting racial and 
ethnic categorization in the United States.   
For both my parents, to have their own house was an exciting opportunity to be 
seized.  It was freedom from parental oversight and offered the promise of making 
their life as they would like it to be.  There was no living culture to learn in the 
brand-new suburban neighborhoods, no place in the built environment of one-
family houses for a socially recognized generation of elders, no duplexes, no flats 
with married daughters living upstairs from their mothers, as my father’s sister 
Henrietta and her mother had in Coney Island.  The generations were separate, 
connected only by telephone, the Belt Parkway, and the automobile.  Ours was the 
first generation to inhabit those neighborhoods, and virtually all our neighbors 
were fairly young parents, one of each sex, with two young children. [Brodkin 
1995: 9] 
 
Writing about one of the most famous planned developments, Levittown, sociologist Herbert 
Gans describes similar motivations amongst “White ethnic” Italian, Polish, Irish, and Jewish 
first-generation immigrant households who became suburban homeowners in the 1940s and ’50s 
in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania (2017 [1967]).  For these families, suburban 
homeownership opened up new social and economic possibilities and facilitated a greater degree 
of integration into the fabric of American society.  But the transformative power of suburban 
homeownership as a whitening agent and source of immigrant and native-born admixture and (at 
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least surface-level) working- and middle-class socioeconomic cohesion was always predicated 
on the exclusion of another growing minority in Northern cities: African Americans.   
The development of U.S. homeownership after the Great Depression is intimately 
entangled with the establishment and growth of the suburbs.  These new communities offered 
working-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-class households the opportunity to provide 
geographically separate, highly gendered domestic spaces for their families even as they 
increasingly relied upon the economic resources available in burgeoning towns and cities to earn 
their livelihoods (Jackson 1985).  But moving to the suburbs had other implications beyond 
altering the landscape.  For European immigrants and their first and second-generation 
descendants, purchasing land and housing in planned, affordable suburban developments such as 
the series of Levittowns built in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey (Gans 2017 [1967]), 
suburban living represented an opportunity for American integration that was denied them in the 
urban ethnic enclaves from whence they came (cf. Low 2003; Ortner 2003).  That the suburbs 
were typically all-white spaces21 only heightened their transformative powers for Russian, 
Polish, Irish or Italian Americans who wished to become “American”—no hyphens involved.   
 The growth of the suburbs provided more than a space for creating whiteness and 
dividing its new members from non-white others.  When World War II drew to a close, the 
United States’ economy, which had been bolstered by the New Deal’s domestic stimulus policies 
and by the manufacturing and agricultural demands of the global war effort, needed a new 
engine.  With the return of sixteen million military veterans, robust industrial capacities, and lots 
of vacant land surrounding growing metropolitan areas, a suburbs-focused housing boom seemed 
                                                 
21The racial homogeneity of U.S. suburbs was reinforced, as discussed above, by real estate 
appraisal practices and their preferential treatment of new, racially homogenous housing 
developments, as well as by racist housing covenants (Brooks and Rose 2013; Stuart 2005). 
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to fit the bill.  Such growth would not have been possible without the groundwork laid by 
previous generations’ growing preference for suburban, single-family living (Garb 2005); the 
housing finance mechanisms put into the place during the 1930s, and the government largesse of 
the GI Bill, a piece of legislation that enabled 7.8 million WWII veterans to complete an post-
secondary educational program, and the Veterans’ Administration, which had insured 2.4 million 
home loans by 1952 (Jackson 1985).   While these conditions were not designed specifically to 
enable suburban homeownership, through the workings of the homeownership complex, they 
seemed to “naturally” coalesce to do exactly that.   
 Because the availability of FHA-insured, federally-backed mortgage loans often allowed 
households to purchase larger properties with lower monthly mortgage payments in the suburbs 
than the cost of cramped rental housing in the city, a suburban relocation often involved a move 
up in families’ habits and level of consumption.  Historian Elaine Tyler May argues that 
working- and middle-class households’ growing capacity to purchase durable household goods—
such as televisions, refrigerators, and washing machines—on credit or installment plan 
contributed to an “universal” middle-class American subjectivity almost as much as 
homeownership did (1988).  Yet as sociologists Lillian Rubin (1972) and Judith Stacey (1990) 
have both noted, greater purchasing power and the bona fide social status associated with 
homeownership did not necessarily provide such households with the kind of psychic and 
financial security that they had been promised.  The blue-collar jobs available to white working 
class men after World War II, while plentiful, were far from secure, and husbands and wives 
struggled to maintain gendered, classed divisions of labor and make ends meet on one income as 
opposed to two.  Further, households’ credit-facilitated purchasing power was a double-edged 
sword, allowing them to “move up” through suburban homeownership but also trapping them 
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into long-term monthly payments that inhibited their ability to save or to invest money 
elsewhere.  In other words, while the abundance of credit, building capacity, and land after 
World War II facilitated a boom in homeownership—rates skyrocketed from 44% to 63% 
between 1934 and 1972 (Jackson 1985: 205)—it also called forth and helped create enduring 
class anxieties and racializing logics. These divisive attitudes left their mark on the U.S. 
landscape and shaped the identities, aspirations, and trajectories of U.S. households for 
generations to come (Patillo-McCoy 1999; Williams 2005).    
 
Racial Discrimination in Housing and Its Consequences 
 At precisely the same time that white households were leaving tenements and crowded 
inner cities and achieving “the American dream” in affordable, newly-built single-family homes 
in the blossoming American suburbs, a very different housing story was playing out for African 
Americans. Making opportunities of homeownership accessible to widening sectors of the U.S. 
population (Jews, Italians, Poles, etc., as well as growing numbers of the working classes) was 
rooted in and, to some extent, dependent upon the denial of these opportunities to non-white (in 
Chicago’s case, primarily African American) households.  This was due to the use and 
perpetuation of homeownership as both an act and a mark of hierarchical distinction (Bourdieu 
1979).   
 From 1916 to 1970, close to seven million African Americans participated in the Great 
Migration when they fled the American south and the strictures of Jim Crow in search of new 
opportunities in the industrial boomtowns of the North.  One of their primary destinations was 
Chicago.  There, jobs were plentiful and Jim Crow did not apply. But the new arrivals were 
nonetheless met with a shockingly virulent array of de facto racial discrimination.  
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In Black Metropolis (2015 [1945]),22 sociologists St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton 
detail the tremendous costs of restricting a burgeoning African American population into an area 
that was then referred to as the city’s “Black Belt.” Unsurprisingly, restricting Chicago’s 
growing number of black residents to a small area created housing challenges.  These challenges 
related to and were compounded by the run-of-the-mill plights of any stigmatized urban 
population: limited access to city infrastructure and services, few employment opportunities, and 
public health and safety concerns associated with living in cheaply constructed and poorly 
maintained housing. The more African Americans flowed into the city (more than 500,000 new 
arrivals came between 1915 and 1970) the more difficult finding a place to live became.  Drake 
and Cayton describe overcrowded, crumbling apartment buildings that were all-but-abandoned 
by their landlord owners.  House fires were a frequent problem, and many Black Belt residents 
lost their lives to them.  And yet, the continuing in-migration from the South meant that housing 
in any condition continued to be in high demand.  For example, an anonymous black Chicagoan 
reported in a 1942 letter to the black-run newspaper The Chicago Defender that he had walked 
the entire length of the Black Belt for 35 days straight looking for an apartment without any 
success (Hirsh 1998: 2). 
As novelist Richard Wright notes in the foreword to Black Metropolis,  
Lodged in the innermost heart of America is a fatal division of being, a war of 
impulses…An uneasiness haunts her consciousness, taints her moral preachments, 
lending an air of unreality to her actions, and rendering ineffectual the good deeds 
she feels compelled to do in the world.  America is a nation of a riven 
consciousness. [Drake and Cayton 2015[1945]: xiii]   
 
Chicago exemplified this division. The city’s white elites relied upon African Americans to work 
in their factories and, when needed, to undercut the power of labor unions mostly comprised of 
                                                 
22 A New Deal-funded masterwork on life in black Chicago in the 1930s and 1940s.   
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European migrants and their first- and second-generation descendants.  But these same valuable 
workers were denied access to the freedom of movement and residence that other Chicagoans 
enjoyed.   
 Homeowners, managers, real estate brokers, and landlords played an outsized role in the 
enforcement of Chicago’s color line.  By refusing to show, rent, or sell houses and apartments to 
non-white families, they maintained divisions between white residential areas and black ones. 
Even when residential integration became inevitable, real estate speculators price gouged black 
households seeking housing in previously all-white areas, selling or renting them substandard 
housing for astronomically high prices. Housing discrimination also occurred through the use of 
restrictive covenants that transcended any individual owners’ biases or open-mindedness 
regarding racial integration. “Like real estate covenants of all kinds, racial covenants were 
supposed to ‘run with the land,’ binding future owners as well as the original signatories; thus 
they were intended to have staying power for a neighborhood and to repel entry by unwanted 
new residents” (Brooks and Rose 2013: 4).    Crafting and abiding by these secret instruments of 
segregation had the secondary effect of building cohesion in the middle and upper class 
communities where they were most often used.  While white working class communities often 
fought the entrance of black families with an escalating array of threats, intimidation, and, in the 
worst cases, acts of violence and arson, more affluent neighborhoods preserved racial purity with 
contractual provisions and real estate steering.   
Although the Supreme Court rejected these types of restrictive covenants in Shelley vs. 
Kraemer 334 US 1 (1948),23 this decision did not put an end to discriminatory residential real 
                                                 
23 In this decision, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause meant that racially-
restrictive real estate covenants were unenforceable by the courts, although they could be entered 
into by private parties.   
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estate practices, nor did it rid properties of provisions meant to restrict who could purchase and 
live in them.  According to legal scholars Carol M. Rose and Richard R.W. Brooks, this lack of 
adherence to the Shelley decision reflected the fact that even after racist covenants became 
unenforceable,  
white social norms against integration continued.  White homeowners had long 
feared that their properties would lose market value if minorities moved into the 
neighborhood, and they continued to believe this—and act on their belief—after 
the Shelley case.  Given that set of beliefs, real estate professionals continued to 
reason that total real estate values would be higher if neighborhoods were 
segregated racially. [2013: 5]   
 
These social norms against integration were legitimized and made manifest by the federal 
government through the FHA, which, in addition to having encouraged racial restrictions on its 
home loans since its founding, also continued to provide insurance for new residential 
subdivisions that included now-illegal racial covenants even after the Shelley ruling.  Shelley was 
just one in a series of legal challenges to deeply engrained social patterns of residential 
segregation by race that failed to change the housing market’s discriminatory and exclusionary 
status quo.  
In 1968, the Fair Housing Act outlawed real estate professionals from providing “overt 
information about residential segregation,” but old racial covenants continued to appear on 
property deeds and continued to signal the neighborhoods’ historic (and often contemporary) 
preferences for racial division.  Although no longer backed by law, such legacies continued to 
differentially shape the housing opportunities, and by extension, the life trajectories, of white and 
non-white households.  Real estate discrimination, whether legally sanctioned or not, became a 
kind of self-fulfilling prophesy. Affluent and middle-class white neighborhoods that resisted 
integration held their value.  Affluent and middle-class black neighborhoods struggled to secure 
mortgage financing and home insurance due to the racist appraisal standards promulgated by the 
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federal government and the discriminatory lending practices of most mainstream financial 
institutions.  The result was that black households paid more for less valuable housing stock and 
did not have access to the same returns on their investment that their white counterparts enjoyed.  
This sharp division in the financing options, geographic locations, and opportunities for asset 
appreciation available to white and black households was to have far-reaching consequences 
(Rothstein 2017). 
In many, if not all, American cities, discriminatory restrictions on multifamily housing 
types, federally-backed real estate appraisal standards that favored racially homogeneous 
communities and penalized integrated or majority-minority neighborhoods, barriers to accessing 
the benefits of government-backed home mortgage loans, and restrictive real estate covenants 
meant that non-white and, at one time, white ethnic immigrant households, had a dramatically 
different housing experience than their white and native-born counterparts.  Even after the worst 
of these barriers became illegal or at least unenforceable, the legacies of this difference have 
persisted and compounded.  For example, vast disparities in household wealth between white and 
black Americans in the present—in 2017, white household wealth was seven times that of black 
households (Economic Policy Institute 2017)—can be traced, in large part, to black households’ 
much later access to the full economic and social benefits of homeownership (Rothstein 2017).  
Such differences, and their material and psychic consequences, reinforce the uneven beneficence 
of private property ownership in the United States.   
 
New Fair Housing Policies, Continuing Inequalities 
 As I outline above, federal housing policies to encourage and support residential property 
ownership were not equally accessible to all Americans, and the developments that such policies 
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supported, such as the movement of white households out of urban areas to new housing stock in 
the suburbs, actually deepened existing racial inequalities and economic prospects in the United 
States. This was true even when African Americans, against all odds, succeeded in saving the 
money necessary to access homeownership. This was because the vast majority of U.S. banks 
refused to serve the African American community, regardless of their resources, income, and 
creditworthiness (Satter 2010).   
 The federal government did eventually did take steps to include fair access to the housing 
of one’s choice as the right of every citizen, but it was a slow, incremental process.  Legal 
changes were often ignored or “worked around” by lenders, brokers, and realtors loath to 
abandon their discriminatory (and often very lucrative) practices.24 The first major piece of 
legislation to impact housing inequalities was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which 
included Title VIII, known as the Fair Housing Act. (FaHA).  The FaHA prohibited 
discrimination in housing markets, and in the U.S. Supreme Court case Laufman v. Oakley, the 
courts ruled that the prohibition applied to redlining, as well.  But this did not mean that 
minorities’ housing woes were immediately lifted.  The FaHA and subsequent Supreme Court 
decision only applied to outright denials on the basis of the borrower’s race.  If the lender, seller, 
or landlord had a policy that had the effect of discriminating against black or low-income 
applicants, such as a high minimum loan amount, that did not count as racial bias.  Even when 
                                                 
24 For example, although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that racial covenants in real estate 
transactions were illegal in 1948, the FHA continued to favor racially restrictive covenants in its 
underwriting processes until 1950, and it was only in 1962 that President Kennedy’s Executive 
Order 11063, barring discrimination in federally funded or managed housing programs such as 
that of FHA and the VA went into effect. And none of these top-down changes was effective in 
stripping racist provisions from existing property deeds or prevented white homeowners and 
realtors from surreptitiously refusing to sell their homes to non-white buyers (Rose and Brooks 




racial discrimination was clear, the original Fair Housing Act came with little enforcement 
power.  “The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)…was only allowed to 
engage in ‘conference, conciliation, and persuasion’…[to enforce] the law” (Immergluck 2009: 
51).  FaHA’s effectiveness was also hampered by its limited implementation.  By 1976, only one 
regulator, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, had issued final regulations, and the ones they 
created fell short of what fair housing advocates had hoped for.  The other regulators proposed 
but did not enforce the adoption of nondiscrimination policies and the display of “equal 
opportunity” posters by the banks under their purview. 
At the same time that the FaHA was slowly taking effect, advocates for fair credit access, 
for mortgages as well as for other loans, were also making their case.  The Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA), which prevented gender-based lending decisions, was passed in 1974, 
but expanded in 1976 to prevent discrimination on the basis of race and age, as well.  According 
to housing finance scholar Dan Immergluck, the ECOA was a stronger law than the 
aforementioned Fair Housing Act in the sense that it applied to “disparate impact,” meaning that 
a case for discrimination could be made even if a lender did not have a blatantly sexist or racist 
policy on its books.  
Two other important pieces of fair housing legislation were passed in the 1970s: the 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975 and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
of 1977.  Both of these laws were the direct result of community activism to redress housing 
inequalities.  In 1974, National People’s Action, a Chicago-based community-organizing group, 
along with many others, lobbied for a HMDA bill that would mandate the collection and 
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disclosure of data on the savings accounts and lending patterns of banks and thrifts25.  The bill 
faced strong opposition from members of the banking industry, and it was amended to only 
require information on lending patterns at the census tract level in metropolitan areas.26  Still, the 
data released revealed a strong linkage between discriminatory lending and redlining practices 
and neighborhood disinvestment and decline.   
The CRA, passed in 1977, represented an attempt to hold banks and thrifts accountable 
for the kinds of discrimination that the HMDA data revealed.  “The basic justification…for CRA 
was that banks and thrifts were given public charters in large part to serve the ‘convenience and 
needs’ of their communities and thus the public had a right to expect them to fulfill that 
obligation” (Immergluck 2009: 53), including in low-income and minority communities. After 
the passage of the CRA, all banks that receive Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
insurance became subject to examination by federal regulators for their lending records in all of 
the communities in which they are chartered. While not as contested as HDMA, politicians and 
industry groups opposed the CRA on the grounds that it amounted to “credit allocation” that was 
disruptive to banks and thrifts’ lending criteria, risk assessments, and decision-making.  Banking 
regulators were against the CRA for similar reasons: they believed its strong prescriptions 
undercut their discretionary authority to appropriately and effectively evaluate a bank’s 
community reinvestment history as part of their institutional performance as a whole.  And it was 
in that mindset that regulators appeared to conduct their CRA evaluations: through the 1980s, 
less than 2.4 percent of banks received failing grades (Fishbein 1993).   
                                                 
25 A thrift is a savings and loan association that accepts consumer deposits and makes consumer 
loans.  This is contrast to a commercial bank that has businesses as their primary clients. 
26 No data on savings account patterns, the race and gender of borrowers, or on lending patterns 
in rural areas, was included. 
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By examining the United States’ series of fair housing laws and their partial 
implementations, we can see how governmental intervention in housing has evolved over time, 
but has failed to address existing racial, ethnic, and class inequalities until it faced political 
pressure to do so.  The activism of civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., who 
marched for open housing and equal access to employment in Chicago from 1965 to 1967, 
eventually led to the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  In the years that followed, 
community activist groups such as National People’s Action, which was instrumental in the 
passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and the Community Reinvestment Act in 1974 
and 1977, respectively, achieved an equally important goal by changing the laws that govern real 
estate and residential mortgage lending practices.  While these were important legislative 
victories, they did not transform the foundational racial and class disparity that continues to 
shape who benefits most from homeownership in the United States. The homeownership 
complex continued to produce a housing market that generated more value for white 
homeowners and the real estate professionals who served them.  Together with homeowners and 
landlords, housing professionals—including realtors, mortgage lenders, appraisers, and home 
insurance agents—continued to practice race and class discrimination in housing even after fair 
housing legislation went into effect.   
 
Privatizing Housing Finance, Expanding Homeownership 
 The civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the fair housing legislation that was an 
outgrowth of it, succeeded in dismantling some of the more pernicious mechanisms that inhibited 
minority households’ ability to access homeownership. Importantly, legislative attempts to 
expand homeownership as a civil rights matter were accompanied by new forms of government 
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involvement in the private housing market.  For example, in 1968, Fannie Mae, which had 
previously served as a conduit to the secondary market for the sale of FHA-insured loans, 
became a “government-sponsored enterprise” (GSE).  This changed Fannie Mae’s status to that 
of a for-profit, privately owned corporation that is subject to some—albeit limited—federal 
oversight and receives various forms of federal subsidy.  As a GSE, Fannie gained the ability to 
raise capital through the sale of common stock to the public.  The scope of its mission also 
expanded from providing liquidity for government-backed loans from the FHA, VA, and 
Department of Agriculture to doing the same for the non-GSE, or conventional, mortgage 
market.  This expansion reconfigured a quasi-government agency into a profit-seeking, private-
market-driven concern that changed the nature of the government’s interest in promoting 
homeownership.     
National macroeconomic policy shifts also played a role in reshaping the role of the 
federal government in the private housing market.   In the 1970s, the United States fell into an 
economic recession.27 The economic recession reduced housing construction rates and slashed 
U.S. employment inside and outside of the housing industry.  It also limited access to consumer 
credit and raised the interest rates charged for borrowing—including for home loans. This was 
followed by the “stagflation” of the early 1980s, which drove mortgage interest rates up to 
unprecedented levels—effectively barring all but the wealthiest households from becoming 
homeowners—or even upgrading to a newer, larger home that would require a new mortgage.   
To cope with these market conditions, home buyers engaged in creative strategies, such 
as rent-to-own contracts and mortgage assumptions with the sellers of their properties, as a way 
                                                 
27 The recession was spurred in part by President Nixon’s suspension of the gold standard, which 
sent the value of the dollar in a tailspin, as well as by the 1973 and 1979 oil crises and 
contractions in the U.S. industrial economy. 
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to become homeowners without paying the astronomically high mortgage interest rates of the 
period, which sometimes topped 20%. The challenge of maintaining or improving upon one’s 
socioeconomic status that even professional middle-class households faced during this period 
highlight the extent to which the opportunities of homeownership, like other bids for upward 
mobility are temporally and structurally conditional. As social commentators and scholars have 
revealed, socioeconomic futures in the United States are based as much upon one’s positioning 
within broader macroeconomic cycles and conditions of possibility as they are on individual 
aspiration and achievement (Ehrenreich 1989; Newman 2012, 1999, 1993).   
Like its home buying customers, the mortgage industry sought ways to adapt to the 
economic challenges they faced in raising capital and extending mortgage loans. One of the 
primary ways this occurred was through the expansion of mortgage securitization strategies as a 
way to keep long-term loans from clogging up lenders’ balance sheets, as well as to provide the 
capital necessary to fund future loans. 
Put most simply and broadly, securitization is a process in which funding of—or 
investments in—mortgage loans is separated from the origination (and originator) 
of the loans.  The loans stand, together in pools with many other loans, ‘on their 
own’ and are no longer tied to the fate of the originating lender…Securitization 
led directly to the widespread ‘vertical disintegration’ of the lending process 
(Jacobides 2005)…Vertical disintegration meant that more contractual 
relationships were now required between originators, issuers of securities, 
investors that purchased the securities, credit rating agencies, servicers, and other 
mortgage market participants. [Immergluck 2009: 34] 
 
The vertical disintegration that Immergluck describes can also be framed as an extenuation of the 
housing value chain to the point that the links of financial obligation that connect households, 
homes, capital, housing professionals, and investors are no longer visible. Three decades of 
financial market deregulation and tax policy changes led to the ever-expanding use of 
securitization as a tool to infuse liquidity into the residential mortgage market.   
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Although mortgage-backed securities received attention (and criticism) during the 
mortgage crisis of 2007-2009, it is important to note that mortgage loan securitization was not a 
new invention.  Recall, for example, the role government-backed insurance against default 
played in jumpstarting the U.S. housing market during the tumultuous 1930s. The first entity to 
create and sell residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) to private investors was the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). In the same year, 1970, the 
Emergency Home Finance Act created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or 
Freddie Mac, to give Home Loan Bank system members access to the secondary market and 
bolster private conventional mortgage capital availability, as well.   
The RMBS that the GSEs28 began to package and sell were game changers, but they did 
not represent the first attempt by banks to increase liquidity by selling off the mortgages they had 
originated.  The innovation of RMBS was that it was a less costly and speedier way for banks to 
turn originated mortgage loans into cash.  Ginnie Mae, and later Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
purchased loans from lenders in different regions of the country, thus diversifying risk, and 
assembled similar types of loans from diverse origins into pools. They then issued bonds or  
“certificates” (called pass-through securities) for the pools.  The cash flow generated by the loan 
payments received from the borrowers by loan servicers was passed through to investors, 
bypassing the originating lender altogether. In addition to protecting investors from an economic 
catastrophe in a particular region of the country, this type of RMBS also shielded investors from 
the repercussions of originating lender bankruptcy, because the pools of loans were either 
purchased or guaranteed by the GSEs who sold the certificates associated with them.   
                                                 
28 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae 
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Unlike later generations of RMBS, these early products were not organized into different 
layers, or “tranches” of risk with different credit ratings.  They also did not protect investors 
from the losses associated with prepayment29.  To overcome this issue and make RMBS more 
appealing to investors, Freddie Mac issued a new type of mortgage-backed security, called a 
collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO), in 1983.  CMOs are a more complex type of RMBS 
in that they “…allocate prepayment risk across different investors—some of whom are more 
willing to accept such risks than others—by structuring the security into different segments that 
pay back over varying schedules” (Immergluck 2009: 36).  Unlike RMBS, CMOs were 
hierarchically divided into tranches, or levels of risk and payment schedules, with each tranche 
receiving its own credit rating (AAA, BBB, B, etc.).   
As readers and viewers of popular accounts of the financial and mortgage crises such as 
Michael Lewis’s The Big Short (2010) will recall, CMOs are the type of security that are most 
closely associated with near-collapse of the U.S. financial system and housing market.  However, 
when they were first introduced, they served an important purpose by helping banks meet home 
buyer demand for mortgage financing at a reasonable interest rate. According to Immergluck, 
they did this by separating “… various types and degrees of risk and allocat[ing them] to 
different classes of investors depending on their appetite and tolerance for different sorts of 
risk…[In this way], CMOs appealed to a broader segment of potential investors and drew more 
capital into mortgage markets” (2009: 39).   
The creation of this more broadly appealing version of a RMBS—with a tranche for 
every investor’s risk appetite and return on investment need—also had the affect of extending 
                                                 
29 Prepayment occurs when the borrower pays off the outstanding balance of their loan before the 
end of the loan term.  This reduces the amount of interest that the “owner” of the loan receives.  
Some loans have prepayment penalties associated with them to guard against this loss, but most 
do not.   
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access to credit to a wider spectrum of borrowers.  Expanding access to credit was also a key 
government policy goal in a lending climate from which large segments of the U.S. population, 
particularly minorities and lower income households, had long been shut out.  The invention of 
the CMO also marked an important transition in lenders’ approaches to pricing credit.  
Previously ascribing to a system of “credit rationing,” from which borrowers below a certain risk 
threshold were completely excluded, lenders now moved to a “risk-based pricing” model, which, 
at least initially, seemed to democratize access to credit by ensuring that even the most “high 
risk” borrower could obtain a mortgage if they were willing to pay a higher interest rate for it.30 
In theory, risk-based pricing appeared to widen people’s access to the housing value chain. If 
more people could get be qualified to buy a home, so the logic went, more people would reap the 
benefits of homeownership (Bush 2002).  But in practice, the primary beneficiaries of loosening 
mortgage-lending criteria were investors, lenders, and brokers (Immergluck 2009).   
In addition to the infusions of capital into the mortgage markets brought about by new 
types of RMBS, regulatory changes that facilitated shifts in the composition of the mortgage 
market in response to the “tumultuous years of economic crisis and rapid inflation during the late 
1970s and early 1980s” (Ball 1990: 3) also had an impact on the evolution of the mortgage 
finance system.  Financial institutions facing a liquidity crisis in the early 1980s lobbied the 
federal government for changes in the regulatory structures governing different types of financial 
institutions, arguing that over-competition amongst local savings & loans banks and commercial 
investment banks for access to capital effectively created disincentives for all kinds of financial 
institutions’ engagement in the bread-and-butter mortgage lending for which U.S. consumers 
                                                 
30 Risk-based pricing was made more palatable to regulators and policymakers by the systematic 
use of the Fair Isaac & Co. (FICO) credit score and the development of automated underwriting 
software (Stuart 2003). 
 
 71 
were clamoring.  With residential mortgage interest rates peaking at 20% in 1980 due to the 
inflationary pressures brought about by the economic tumult of the late 1970s, it is no wonder 
that policy changes were deemed necessary.   
 
Neoliberalism, Financial Deregulation and Housing Market Growth 
A market-oriented and orientating political and economic logic, neoliberalism, also 
influenced the development of U.S. fiscal policy, and, by extension, the nature of the U.S. 
housing market. In the 1980s, the Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher administrations both 
promoted deregulation in their home countries and abroad as a mechanism to stimulate growth in 
a sluggish global economy. A particularly important act of deregulation for the U.S. housing 
sector was the passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
(DIDMCA) of 1980, which effectively phased out state usury limits governing interest rates by 
1986, allowing banks in low-regulation states to export their lower rates and compete more 
effectively in a national mortgage marketplace. DIDMCA also eliminated Regulation Q, which 
had limited the rates that federally insured depository institutions could pay on their deposits. 
The increased competition that S&Ls faced in the residential mortgage market incentivized them 
to enter into riskier commercial lending.   
One of the consequences of financial deregulation was the loss of market share by 
Savings & Loans (S&Ls), the banks that served as It’s A Wonderful Life-style depository 
institutions and providers of consumer credit, to mortgage companies who now had ready access 
to cash and were able to offer long-term, fixed-rate mortgages more cheaply and at higher 
volumes. And because they were not FDIC-insured, deposit-holding institutions, these 
companies were also subject to far less regulatory restriction and scrutiny. As Immergluck notes,  
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By explicitly favoring the securitization circuit over the traditionally dominant 
S&L circuit, federal policymakers provided crucial help in shifting the structure 
of the mortgage industry from a predominantly local to a predominantly national 
system and from one in which most loans were made by relatively regulated 
lenders (S&Ls) to one in which predominantly unregulated mortgage companies 
and a growing set of essentially unregulated mortgage brokers dominated.  
Combined with the failure of policymakers and regulatory agencies to increase 
regulatory supervision over these emerging lenders, these moves meant that the 
path toward greater overall deregulation of the mortgage industry was indeed well 
paved by the middle to late 1980s. [2009: 41] 
 
Because the Savings & Loan crisis reduced the liquidity of all financial markets, it was 
met with further deregulatory moves31 rather than the reinstatement of more conservative 
financial principles.  In the aftermath, the mortgage market’s reliance on securitization increased, 
spurred on, in part, by the passage of the 1989 Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (FIRREA), a “bail-out” bill for S&Ls that required that they rid themselves of 
their loan portfolios entirely in favor of RMBS—supposedly to increase their liquidity and lower 
the risks associated with holding onto long-term, fixed-rate mortgage loans which could be 
prepaid or go into default.   
Other changes were underway that would eventually made things harder for would-be 
homeowners. Although the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOPEA) was passed in 
                                                 
31 Deregulatory legislation continued with the passage of the Alternative Mortgage Transaction 
Parity Act (AMTPA) in 1982, which dismantled barriers to large-scale, delocalized, and less-
regulated mortgage lending operations.  AMTPA also allowed non-depository institutions to 
compete with depository institutions more effectively. While both of these laws were initially 
designed to help struggling S&Ls, they effectively did the opposite by intensifying competition 
and enhancing non-depository institutions ability to engage in mortgage lending. In 1981, 
President Reagan launched the President’s Commission on Housing.  Based on the 
Commission’s recommendations, Congress passed the 1984 Secondary Mortgage Market 
Enhancement Act (SMMEA), which furthered the use of “private-label (i.e. non-GSE) 
securitization by eliminating the state registration of RMBS and allowing banks and thrifts to list 
RMBS as assets on their balance sheets. With an increasingly hands-off regulatory structure, 
institutions were allowed to funnel depositors’ money, backed by the federal government, into 




1994 with the intention of boosting disclosure requirements as a mechanism for consumer 
financial protection, it did little to prevent abusive or unsound lending practices for most 
mortgages.  As described above, this pattern of well-meaning but ineffectual consumer lending 
regulation harkens back to the 1980s, when federal policies began chipping away at states’ 
abilities to regulate consumer financial products, including mortgage loans, in an effort to bolster 
the growing private mortgage securitization market, and, by extension, bolster homeownership.   
At the same time, the federal government was  “…doing little to nothing to create a new system 
of financial regulation, or even expanding existing regulatory resources, for…new…unregulated 
mortgage lenders that benefited from new secondary-market funding sources.” (Immergluck 
2009: 12).  Further, by providing mortgage companies with access to cheaper secondary-market 
capital and freedom from the more extensive regulatory regime governing Savings & Loans, 
deregulatory policies hastened the demise of more conservative banks and encouraged the 
growth of what would become the subprime mortgage market.   
 Outside of the series of governmental reforms just described, another, even more global 
pattern was afoot in that had important and often deleterious implications for the stability and 
soundness of the U.S. home finance market: bank mergers and consolidations.  According to 
housing economist Michael Ball, the economic turmoil of the 1970s and early ‘80s, when 
combined with loosening regulatory oversight over different kinds of commercial and retail 
financial institutions, meant that many large and small mortgage banks and retail banks merged, 
becoming part of larger “financial services” firms that offered customers everything “under one 
roof”—including non-banking services such as insurance, pensions” (1990: 2).  These types of 
mergers, and the diversity of financial products they allowed single entities to manage, invest, 
and sell to consumers, was an important precursor to the 1999 repeal of the Glass Steagall Act of 
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1933 and the breakdown of the firewall between investment and commercial banking in the 
United States.  
During the 1990s, continuing financial deregulation policies were coupled with Clinton-
Era welfare reform, which, also drawing on neoliberal logic, advocated that the poor take greater 
“personal responsibility” for meeting their basic needs.  This included devolving responsibility 
for finding and paying for a place to live (Newman 2009) and a push to dismantle the most 
visible form of state intervention in the housing market: public housing (Fennell 2016). As the 
Clinton Administration signed “welfare to work” legislation and supported the tearing down of 
public housing developments in Chicago and elsewhere, expanding homeownership was put 
forward as a panacea against the individual ills of urban poverty and social dependency and, as it 
had been after the Great Depression, a lever through which to expand consumer spending and 
grow the national economy.  The Clinton and then the George W. Bush administrations sought to 
facilitate expanding homeownership in a variety of ways.32 But although each administration 
saw initial successes, they came at a high cost.  The dream of sustainable homeownership 
expansion was not realized.   
When the dot.com crash occurred in the late 1990s, the private market for mortgage-
backed securities kicked into overdrive. Investor money flew from technology stocks to a 
seemingly safer yet still highly lucrative mortgage securities market. As more capital flowed into 
                                                 
32 The stated goals of both Clinton’s 1995 National Homeownership Strategy and George W. 
Bush’s 2002 Blueprint for the American Dream were to increase homeownership’s accessibility 
for low and moderate-income households and for minorities. The mechanisms for achieving this 
shared, bipartisan goal included streamlining the mortgage lending process, increasing funding 
for homeownership education and counseling, increasing the supply of affordable housing for 
purchase, funding down payment assistance programs, increasing public awareness about the 
benefits of homeownership, and lowering the down payment required to receive an FHA-insured 




mortgage-backed securities, non-bank mortgage companies such as Countrywide Financial, 
which had been steadily gaining market share since the 1980s, began to introduce more diverse 
loan products.  Using algorithms and consumer credit scores to set risk-based pricing schemes 
that allowed them to serve a wider range of borrowers, and unhampered by the level of 
regulatory scrutiny their bank competitors faced, mortgage companies and other “non-bank 
entities” rapidly increased their lending operations to keep up with investor demand.  Banks 
followed their lead. Risk-based pricing expanded borrowers’ access to mortgage and refinance 
loans and resulted in increased homeownership rates, but it was not sustainable. Lenders adopted 
risk-based pricing and expanded their product offerings not because they believed in the social 
and economic benefits of homeownership for individual households or the nation, but because it 
allowed them to meet the secondary market’s seemingly limitless appetite for mortgage-backed 
securities.   
Risk-based pricing begat subprime loans with higher and often variable interest rates, 
prepayment penalties, and high origination fees, and they were disproportionately marketed to 
the same minority borrowers that had been denied access to consumer credit prior to the fair 
housing legislation of the 1960s.  In the short term, the high costs associated with these types of 
loans, and the frequency with which many homeowners availed themselves of them, was 
obscured by rapidly increasing real estate values in much of the country.  So long as properties 
rapidly appreciated, borrowers could refinance their loans when there was a spike in their interest 
rate, or sell their properties easily at a profit if they could no longer afford to make their 
payments. They could also use their home’s growing equity to finance other costly purchases, 
such as college educations, home repairs, or a new car, by taking out a home equity line of credit.   
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At the secondary market level, the expansion of the mortgage market was also an initial 
success.  Investors in mortgage-backed securities received consistently high rates of return on 
mortgage-backed securities, and filled their balance sheets with them as a result.  But housing 
boom participants, including the federal government and the GSEs, were operating under two 
dangerous assumptions: 1. that real estate tends to increase in value, and 2. that the real estate 
they were buying and selling and the mortgage loans they were using as securities collateral had 
been subjected to a thorough risk assessment. When it was revealed that both housing and the 
mortgage-backed securities market had been overvalued, and market participants at all levels of 
the securitization chain were overleveraged, the mortgage crisis began.   
 According to several scholars of mortgage finance (Ball 1990; Langley 2008; Schiller 
2000), one of the fundamental problems with dismantling the New Deal-era housing finance 
system was that it ignored the key differences between home mortgage loans and other kinds of 
consumer finance. Financial deregulation resulted in a world in which “mortgage lending was 
treated no differently than markets for some mass-marketed consumer product. The politicians, 
regulators, and investment bankers gave little thought to the fundamentally different nature of 
real estate and housing, or to the impact of foreclosure on households’ long-term economic 
prospects and on neighborhoods and cities” (Immergluck 2009: 223).   
While financial deregulation, risk-based pricing, and new mortgage and 
mortgage0backed securities products played a role in U.S. economic growth and expanding rates 
of homeownership during the 1990s and early 2000s, it also resulted in an increasingly complex 
problem of “default correlation” (Langley 2008: 481) that knit together local, national, and 
global financial markets in terrifying ways.  But perhaps the issue was not that bankers, 
politicians and regulators did not recognize a distinction between home mortgage loans and other 
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kinds of consumer products. Instead, their judgment may have been clouded by one of the tenets 
of the U.S. homeownership complex: homeownership, no matter where it occurs or how it is 
financed, is a social and economic that generates future value for those who facilitate and 
participate in it. In Frame II and Chapters 3 and 4, I explore how mortgage lending and real 
estate professionals contribute to, capitalize on, make sense of, and feel constrained by the 
housing value chain that the homeownership complex generates.   
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FRAME II: MARKET MAKERS OR MARKET MADE 
As the history of government’s role in the making of the U.S. housing market outlined in 
the previous chapter reveals, the institution of homeownership is neither natural nor inevitable. It 
requires a complex of interests, actors, resources, and actions to produce and sustain it.  The 
preceding chapter placed the century-long entanglements of the government policies, the private 
housing market, mortgage finance, and historical and existing racial and ethnic inequalities in 
macro-level economic and cultural perspective.  It also attended to how those policies shaped 
local understandings of homeownership’s value through the workings of an emergent 
homeownership complex.   
The following two chapters, which focus on mortgage lending professionals and real 
estate brokers, move from the macro-scale of government housing policymaking and its 
localized effects to a mesoscale of interstitial action and analysis.  Here, mortgage lending and 
real estate professionals act as market middlemen, mediators, and gatekeepers. They strive to 
manage government policies, financial market opportunities and crises, and household-level 
preferences, interests, and ideals in order to connect their customers with the financial capital and 
properties they need to become homeowners. In so doing, they also give financial institutions 
and individuals access to the risks and opportunities involved in a housing value chain that 
stretches from Main Street to Wall Street and beyond.   
The experiences of mortgage lenders and realtors as they navigate the housing market’s 
ups and downs offers us a window into the dense configuration of interests, ideologies, and 
practices that make up and are reproduced by the homeownership complex.  While the 
government initiatives to promote and facilitate homeownership that I describe in Chapter 2 were 
integral in creating a functioning financial and political infrastructure for widespread 
 
 79 
homeownership, mortgage lenders and realtors also play an essential role. They sell the dream of 
homeownership and their own expertise at translating the complicated financial and legal 
entailments of becoming a homeowner or selling a property into something that is understood by 
most people living in the United States as routine process and a form of good citizenship in a 
world that treats access to credit (alternatively framed as a capacity for debt) as an asset.   
Understanding the work of realtors and brokers allows us to see how homeownership 
complex is brought into being by teasing out key links in the value chain required to transform 
individual homes into commodities that can be bought and sold (cf. Mintz 1985; Tsing 2013), 
and turn individual mortgage loans into collective fodder for the global securities market (Ball 
1990; Immergluck 2009).  My focus on market middlemen, rather than on financial elites, also 
offers a way to understand market performativity as the product of a wide variety of differently 
positioned participants. Mortgage lending professionals and real estate brokers I studied have 
less social, educational, and financial capital than the global elite that populate many recent 
social scientific studies of finance (Ho 2009; Holmes 2013; Riles 2011), and thus may appear to 
be less compelling protagonists. However, their position in the value chain betwixt and between 
local and global markets and risks makes them portent figures for understanding the interstitial 
spaces that knit together different social and economic domains and scales of action.  
Just as the financial algorithms created by economists and elite financial professionals 
influence the very market space they strive to understand and control (Granovetter 1985; 
MacKenzie 2008; MacKenzie and Millo 2004), mortgage lenders and real estate brokers’ ideas 
about “the market” and understandings of the risks, freedoms, and opportunities therein facilitate 
the buying and selling of residential property and shape the larger financial circuits in which they 
and their clients are imbricated (cf. Preda 2017; Zaloom 2006).  At the same time, their positions 
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as contributors to the housing value chain are also made, in the sense that they and their positions 
as market mediators are produced and shaped by the exigencies of the U.S. economy and the 





CHAPTER 3: FINANCING DREAMS: MANAGING MORTGAGE RISK 
AND REGULATION 
 
And when you mortgage a home, if you want to do something that’s really great 
for the economy, it takes at least ten people on our side: appraisers, title 
companies, real estate agents… It creates jobs. It keeps people moving. In 
addition to that, after [they] buy their house, well, they go buy furniture. And now 
they’re buying more products out in the market. And if they don’t spend all their 
money on the home, they have more money to spend to work on the home…So 
that’s why there’s such a big focus on [mortgage industry] regulations to make 
sure we do it right and to keep the cost of money feasible to our consumers so that 
we can keep this market moving. Because we need it, we really do.  
—Mortgage Broker Mario Abruzzo, 2014 
 
Above, mortgage broker Mario Abruzzo, a well-dressed, confident white man in his early 
thirties, proudly details the power of mortgage lending as a driver of the U.S. economy.  His 
words echo the sentiments expressed by President Bill Clinton in the epigraph of Chapter 2.  In 
his 1995 address unveiling the National Homeownership Strategy, Clinton promised that citizens 
who became homeowners would reap social and economic benefits and be key contributors, 
through the ripple effects of homeownership-driven consumer spending, to national economic 
growth. “When we boost the number of homeowners in our country, we strengthen our economy, 
create jobs, build up the middle class, and build better citizens,” he said.  Mario shared President 
Clinton’s belief in the power of homeownership.  But rather than placing homeowners as the 
primary figures in the creation of home-fueled consumer spending and market growth, he 
emphasized the essential role that housing professionals, like himself played in the creation of a 
flourishing housing market, and by, extension, a thriving economy. This dissertation, by 
centering on professional housing stakeholders instead of homeowners’ more celebrated role in 
the creation and reproduction of homeownership, follows his lead.   
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Believing in a greater purpose for his work as a mortgage lender, as Mario did, allowed 
him to accept the increased scrutiny of his industry after the housing crash as a fair price to pay 
to “keep this market moving.”  But many of the mortgage professionals I encountered in 2014 
and 2015 were angry, defensive, or bewildered, and they had a very different attitude about the 
post-crisis regulation of their industry and its purpose.  While “Wall Street” garnered public 
vitriol for fanning the flames of financial crisis for their own pecuniary gain, lower-level 
financial professionals in the mortgage lending and broking field were also scorned. As one 
mortgage broker put it bitterly, mortgage brokers were “the whipping boys” of the mortgage 
crisis; maligned for their role in financing an unsustainable housing boom by responding to the 
secondary market’s appetite for mortgage debt and U.S consumers’ appetite for homeownership, 
even though, from his perspective, they were the middlemen, selling the loan products the 
market offered to consumers who wanted to buy them.   
Even as many in their mortgage industry pushed back against criticism by insisting that 
they were merely the mortgage loan salespeople rather than their creators or principal 
beneficiaries, other mortgage brokers, like Mario above, were quick to assert how essential they 
were in housing and economic prosperity more generally. In this chapter I strive to take both 
claims seriously. I take Mario’s claims about mortgage lending’s integral role “in keeping the 
market moving” and other mortgage brokers’ lamentations of the crushing weights of 
government regulation and market contraction and consolidation to be indicative of different 
visions of the housing market and mortgage lenders’ own place and power within it.  
In this chapter, I consider mortgage professionals’ role in the brokering of the 
connections between Wall Street investment firms and Main Street consumers and the 
perspectives and understandings of “the market” and their own industry that this position affords 
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them.  I begin with an extended ethnographic vignette on the life of a mortgage loan as seen 
through the eyes of the various front and back office mortgage industry professionals that move 
it from the application phase to the closing table to an investor’s balance sheet.  I then explore 
mortgage brokers’ experiences of the post-crisis housing landscape and the new regulations, 
economic conditions, and cultural shifts that shape it.  I close with a discussion of how mortgage 
professionals reckon with "crisis" and see themselves as empowered and stigmatized market 
middlemen.   
 
The Life of a Mortgage Loan  
To originate and close a mortgage loan, you have to find a customer who wants one.33 
The loan originator, or "LO" (also called a loan officer, mortgage broker, or mortgage banker, 
depending where they work and how they are compensated, licensed, and regulated) helps the 
borrower fill out a loan application and authorization forms that allow the loan originator and 
his34 colleagues to access the customer’s financial information and credit score.  They may also 
advise the borrower to “lock” the best possible interest rate that is currently available to them on 
the loan of their choice.  This initial information is passed on to a loan opener, who enters the 
information that the originator gathered from the customer into their electronic lending database 
and retrieves the necessary documentation to create a complete loan file.  Then a loan processor 
checks the veracity of the documentation and the calculations made by the loan originator to 
justify an approval for a specific type of loan product. As these steps of the process are going on, 
                                                 
33 You need to find someone who needs a loan for the purchase of a home or a refinance of an 
existing mortgage. In Illinois in the winter of 2015, low interest rates and low season in the home 
buying market meant that refinance loans were more popular than purchase loans.   
34 According to my mortgage field interlocutors, “front office” mortgage loan originators tend to 
be men, and “back office” loan openers, processors, underwriters, and closers tend to be women. 
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the secondary markets department makes a reservation for the loan for which they anticipate the 
prospective borrower will qualify with an affiliate investor. Once the loan application has passed 
through the opening and processing departments and a reservation has been made with an 
investor for a specific type of loan, an underwriter reviews all of the material in the loan file to 
make sure that the numbers entered are correct and correspond with the criteria of the loan for 
which the customer has applied.  Once the loan passes underwriting and the property has been 
appraised, it is “clear to close.”  At closing, the client signs all the necessary documents to 
receive their loan, and, if they are purchasing a new property, receives the keys to their new 
home.  After the closing, the loan is prepared for sale and “shipped” to its investor.  Right before 
it is shipped, it is reviewed again to make sure that it is still in compliance with the stated criteria 
and terms of the investor.  The entire process, from the application to loan closing and shipping, 
can take anywhere from two weeks for a straightforward refinancing loan to six weeks for a new 
purchase loan.  
In February 2015, I spent two weeks at a nationally chartered mortgage bank35 in the 
Chicago suburbs. As a mortgage bank with an affiliated depositor institution as opposed to a 
mortgage brokerage that only sold loans, Darden Home Loan Bank (“Darden” hereafter) 
employed both “front office” loan originators (LOs)36 and “back office” staff (including loan 
openers, processors, underwriters, secondary market liaisons, closers, and post-closing shippers). 
This characteristic is important for understanding how mortgage risk was managed at Darden. 
                                                 
35 A mortgage bank differs from a mortgage brokerage in that it has a line of credit, which allows 
it to use its own funds to “originate” or “front” the money for a new mortgage loan.  But it also 
differs from a traditional savings and loan-style bank in that it does not keep the mortgage loans 
it originates, but rather sells them within a couple of weeks of the closing date to a secondary 
market investor.   
36 Two dozen loan officers worked out of the Illinois branch of the bank, but many more were 
located in other parts of the country, including New York, Florida, Missouri, and Texas. 
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Unlike independent mortgage brokers who worked in isolation from other parts of the loan’s life 
cycle from application to origination, Darden front office and back office staff assumed 
responsibility for mortgage loans’ entire trajectories.  This made them more attuned to the risks 
that existed at different levels of the mortgage value chain.   After interviewing the president of 
Darden in the fall of 2014, I was given the opportunity to shadow people involved in each stage 
of the “life of the loan,” from the application that a home buyer fills out with a LO to the signed 
documents and forms that the shipper packages up and sends to the mortgage loan investor after 
the deal has closed.   
 My first day at Darden was blanketed in snow.  We had a major storm the evening 
before, and the streets were piled high.  Even though my husband and I had dug out our car from 
the layers of snow and ice encasing it the night before in preparation for my drive, I couldn’t get 
the car out of the parking spot without the assistance of a kind stranger. I was nervous I would be 
late for my first day of shadowing, but fortunately, the highways were clear on the way to the 
Darden office in one Chicago’s affluent northwest suburbs.   
I was relieved when I arrived at the address given to me by Don Guerello, a loan 
originator, vice president,37 and area manager, but immediately became confused about where, 
exactly, his office was located. Eventually, I found the exact address and entered a two-story 
building in a small suburban office complex made to look like a neighborhood of identical 
colonial-style houses with white vinyl siding and black shutters arranged in winding cul-de-sacs.  
Inside, I found a carpeted, conservatively decorated lobby area with an empty reception desk.  
Again, I was confused: was I in the right place? Luckily, at that moment, Don, a tall, middle 
                                                 
37 My understanding is that the “vice president” title is relatively meaningless in the mortgage 
lending field—its given as a courtesy to any experienced loan originator and doesn’t reflect their 
degree of influence or an important position in the hierarchy of their place of employment.   
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aged man with salt and pepper hair and slightly stooped posture, emerged. I started to introduce 
myself, but soon noticed that he was on the phone, Bluetooth in his ear. He smiled and motioned 
for me to follow him back toward his windowless, sparsely decorated office.  
Later, I learned that Don shared the office space with another Darden loan officer, Hank 
Cordon, who I had interviewed previously by phone.  But Don told me that Hank mostly worked 
from home, and he was not in during the time I spent there.  My initial impression, that the office 
was empty, is symbolic of the changing nature of the mortgage business as a whole.  Don has 
been in the mortgage business for thirty-eight years, first at a few different large mortgage banks, 
then owning his own mortgage brokerage and title company, and finally, in his senior years, at 
Darden.  Much has changed since he first started.  He told me that “networking” used to involve 
taking a fresh stack of business cards and passing them out to all the businesses on Harlem 
Avenue38, but that now he established and maintained most of his connections online. And while 
he used to meet with clients at his office all the time, now, he seldom interacts with them face-to-
face, communicating with them by phone and email instead.  This change in ways of doing 
business was facilitated by the advent of digital signature and verification software39 that allows 
clients to apply for a mortgage without setting foot in a physical office until closing time.  Even 
then, they can appoint a proxy to sign for them if they so choose, and many never meet their LO 
or any of the other people who work on their loan application other than their loan’s closer on the 
day they complete their final paperwork and receive their set of house keys.   
                                                 
38 a main commercial strip in Chicago that used to house many realty and mortgage brokerage 
offices.  It now hosts numerous used car lots.   
39 Digital signatures became legally binding through the passage of the E-Signatures in the 
Passage of Global and National Commerce (E-Sign) Act in 2000 and began to be used in the 
mortgage lending industry shortly thereafter (Maxie 2014).    
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 Don seemed a bit wistful about these changes.  He defined himself to me as a “people 
person through and through,” and unlike some of the other Darden staff members who merely 
tolerated my presence, he seemed genuinely excited to talk and tell me about his work during our 
time together. In part, I think this was because he missed the camaraderie of a bustling office.  
He complained to me about the tediousness and inefficiency of emailing back and forth with 
clients and other Darden staff rather than picking up the phone. His attachment to his Bluetooth, 
which stayed in his ear for the entirety of our three days together, can be read as a commitment 
to the telephone, which from his perspective seemed to be a more direct form of faceless 
communication than text or email messages.   
At the same time, Don did embrace some aspects of technological evolution in his 
industry.  He proudly showed me a PowerPoint presentation on e-signing mortgage documents 
that he and Hank, the other broker in the office, had designed for techno-phobic clients.  And 
technology also gave him immediate access to information that could help him get both new and 
repeat customers.   He showed me ECustomerBase , a “relationship management” software that 
allowed him to keep track of all his current and prospective clients and quickly send birthday 
greetings, check-ins, and reminder emails from a single portal. He also showed me a U.S. 
Treasury Note yield ticker on Yahoo Finance that he always kept open on his computer desktop. 
The ticker allows him to track the direction that the markets are going and make predictions 
about interest rate changes. When the U.S. Treasury note yield goes up, he explained, mortgage 
interest rates go up, as well.  A threshold of twenty-five to thirty ticks up or down will change 
the mortgage interest rate by an eighth of a percentage point.  While I was there, the rate went up 
about fifty-five ticks, reaching the threshold for the 1/8 of percentage point change but not the 
more significant quarter of a point .  In my first day with Don, he got an email from Darden’s 
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secondary markets department saying that if a customer requested an interest rate lock after 2 
PM, the bank could not guarantee it. Don showed me the email proudly, saying “we knew that 
would happen” already by watching the treasury note yield.  
I also saw his use of relationship management software in action.  When I arrived on a 
Tuesday, Don told me he had already used E-CustomerBase to send out six personalized emails 
to clients with a snapshot of what their new monthly payments would be if they decided to 
refinance their loans40.  By the time we discussed the software in more depth on Wednesday, he 
had heard back from four of the people he had emailed with requests for more information, and 
was already in the process of refinancing the mortgages of the other two people he had 
contacted. He said that refinances were a “great opportunity for repeat business” and that “there 
are always people who could use more money, but the conditions and the borrowers’ 
circumstances had to be right for it.”  Interest rates had fallen dramatically since the peak of the 
housing market, yet only those homeowners that had some equity41 in their homes could take 
advantage of the lower rates.   
Watching U.S. Treasury Note yields and anticipating their effects on mortgage interest 
rates was one way that Don sought to add value as an indispensible market mediator. He 
explained to me that only a significant “global event” will really wreak havoc on interest rates 
and lead to a dramatic change.  But markets shift incrementally for a variety of reasons, like the 
                                                 
40 A mortgage loan refinance involves transferring the existing balance of one’s loan to new loan, 
usually at a lower interest rate.  Some refinances also give the borrower “cash out” or a home 
equity line of credit to use, whereas others involve a change in the interest rate or in the length of 
the loan term only.  All refinances involve processing fees, some of which go to the mortgage 
loan originator (in this case, Don).   
41 Equity refers here to the difference between the amount of money outstanding on the 
homeowners’ mortgage loan(s) and the current assessed market value of their home.  Many 
people had “negative” equity after the mortgage crisis, either because their falling home prices 
had negatively effected the assessed value of their property, they had refinanced their mortgage 
loans or borrowed against their home through a home equity line of credit, or both.   
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Federal Reserve releasing their quarterly minutes.   Like his use of E-CustomerBase to stay in 
touch with clients so he could continue to offer his services to them, Don monitored financial 
markets in order to better anticipate market shifts that he could use to create new or repeat 
business for himself.  He told me that what’s good about his kind of proactive monitoring is that 
the markets open at 7:30 AM Central Time, but mortgage interest rates are not set until 10 
o’clock in the morning.  Don said that he knows (and can tell the loan originators he supervises) 
to start moving on a change (like a downturn in prices) before that change affects his customers.  
He explained to me that keeping track of price movements is a big way to “churn” the loans of 
existing clients.  When interest rates drop enough below the rate the client currently has, Don or 
someone else on the sales team sends an email or makes a call, and shares how the change could 
impact the client, whether they want to refinance to lower their rate or get cash out.   
According to Don, a mortgage loan refinance is good for the bank and good for the loan 
officer, but first and foremost it’s good for the customer, allowing them to lower monthly 
payments, reduce the term of their loan, and/or get cash out.  “It’s a tool,” he said.  “Odds are, 
you’re not like your great grandmother who lived and died in the same property.”  Don’s insight 
speaks to the home’s simultaneous identity as family dwelling and financial instrument. In The 
Financialization of Everyday Life, Randy Martin warns that “without significant capital, people 
are being asked to think like capitalists” (2002: 12). The implication of this observation seems to 
be that it is unreasonable, or even detrimental, for people to treat their lives as a kind of 
commercial venture and to make important decisions, such as when to buy, sell or refinance a 
house, on that basis.  From the perspective of a mortgage professional like Don, however, 
homeowners with a mortgage should be thinking like capitalists if they want to, in the words of 
mortgage broker Mario at the beginning of the chapter, “leverage their money.” That a mortgage 
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lender will also receive another commission if existing clients chose to refinance their loan is not 
seen to be a conflict of interest so long as the refinance benefits the customer in some way, as 
well. Don told me that an interest rate reduction counts as one of the acceptable “net tangible 
benefits” that allow a LO to approach a borrower about the possibility of refinancing their loan42. 
As Don worked to serve his clients in the origination phase of the loan process, he was in 
near-constant communication with two types of “back office” Darden staff members: loan 
openers and processors.  At Darden, each LO is assigned an opener and processor, ostensibly to 
facilitate clear communication, streamline the origination process, and better serve their clients.  
But from what I observed and heard from Don, the LO’s relationship with back office workers 
was a delicate thing, subject to costly misunderstandings, resentments, and communication 
breakdowns if not treated with care and finesse by the loan officer.  This was because the loan 
opener and processor represented the first two institutional checks against a loan officer’s 
overzealous selling of loan products to potentially unqualified borrowers.   
Once a loan application comes in, the loan officer gathers some preliminary documents 
from the prospective borrower, like their credit report, bank statements, pay stubs, W2s, and tax 
returns. The loan officer also runs the borrower’s data (credit score, income, existing debt 
obligations, and proposed loan amount and type) through an automated underwriting system,43 
                                                 
42 According to Don, before the mortgage crisis unscrupulous lenders would use frequent 
refinance offers to “churn the loan,” scoring commissions and fees each time their cash-strapped 
customers refinanced.  Some clients became caught up in a vicious cycle of adjustable and teaser 
rate mortgages that necessitated frequent refis to be sustainable.  These mortgages went into 
default as soon as home values started to fall and consumer credit dried up.   
43 Automated underwriting began in the 1990s, when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac developed 
the programs to quickly assess whether loans met their underwriting requirements before 
purchasing them for securitization purposes. Eventually, they became an industry standard.  
Lenders use automated underwriting to generate an initial approval, which confirms that the 
proposed loan meets basic underwriting requirements, such as Debt to Income ratio.  But most 
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such as Automatic Underwriter or Loan Processor, to get an initial approval.  Then the LO sends 
the loan application to an opener, who requests verifications of every piece of information that 
the borrower submitted, such as a verification of employment, social security number 
confirmation, and IRS tax return transcripts.  The opener communicates with the borrower and 
with the loan officer to gather these verifications so that the file can move to the next phase, 
processing.   
While the opener holds an essentially clerical role of collecting documents and entering 
them into the loan file in Darden’s database, the processor is charged with doing a higher order 
of work.  Her role consists of cross-checking the documents gathered by the loan officer and the 
opener against the representations made by the prospective borrower on the mortgage loan 
application and making sure that the loan officer’s initial approval of the loan was based on 
accurate and correctly-interpreted information from the borrower.  In this sense, although she 
and the loan officer are on the same team and working toward the same goal of origination and 
closing the loan, her responsibility to check the accuracy of his work make their relationship 
slightly adversarial.   
After my days with Don, I moved to another one of Darden’s branch offices where I 
spent the day with a Darden processor supervisor, Samantha Marsdale, a blonde white woman in 
her early forties whose office was covered with photos of herself and friends and family on 
various adventures and outings. Samantha played basketball in college and, while she was not 
particularly tall or physically imposing, she retained the calculating gaze and direct manner that I 
associate with a tough athletic competitor.  One of the first things she told me, quite bluntly, was 
that she would never want to sell mortgages.  Her father was a banker and, although she went to 
                                                                                                                                                             
loan products also have additional criteria that must be manually checked even if the loan is 
approved by the automated program.   
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school to be a teacher, she changed her mind when she realized that they didn’t make enough 
money.  She started out in banking as a loan closer, then went into business-to-business sales for 
a while, then worked as a mortgage loan processor, eventually moving up to the supervisory role 
at Darden’s processing department that she currently held.  She said sales was not for her 
because “I always wanted to do what was best for the borrowers and what was best for the 
borrowers wasn’t always selling.”  Salespeople’s job was to sell, she explained, but “processors 
have a job because they make sure the paperwork is right in an industry with a lot of paperwork.”  
Pulling up a loan file to illustrate the nature of her work, Samantha told me that “the 
application gives me a full and complete picture of what these people are.” Unlike Don, 
Samantha would likely never meet or speak with the borrowers whose files she reviewed.  
Her part in the lending process is to gather and crosscheck all supporting documentation to verify 
that the picture the borrower provides in their loan application is an accurate one.  Some of the 
documents she reviews are the ones that the loan officer and opener gather from the borrower, 
while others come from third parties, such as verifications of employment or IRS tax return 
transcripts.44  She told me that as a processor, “you need to make sure you don’t see any 
‘misrepresentations,’ or fraud, in the file.  What happened before [the mortgage crisis of 2008] 
was that there were no third-party verifications.”  By this she means that many lenders treated 
the borrowers’ stated income, assets, and debts to be what the borrower said they were, without 
checking with their bank, employer, or the IRS.    
Samantha is an experienced member of Darden’s back office team who takes her work 
very seriously, mentors and cajoles the loan openers and processors she supervises, and deals 
                                                 
44 Tax return transcripts from the IRS have to be matched against the tax returns that the 
borrower submits to the loan officer to make sure that they actually filed what they claim they 
did.   
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with loan officers in a direct but respectful way.  She recognizes that a processor owes a 
responsibility to multiple parties in the loan process, including the loan officer, the prospective 
borrower, and the bank where she works, but does not seem to see these as conflicting 
orientations.  In fact, she told me that tying loan opener and processor compensation to the fate 
of the loan files they work on makes good sense and helps create a team atmosphere at the 
bank.45 However, I did not get the impression that that meant that she would cut corners to 
appease a domineering loan officer’s demands.   
 In the afternoon of my second day shadowing Samantha, she checked in with the two 
men who manage Darden’s relationships with investors in the secondary markets department.  I 
had the opportunity to meet with each of them briefly and hear about their part in the mortgage 
loan origination process, as well as the role their department plays once the loan is closed and 
ready to be sold to an investor.  The first time they come into the picture is when a prospective 
borrower requests an interest rate lock. The secondary market department has to “go out into the 
market” on a virtual basis and find an investor with whom Darden has a relationship who is 
willing to purchase the type of loan that the borrower wants at the rate they have requested.  
Darden partners with approximately twenty secondary market investors, and new investors pitch 
them all the time.  While the prospective borrower has no contact with this part of the origination 
process whatsoever, save being told that Darden will sell their loan once it closes, what the 
secondary market team does is absolutely essential for the loan to reach the closing table. They 
are the ones who bridge the gap between individual borrower applying for a mortgage loan for 
their own specific property that meets their needs and the global circulations of financial capital 
that buy, package, and turn mortgages into securities, which are then sold and circulated again.   
                                                 
45 While loan openers and processors are employees rather than independent contractors, they 
receive a commission when the loan files they work on close.   
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Once a loan file has been reviewed and checked by a processor and a place has been 
reserved for it with a partner investor, it moves into underwriting.  The underwriter’s job is to 
make sure that the borrower presents an acceptable level of risk for the bank that will originate 
her loan46 (in this case, Darden) and the investor who has agreed to purchase her loan once it has 
been finalized and closed.  The presence of an in-house underwriting department is also one of 
the things that separates how lending works at Darden, a financial institution with the capacity to 
underwrite in-house and originate loans on its own line of credit, from how it works at mortgage 
brokerages, which employ brokers and processors to take in loan applications and quickly verify 
their underlying documentations but then rely on third-party underwriters employed by the 
different lending partners with whom they are affiliated and who possess the necessary capital 
and capacity to fund the loans they broker.  While Darden sells the loans they make shortly after 
closing (the point at which money transfers from the buyer to the seller), the fact that they are 
responsible for the entire process until the closed loan is shipped to an investor affects the level 
of responsibility, fiscal and otherwise, that Darden assumes with regard to each loan. When loans 
cannot be sold or fail within the first three months and are “returned” to Darden by their lending 
partners, a problem loan committee figures out what to do with them.47   
                                                 
46To originate a loan means to make the initial outlay of money to purchase the property or 
refinance an existing loan.  Shortly after Darden makes the origination, however, the loan is 
resold to a secondary market investor. 
47 During my time at Darden, the problem loan committee assessed the status of loans that, for 
one reason or another, they had had to “portfolio”—meaning keep on their balance sheets, thus 
diminishing their lending capacity and heightening their exposure to risk—because they had 
either been unable to sell them because of some defect that they did not discover until after they 
originated the loan, or because the borrower had defaulted within the first six months and they 
had had to buy the loan back from the investor to which they had sold it.  They weighed the 
wisdom of selling the problem loans for pennies on the dollar to a subprime investor or keeping 
them and servicing them themselves until, if all went well, they could be brought into 
compliance, refinanced, and sold at their full value.   
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I learned from the loan originators I spoke to that there are benefits and drawbacks to 
working with in-house underwriters.  On the benefit side, according to Don and Mario, who both 
had previous experiences working at brokerages without in-house underwriting, it is easier to 
communicate with and potentially easier to change the minds of the underwriter about the 
viability of a loan if they work at the same company that you do.  But a drawback is that loan 
officers who work at financial institutions that underwrite and originate their own loans are often 
constrained by stricter underwriting parameters than loan originators who broker loans with a 
number of different lenders, at least some of which have very lenient underwriting requirements.  
However, there’s a spectrum: large commercial banks such as Chase and Bank of America have 
even more stringent requirements because they originate loans and securitize them themselves.   
There is also a spectrum of risk and compensation associated with the different types of lending 
institutions where an LO can set up shop, although some of the high-risk, high-reward 
opportunities at the fringes of the market have been curtailed by post-crisis regulatory initiatives.   
Although the underwriter I shadowed, Martha Kirchner, is an employee of Darden like 
Don and Samantha, her compensation is not tied to loan closings, and her responsibilities are not 
as divided. Martha is a white woman in her fifties with hair dyed an arrestingly magenta shade of 
red.  She explained to me that her job is to protect the interests and financial wellbeing of Darden 
Bank, and only that. She also feels a strong moral responsibility to protect prospective borrowers 
from entering into mortgage loans they cannot afford.  She did not articulate feeling any parallel 
sense of obligation to the loan officers whose loan’ fates she determines.   
Although she has been in the mortgage business for twenty-six years, Martha is a relative 
newcomer at Darden. She spent the majority of her career working at Countrywide and then 
Bank of America after Countrywide collapsed and was bought out. When we met at the bank in 
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2015, she had only been there for six months, and spent part of each week working from home.  
She is much less involved in the back-office culture and camaraderie than Samantha or the other 
openers and processors I observed, who seem to spend their days chatting and joking about their 
LOs, clients, and fellow back-office workers.  This social distancing, it seems, is intentional, as 
Martha believes her work requires her complete attention and demands impartiality.  She avoids 
speaking directly to borrowers or gossiping about the files with coworkers in order to ensure that 
her judgment of what is in each file remains clear.   
Martha tells me that what she likes about underwriting is that “it’s not an exact science” 
and that it “works both sides of her brain”—both the mathematical/analytical part and the 
abstract part.   When reviewing a file, her job is to reconstruct “the story behind it.”  To do that 
she “connects the dots in a way that’s not easy to explain.”  In part, it involves “catching some of 
the errant threads” and figuring out if the story in the file “sits well” with her or not.  These acts 
of interpretation are an integral part of the risk assessment process, as Martha’s decision-making 
is shaped by underwriting “guidelines,” and by the loan file’s contents as presented by the LO, 
but it is not determined by either. As Guy Stuart discovers from his observations of underwriters’ 
risk assessment practices in Discriminating Risk: The U.S. Mortgage Lending Industry in the 
Twentieth Century (2003), “[i]n looking at the information before them and filling in the gaps, 
the underwriters engaged in a series of storytellings.  Each piece of information in the file had a 
story behind it, which often could be checked by reference to another piece of information 
there.” (121).  Like the underwriters that Stuart shadowed, Martha seemed to acknowledge that 
the numbers and data points in the loan files she reviewed were only partial representations of 
the character, intentions, and financial wherewithal of the person applying for the loan. And yet 
she also seemed confident in her ability to pull together the file’s “errant threads” in a way that 
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allowed her to more accurately assess both the applicant’s present circumstances and predict the 
part of their future that the bank cared about: whether they would pay their debts. 
For example, Martha showed me a loan file that she had decided had to be denied due to 
the insufficient income.  The borrower only earned $1,700 in gross income per month and had no 
consumer credit history.48 In addition, she was not currently paying rent.  On paper, none of 
these things were negatives, per se. But Martha felt that because there was no evidence of the 
woman taking on and managing consumer debt (no credit history) and was not paying for her 
housing, she had no basis for assessing the three basic criteria in whether or not to underwrite a 
loan: a borrower’s willingness, ability, and capacity to pay.  I asked how, if the file had passed 
through the hands of a loan originator and processor, she was the first one to come to that 
conclusion.  She told me that the LO, the processor, and she had all calculated this woman’s 
income differently.  The borrower had just obtained a new job that might give her the 
opportunity to make more money in the future, so the LO had averaged her current and 
prospective future earnings to come up with the income he used to qualify her.  But Martha told 
me that this is not the proper way to calculate qualifying income—you have to look at what the 
borrower’s earnings are now.  Approaching it that way, the woman’s front-end debt to income 
ratio (DTI) was 49%, which barely qualified her for the loan in the Automatic Underwriting 
System.  Further, Martha insisted that we needed to take into account the fact that her gross 
                                                 
48 Introduced in 1989 by Fair, Isaac and Company, the consumer credit score is used by lender’s 
to assess potential borrower’s risk of credit default. The score is based on a numerical 
approximation of the consumer’s credit history, which includes the amount of credit extended to 
them through trade lines (credit cards) and loans (student loan debt, mortgage loan debt) and 
their history of repayment.  Ironically, in order to have a “good” credit score, one must have 
taken on (and routinely made payments on) multiple forms of consumer debt.  Those who rent 
and do not have debt, for example, may not have sufficiently established credit histories to 
generate a useful credit score.   
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income is very low, so if anything goes wrong with the property, she will have very little cushion 
to pay unexpected expenses.  
Martha explained to me that the different ways that the loan officer and she calculated the 
borrower’s income made sense because while his job was to sell mortgages, her job was to 
protect the consumer and the bank. Brokers and underwriters may work together under the same 
roof, as they do at Darden, but as Guy Stuart notes, they both assess and present risk differently.  
While a broker is searching for a way to present the borrower as an acceptable risk, the 
underwriter searches for the risks that the broker ignores or obscures:  
[T]he application process itself contributes to the construction of the loan 
applicant as a good risk.  This is done by both exclusion and inclusion.  Both 
brokers and loan officers exclude those who they anticipate will not fit the rules.  
But once they decide to include them in the process they make effort to represent 
them in the best possible light.  In doing so, they pull together information 
according to the requirements of the underwriting guidelines.  They also include 
or omit information in order to construct a file that presents a good risk according 
to their reading of the guidelines.  Then it is up to the underwriter to review that 
information and come up with a final decision based on those same guidelines. As 
a result a rejection is an indicator of a disagreement between the loan officer and 
the underwriter, based either on the discovery of new information during the 
processing of the loan or a difference in their readings of the file. [Stuart 2003: 
110]   
 
As Martha explained it, if she underwrites a loan that Darden cannot sell to its target 
investor because it does not fully comply with their underwriting criteria, or the borrower 
defaults in the first year, blame comes back to her as the underwriter.  It also comes back to the 
bank, which will sometimes have to keep the rejected loan in its portfolio49 or, if it is sold but did 
                                                 
49 A loan that is in a lender’s “portfolio” is still on its books.  In the 1980s, lenders were 
encouraged to sell off the mortgage loans they made in order to reduce their risk exposure.  
However, some banks choose to keep difficult to place loans on their portfolio in order to 
comply with Community Reinvestment Act requirements or because they are high risk and thus 
hard to sell, but the lender has a relationship with the borrower they wish to maintain.  For 
example, real estate developers’ loans are portfolioed by banks until they are “seasoned.” Some 
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not perform, buy it back from the investor at a premium.  Plus, she told me that she does not 
want to set a borrower up to fail by putting them in a property with a mortgage they cannot 
afford.  These calculations of risk and responsibility at the mescoscale (Orta 2018; Scott 199; 
Tsing 2005) help shape the U.S. housing market and the opportunities and pitfalls that the 
homeownership complex makes possible within it. 
Like Don, Martha expressed frustration with some of the ways the nature of her work has 
changed as a result of technological innovation.  She talked about how it was just easier for her 
to keep track of her notes on each loan file on paper, as I mention above, in part because it is 
sometimes difficult for her to recall her decision-making process and “catch an error on the 
backend” unless she has a written record on the file itself.  She believes that virtual loan systems, 
which went into effect universally in 2005, are “not as transparent between the underwriter and 
investor.” This is an issue because “if there’s confusion about how something’s calculated, [the 
investor] is not going to give you [the originating bank’s underwriter] the benefit of the doubt.”  
Martha sees herself as a gatekeeper who protects the borrower and the bank, although she “leans 
on the bank side to protect their assets.”  She said being a good underwriter requires that you 
“apply reason to the process, know the business, and have a sense of flow.” Martha expressed 
skepticism throughout our time together about the ability of automated underwriting systems to 
completely replace a human underwriter in this process. Although not an avowed “people 
person,” like Don the LO, she, too, seemed concerned about how technological innovations in 
her field had made human skills and capacities less valuable.  “It’s not an exact science,” she told 
me, her implication being that as a human being, she was better equipped than an algorithm to 
sort through disparate pieces of a loan file and accurately assess risk.    
                                                                                                                                                             
small community banks also keep loans in their portfolio and service them themselves in 
recognition of the value and importance of direct, long-term client relationships.   
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Once a loan has passed through underwriting, it is in the home stretch of its journey to the 
closing table.  But another, parallel process is necessary to get the loan to closing: Darden must 
find a third-party investor that is willing to buy the loan from the bank once it has been closed, as 
they have a limited line of credit which they want to keep as free as possible—necessitating that 
most closed loans are sold within a couple of weeks of their origination date.  The secondary 
market department, in collaboration with the loan officer, handles this aspect of the loan’s 
passage. Assuming all goes well and the loan makes it to closing before its interest-rate lock 
expires, the penultimate phase of its lifecycle is overseen by Darden’s loan closers.  To 
understand this aspect of the loan process, I traveled to a Darden branch office in another 
Chicagoland suburb—this one less affluent than the branch where Samantha, Martha, and the 
secondary market staff worked.  This office housed both back-office staff and a retail branch of 
the bank, staffed by bilingual Polish, Lithuanian, Italian, and English-speaking tellers in 
deference to the diverse white ethnic composition of its retail customer base.   
Amy, a middle-aged white woman in her forties with the husky voice of a long-term 
smoker, is a closing manager at Darden.  She was very warm and welcoming toward me, but also 
very busy.  A closing was scheduled to start at ten in the morning, about ten minutes after I 
arrived, and there were lots of last-minute issues.  The biggest problem was related to 
disclosures.  Something had been disclosed to the borrower as an APR fee, but it was not in that 
category.  Amy was worried that an error in the way that the origination fees were categorized 
was going to put them out of compliance with Truth in Lending Acting requirements, which 
stipulate that certain closing costs cannot vary from the projected amount given the borrower 
seventy-two hours before the closing date by more than ten percent of the loan, but the loan 
amount was large enough that it did not happen.  Still, fixing the error was a hassle. All the forms 
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that had already been submitted to the title agent had to be amended to reflect the revision.  Amy 
called the title agent and they agreed that she could send the amended documents.  Fortunately, 
Amy had not yet ordered the wire transfer from Darden to the seller’s bank, which was good 
since the amount of money was now going to be slightly different.  Amy called the processor on 
the loan file, Holly, who felt terrible about not catching the error before it reached the closing 
table.  Amy was very calm and kind to her, telling her it was okay and that she would fix 
everything.  This measured response matched what she said was her overall philosophy—that 
“getting all worked up usually doesn’t make anything better.”  She said she learned that when 
she worked as a closer (as opposed to her current title, closing manager) but it is something that 
applies across the board in the lending business.  She said that people in other parts of the bank 
often get upset with closing and with compliance, too, because they’re always asking them to 
make corrections and fix mistakes, so “it helps to joke with people and be extra friendly if your 
job is to tell them they’ve messed something up.”  
She told me that this was her first time closing this type of mortgage, a 503K Homestyle 
loan that included an initial loan amount to be used for home repairs and then a loan for the 
mortgage itself, if the repairs brought up the property’s appraised value sufficiently within the 
proscribed six-month-renovation period. As she worked on the various issues, she briefly 
described what she was doing and why.  Someone emailed to ask about whether a LO could e-
sign some document.  It turned out he couldn’t, which presented a problem because he was out 
of state, in Florida.  So she emailed him the form and asked him to send it back. As she readied 
the wire transfer for the 503K loan (after correcting all the necessary forms with the updated fee 
schedule) she explained to me that every wire transfer that is sent has to be documented in order 
to comply with the Good Funds Act. “Closers need to make sure that all the rules, all the end 
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rules are followed, and make sure we’re verifying who the people actually are.  We’re the last 
line of defense [against mortgage fraud], kind of.”  
Her troubles with the 503K loan were not over, however.  There were several 503K 
specific addenda that had to be filled out and, while she had filled them out and printed them the 
previous night, when she went to get them, she realized that the documents had printed blank—
the file type was “read only,” which meant that her work had not been saved.  Two of the 
documents were Microsoft Word files so she could fill them in on the computer (although they 
weren’t real forms—entering data displaced the little underscore they were using for a line).  But 
one was a PDF that she could not type in. We looked for a typewriter tool but couldn’t find one, 
so eventually she just had to print the document, handwrite the necessary information, and scan 
it.  This all happened as the borrowers were sitting (presumably impatiently) at the closing table, 
but Amy stayed calm.  The last problem was the wire transfer—the title company where the 
closing was taking place could not find it.  They requested a federal reference number for the 
wire.  With that information, they realized the problem—the title agent had been looking for the 
wrong amount.   
As she went about her work, Amy continued to explain aspects of the closing process to 
me.  Her work seemed stressful; she was constantly responding to problems that seemed to arise 
at the last possible moment, right before the loan could be closed, her co-workers could be 
compensated, and the bank could wave goodbye and close the file of another happy customer.  
But the troubleshooting she did to fix earlier errors and address last minute issues illustrated an 
important aspect of the mortgage lending process at Darden: it demanded team work and a host 
of double and triple checks, most of which were completely invisible to the borrower.   
 
 103 
After a loan closes at Darden, it moves to the compliance department and then to its final 
stop, shipping.50  When I initially saw “shipping” on the observation and interviewing schedule 
prepared for me, I thought it meant spending time in the mailroom where they boxed up the 
physical documents associated with each loan and sent them somewhere, something I did not 
expect to be relevant to my research. But I learned that the shipping department oversees what 
they hope will be the final part of Darden’s role in the life of the loan and the borrower.  After 
the loan closes, they inform the investor with which they have made an initial agreement to place 
the loan and make sure that the sale can go ahead as planned. 90% of the time, it can. But 
sometimes an error in some phase of the loan’s life cycle at Darden, or an unanticipated shift in 
the borrower’s circumstances that will affect their capacity to pay, such as a job loss or illness, or 
a recent change in investor’s underwriting criteria, means that the loan cannot be sold to that 
investor as originally planned. In those circumstances, the shipping department works closely 
with the secondary market staff, the loan’s original processor and underwriter, the loan officer, 
and the closer to find another home for the loan and get it off of Darden’s balance sheet as 
quickly as possible.  In rare cases, this cannot happen and the loan, crippled by a “fatal error” 
that puts it out of alignment with investor underwriting requirements, has to stay on the books for 
a period of time to be seasoned and then refinanced by Darden or, if all else fails, sold to a 
subprime investor for far less than originally planned.  When Darden has to keep a problem loan, 
it diminishes its capacity to originate new loans, hurting everybody’s bottom line.  For this 
                                                 
50 In the compliance phase, the closed loan goes through another series of checks, focusing 
specifically on the closing process, to ensure that the loan is still in compliance with all 
regulatory and investor requirements and is ready to leave the originating bank (Darden) and be 
sold to an investor.  Although I was scheduled to meet with and shadow the supervisor of 
Darden’s compliance department, I was unable to do so due to a death in her family during the 
time I was scheduled to do research.  
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reason, Darden staff work hard to ensure that the loans they originate will not be rejected or 
kicked back to them.  
What should be clear in the above description of a loan’s journey from application to 
closing and shipping is that this is a complex process of information collection, assessment, and 
interpretation.  Divergent understandings of market and customer risk and opportunity must be 
brought into alignment before the process is complete.  The Darden staff I met were experienced 
mortgage lending professionals who, at least during the time I observed them, seemed to work 
relatively well together, take their work seriously, and take pride in what they did.  Darden’s 
lending process, with its chain of differently positioned, trained, and empowered actors each 
taking responsibility for ensuring that the loans they sell and originate are sound, is instructive as 
a counterpoint to the predatory, fraud-filled nature of some corners of the mortgage lending 
industry prior to the mortgage crisis. It is also as an illustration of the layers of responsibility and 
the different orientations and interests that exist in the housing value chain of credit, debt, and 
securitization (Stout 2016).   
Because Darden originates mortgage loans, several links of the securitization chain occur 
in-house, and the different priorities of brokers, underwriters, and the bank itself have to be 
managed and reconciled with one another in order for lending to occur. But mortgage brokerages 
that sell mortgage loans to consumers have no such internal reconciliation process: they sell the 
loan products that investors give them to sell.  During the pre-crisis housing boom, this meant 
that the kinds of checks and double checks that I witnessed at Darden were not made high 
priorities for many mortgage professionals. Brokers could use automated underwriting to issue 
an initial approval of a client’s loan application on the basis of a few key pieces of unverified 
information, such as their stated income, assets, credit score, and debts. Compensated based on 
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the quantity of loans they sold rather than their underlying “quality,” many passed on loan files 
with unsubstantiated numbers to outside underwriters, who were also compensated based on loan 
approval numbers, and thus had little incentive to dig any deeper than their baseline criteria 
required.  The banks and non-bank entities that funded these loans with unsubstantiated borrower 
information then sold them to secondary market investors eager for securities fodder.  
As economic geographer Paul Langley points out, there is nothing surprising in this lack 
of concern for the macro level risks such lending practices created; “systemic risk” was not on 
mortgage brokers’ radar when they sold loans to customers because it did not have to be.  
Langley cautions against condemning subprime lending for creating the mortgage crisis because 
it leaves a much broader “ambiguous politics of calculation” untouched.  He argues that pointing 
to subprime loans as the cause of the mortgage finance market’s collapse may lead to a false 
confidence that the housing market’s problems can be regulated away.  Instead, he asserts that 
we need to “call into question not only those [lenders and borrowers] who seem to be implicated 
in [subprime’s] excesses, but also the broader and seemingly secure ‘prime’ networks of 
mortgage and consumer finance” (Langley 2008: 490).   
Although new regulations and compliance requirements under Dodd Frank and the CFPB 
have slowed the loan origination and securitization process down and introduced more checks 
against fraud, such as the third party verification requirements that Darden loan processor 
Samantha mentioned, the mortgage lending industry remains intimately tied up in and reliant 
upon financial markets to purchase the loans they sell.  As such, the future of lending, and, with 
it, U.S. homeownership, depends upon mortgage loans continuing to be both an attractive and a 
relatively safe opportunity for both Wall Street investors and prospective borrowers. While the 
homeownership complex’s aim is to produce homeownership, it also must sustain the machinery 
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of housing finance.  This means appealing to both borrowers and to financial markets: the home 
must simultaneously be a tangible vehicle of financial and social stability and it must be 
immediately transformable into a security with a good return on investment.    Mortgage banks 
like Darden and the lending professionals who work there sell products and services up and 
down the value chain of mortgage finance.  Their work, when successful, sustains the financial 
component of the homeownership complex.  
    
Mortgage Brokers Respond to Crisis and Regulation 
The mortgage lending professionals I shadowed and interviewed at Darden seemed 
cocooned in a relatively safe and lucrative corner of the lending world.  But I also spoke with a 
number of loan originators who worked for brokerages rather than banks, felt far more exposed 
to market and regulatory changes, and struggled to understand how they fit within and might 
make a decent living in the lending field.  Social scientists who study finance have drawn on 
actor network theory to make sense of agencies and technologies of risk assessment, forms of 
securitization, and global financial circuits, and their economic and social effects (Callon 1998; 
Callon and Caliskan 2010, 2009; Langley 2009, 2008; LiPuma and Lee 2004). But academics are 
not the only ones invested in better understanding how the economy is produced and what it 
produces. Many of the mortgage brokers I encountered were struggling to navigate and make 
sense of the markets in which they worked and the effects of technological, cultural, economic, 
and regulatory change on the same.  As the mortgage industry wrestled with the extent to which 
strategies that were once tacitly accepted have now become categorically illegal and ethically 
compromising under new regulatory guidelines, my interlocutors’ readings of the market and the 
mortgage crisis of 2007-2009 varied.  While some expressed dismay at colleagues whose 
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behavior they saw as unethical, others pushed back against characterizations of their industry as 
corrupt and in need of reform.  Some suggested that the real culprits of the financial crisis existed 
above them in the securitization food chain, in the secondary market.  Others insisted that the 
federal government was to blame for prioritizing the creation of homeownership and interfering 
in mortgage finance to achieve this political goal.   
The stakes of housing market failure, whatever its origin, were high for my mortgage 
broker interlocutors. Katherine Canter, one of only two women brokers whom I interviewed, 
turned to mortgage lending after her career in filmmaking began to falter.51 Originally from 
Ohio, she moved to Chicago in the early 1990s to attend the School of the Art Institute and 
ended up earning a living making films that corporations used as promotional material during 
large conventions and trade conferences.  After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the 
ensuing travel fears and economic contraction that followed it, her work, which was always 
freelance, dried up. With no prior interest in or knowledge of mortgage lending, she entered the 
business when an old acquaintance of hers called one day and asked, 
 “What are you doing?” I said, “Well, I don’t really know.”  He said, “Well, I’m a 
mortgage broker now and in the middle of a refi boom and I need some help” and I said, 
“What is a refi boom?” [She laughs.] And so he explained it to me, and I said, “what do 
you need me to do?” and basically it was the processing.  It’s a clerical position…after 
someone signs a loan application then you need to make sure that all that stuff that needs 
to take place before the closing gets done, so you look for the title, you have to order an 
appraisal, you have to make sure that you get all the documents you need from the client, 
everything has to all come together...And I did that for about six months and I did not like 
it at all, but I understood the business and I said to him that “Look, why don’t you hire 
another processor and you and I will both originate loans.” So he’s like, “Alright, let’s do 
it.”   
 
                                                 
51Anecdotally I was told by many of my mortgage industry interviewees that theirs was a male-
dominated field. Because mortgage lenders are a diffuse set of workers, I was not able to locate 
reliable statistics to back up or counter this impression. 
 
 108 
She worked with him for another couple of years and then went out on her own and had good 
success.  Although it was not a career she was passionate about, Katherine was a practical 
person. She had already made the compromise to focus on corporate projects instead of making 
her own films.  When the corporate film industry contracted, selling mortgages gave her the 
income she needed and the flexibility and autonomy she wanted.  And she found she liked 
helping people, particularly first time buyers, purchase a home.   
But in 2008, she was faced with the same question she had had after September 11th—
should she stick with a job with a less and less stable income, but the flexibility she wanted, or 
venture into something new once again?  She recalled that moment vividly and somewhat 
bitterly.   
Well, I wanna know what happened [in the mortgage lending industry]. Because I was at 
a point in my life where I was like okay, I’m competent at this and I like helping people 
buy homes and people like working with me and I’m making good money—the best 
money I’ve ever made in my life, frankly, and I thought, okay, I can do this until I retire.  
And then the rug was pulled out from under me.  And I think very few of us knew what 
was going on in the secondary market. I mean basically we knew that it existed.  But 
what it did, and what they were doing was completely opaque to us.  So that’s where Too 
Big to Fail was really helpful to understand what was going on, or what happened.   
 
And I remember the day that it started.  I could look back at it and go, okay.  I can look 
back to that very day…I think it was in August.  We got an email from operations that 
said “until further notice don’t lock52 any more loans with American Home.”  I thought, 
“hmm, I wonder why,” [but] didn’t really think much of it…And then in the following 
Monday I think it was, they said “we’re not doing business with American Home 
anymore.”…So I found out later, after doing some research… American Home Mortgage 
was, like many companies—they were packaging up their riskier loans into these—what 
do you call it—CDOs?  And they were selling them on the market as “A” Paper.  Well 
they weren’t “A” Paper.  And so somebody one day took a closer look and said, “Well 
                                                 
52 A lock occurs when a loan officer enters into an agreement with an investor for the sale of a 
mortgage loan with a specific interest rate, term, and other conditions. When a borrower applies 
for a loan with a broker, the broker finds them a loan and identifies an investor who will buy it 
after the loan closes, but the loan is not sold until after the closing.  During the crisis, these 
investors sometimes disappeared overnight, leaving brokers unable to fund (and thus close and 
be compensated for) the loans they currently had in process.   
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this is junk!  You should stop buying this!’ So somebody somewhere decided they’re not 
gonna buy anything more from American Home.  
 
In her description of when she first recognized the mortgage crisis in her own profession, 
Katherine frames herself as a curious but relatively ignorant and powerless cog in a much larger 
mortgage finance securitization food chain. Unable to place her borrowers’ loans with investors 
as the credit markets tightened up, seemingly overnight, Katherine left the field and cobbled 
together a modest income for herself selling insurance, but she missed the freedom and 
autonomy of mortgage broking. When I met her at a foreclosure prevention and home buying fair 
in 2013, she had recently re-entered the business, but was struggling with the challenges of 
obtaining financing for her borrowers and complying with new industry regulations. When I 
formally interviewed her six months later, she was already planning her next career move. She 
hoped to be able to make enough money in mortgages to sustain herself and put some savings 
aside and then leave the field once and for all. “Because it’s really stressful.  It’s very stressful.  I 
didn’t really realize that when I was doing the refi thing, it wasn’t as bad. But when somebody’s 
buying a house, you’re—their lives are in your hands, because if you screw up, they’ve—they’ve 
got somebody waiting to move into their house or rent their apartment.  They’ve got movers 
lined up. I mean, they’ve got—everything’s got to happen,” she told me soberly.    
While Katherine had not spent decades of her career in the mortgage industry before the 
crisis hit, her reaction was that of someone whose world had been turned upside down.   In our 
interview, she revealed that she closely followed the contours of the mortgage crisis and different 
journalistic and expert diagnoses of its root cause, searching for ways to make sense of what had 
happened, who was to blame, and what the future might hold. Although Katherine seemed to 
have read more widely than a lot of the brokers I spoke to, others shared her sense of bewildered 
curiosity about what had happened to the housing market.  Prior to the crisis, many of the 
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brokers I met recalled feeling like they had made a relatively stable career for themselves.  They 
believed they had found a way to help others and earn a good income.  But the financial 
misdeeds on Wall Street and all their ripple effects, including intense new regulations of their 
industry, had changed that.   
One mortgage broker I spoke to, Kip Bailey, mentioned that although he understood that 
the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act was to increase transparency in mortgage lending, he felt that 
by following the new rules, he was losing business to other, less reputable and law-abiding 
brokerage firms. He complained specifically about a new policy mandating that loan originators 
(LOs) receive the same compensation regardless of the loan product they sell. He said this 
policy, while it aimed to protect the consumer, limited his ability to use his discretion to cut a 
borrower a better deal and forego some of his commission if he so chose.  Because his brokerage 
sets the commission rate that LOs earn, he can no longer give a client a discount by cutting his 
commission, because they would be the ones losing money, not he, as they cannot change their 
compensation structures on a case-by-case basis.  He gave an example of a client he liked who he 
had been working with to get a loan for six months.  But before the loan application was 
complete, the guy shopped around with other lenders and got quoted a better rate that Kip’s 
company (and by extension, Kip) could not compete with.  Before, if he liked the client and 
wanted the business, he could reduce his commission and get the deal done. Now, he can’t.  He 
understood why—he mentioned steering, strong-arming, etc—but he felt it was an unfortunate 
and unintended side effect, one that cost him clients and potentially cost his clients’ money.  
But broker Mario Abruzzo had a very different attitude toward the compensation 
restrictions that Kip abhorred.  According to Mario, post-crisis regulations had leveled the 
playing field and pushed unscrupulous actors out of mortgage lending.  “We needed a cleansing 
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so bad,” he told me, and related an incident that had made him see just how dangerously 
unregulated his industry had become.   
I was in Michigan at my sister’s lake house.  I got pulled over on a jet ski because 
I rode too close to a dock…probably 15-20 feet out.  [When the boat policeman 
gave] me a ticket..[I asked him] “if I go online and get my boater’s license, pass 
the boater’s examination, will you waive this ticket” And he said “Absolutely.”  
So I went to this automated system online, it took me longer to get my boater’s 
approval than I ever had to spend, prior to the change in the market, to get my 
license to do real estate, to sell mortgages.  And that’s when I said, there’s 
something wrong with this whole world.  And as it was getting cleaned up and 
regulating and changing, I said this is great, this is something that we’ve always 
needed.  And it’s basically regulations coming in and standardizing what we need 
in order to lend comfortably… 
 
The biggest change was the way that loan officers like myself are compensated.  I 
have to earn the same percentage on every dollar that I lend, whether it’s to you or 
to the next person in line.  The old school way was, if someone’s not smart 
enough to shop their mortgage, you could charge them whatever you wanted, and 
if they were gullible enough to buy it, you could earn that commission…So by 
standardizing, after cleaning up the industry and only having limited mortgage 
products, then that scrubbed people out that couldn’t have the right type of 
communication with real, qualified buyers.  Then the standardization of how 
mortgage bankers were paid, also got another wave of guys out, because they 
would do two or three deals a month and make as much as someone like me who 
is doing 10 to 15 a month, and why should they be earning more for doing less 
work, they’re not really—is there real value there?...And instead of me selling my 
interest rate, I’m selling how well I’m educated in this industry, and how well I 
know the banks that I work with to deliver a mortgage to close. And it’s not about 
the rate. It’s not about the fees that you’re going to pay. It’s more or less, how 
much does that cost, what is my rate, and what am I getting out of it?  And that’s 
what it should’ve been always, and that’s where it’s at today.   
 
 From Mario’s perspective, standardizing broker compensation effectively “cleansed” the 
mortgage business because it eliminated brokers’ ability to tap into the housing value chain in a 
way he deemed to be unethical. Mario had no problem with a regulation that made it impossible 
for other brokers to scam unsuspecting borrowers by steering them toward the most lucrative 
loan products even when the borrower qualified for something better.  His attitude is related to 
the kinds of financial institutions where he had worked and the type of professional identity he 
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had crafted for himself, both of which provided him with financial and social capital to which 
some of the other LOs I interviewed did not have access. That capital helped Mario feel 
comfortable taking a moral high ground when it came to compensation: he did not feel that 
competing for clients on the basis of the interest rates and fees was the best way to serve their 
interests or his own.   
 Craig Reiss, another broker, who, like Katherine, had left the industry during the recession 
because he could not make ends meet, felt regulations stymied risk-based pricing methods and 
undercut brokers’ discretion. Craig believed that brokers were completely justified in charging 
different commissions and fees to different kinds of borrowers, because finding a loan was 
harder to do for some customers than it was for others.  He insisted that “buyer beware” rule 
should apply to mortgages: it was not his job to tell people what they could afford. It used to be 
that “we could make as much as we wanted based on each transaction [i.e. based on the time 
each transaction took]…but the government in its infinite wisdom decided we’re the bad guys,” 
he lamented.  “So now we have to make the same amount for every deal.”   
As Craig saw it, it was just common sense that the broker would get a higher commission 
from borrowers for loans that required more leg work to close. He viewed the new rule as a “slap 
on the wrist” rather than a form of consumer protection. “I resent being in sales and being told 
how I can get compensated,” he told me, pointing out that car salesmen were allowed to charge 
higher prices for riskier buyers, and even grocery stores like Whole Foods could charge higher 
prices without being accused of harming consumers. Craig felt that mortgage brokers were being 
unfairly persecuted for standard sales practices, practices which would have stood them in fine 
stead if not for the fact that "people were getting loans that they shouldn't have." The fact that his 
industry was facilitating such ill-advised decisions did not change his sense that ultimately, it 
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was the borrower's responsibility to make good decisions.  "Just because Costco is offering a 
ninety-inch TV for $3,000 doesn't mean I should buy it," he remarked to me.  For Craig, the 
housing market was like any other market.  He seemed to feel no greater compunction about 
price gouging home buyers than he would have if he sold anything else.   
 The broker who felt that mortgage brokers were "whipping boys," Hank Cordon, expressed 
similar feelings to Craig with regard to brokers' limited responsibility for the mortgage crisis.  He 
told me that mortgage industry had taken the fall because they lacked the resources of banks and 
the lobbying power of realtors, and that it was “the populist thing to do to shift blame and 
responsibility from the individual to the corporation.”  Like Craig, he felt that mortgage brokers 
were salespeople, and thus bore less responsibility than either the big lenders who gave them 
mortgage products to sell or the customers to whom they sold them.  He called the crisis a "cycle 
of irresponsibility," noting that "if you put a bunch of drugs on the street, you're going to find 
people to take them."  Yet when I asked Hank for his opinion of the post crisis regulatory 
environment he said it was “way too strict and an extreme overreach” that was preventing the 
markets from correcting themselves in the way that they otherwise would. He held that the new 
rules were “perverting the risk management process” and that now lending decisions were “not 
based on risk, they’re based on government regulations.  [It is] no longer risk-based, it’s 
compliance-based.”   
At the heart of these different responses to market regulation was brokers’ understanding 
of how they fit within the larger universe of finance.  Were they whipping boys and scapegoats, 
empowered actors or dupes?  And what about the responsibility of their customers? In 
Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street (2009), Karen Ho explores how the bankers and 
consultants who work at prestigious Wall Street investment banks and consulting firms develop, 
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in concert with the alumni of Ivy League universities who they aggressively recruit, a “culture of 
smartness.” Ho suggests that this culture allows them to project and produce a level of mastery 
over financial markets that, in turn, feeds into their sense of themselves as the best, indeed the 
only, people up to the task of guiding corporate decision-making, mergers, and restructurings. 
And if they are the best people, then their approach to their work cannot be wrong.  Many of the 
brokers I met seemed to project a similar sense of their own infallibility in a marketplace filled 
with less financially savvy actors—even though they lacked the social and financial capital of 
Ho’s interlocutors to back it up.   
But for Mario, there was plenty of blame to go around. No housing market participant was 
infallible. 
You know, everybody’s so good at pointing their finger in the wrong direction.  I 
think it was everybody’s fault who was in the industry.  It doesn’t matter if you’re 
the mortgage banker, if you’re the banks creating the products, if you’re a private 
equity firm coming in with unique private mortgage products that you’re 
leveraging other people’s assets [for], it’s all greed. And I think that…everybody 
had an impact on it. And naturally, we should’ve all been conservative and 
educational in leading people in the right direction, but there was so much greed 
around it, that even honest people didn’t know that they were being greedy, or 
using greedy products, because they felt so natural.  So it was really hard for 
people to gauge what was going on. And they thought that, if I’m approved, or 
this mortgage banker says I’m approved because some bank created a product for 
the mortgage broker to sell, then the banks must, because they’re so conservative, 
they protect our money, so they must think it’s okay for me to own a home.  So 
everybody is relying on other people’s perceptions. Me, because the banks are 
giving the product away, and the consumer, because the product the bank gave 
me, I was allowed to get them approved on, everybody has this perception that its 
okay because someone’s willing to give it to me.  And if someone’s willing to 
give me all this money to buy a home, they must not see risk in me.  So it was 
almost like this fictitious confidence that they were putting people in the 
environment that was toxic.   
 
In Mario’s framing of who bears responsibility for the mortgage crisis and why, the risk that 
each market participant assumes when they engage with the housing value chain is pushed aside 
because each entity imagines that a thorough and complete risk assessment is already underway 
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at another level of the chain. From his perspective, it is not that brokers or borrowers knew that 
their actions were risky and did not care but, rather, that they assumed that, if the market allowed 
it, it must not be that risky after all.  Recall Mario’s story about getting his boaters’ license to 
avoid a ticket and realizing that boating was more regulated than mortgage lending, an industry 
that facilitated the transfer of residential properties, household wealth, and financial capital.  In 
hindsight, he and others in his industry recognized how ludicrously unregulated their activities 
were. But in the moment, they experienced these market conditions as natural, normal, and right. 
 
Against a Crisis Narrative of Mortgage Lending and Risk 
 In their stories of the mortgage crisis and its aftermath, most of my mortgage broker 
interlocutors drew sharp lines between what their work was like before the crisis and what it had 
was like afterwards.  If they had been in the industry for ten years or longer, they also harkened 
back to an even earlier era, before the rise of subprime, and talked about, as Hank Cordon 
described, the “perverting” of the risk management process after the mortgage crisis.  At the time 
of our interviews, I took them at their word. But what if the crisis was not an aberration, but a 
recurrent part of the market itself?   
As I described in the introduction, Janet Roitman’s Anti Crisis (2013) examines when, how 
and why we declare a crisis, and what questions such a declaration allows and forecloses. In the 
book, Roitman declares that she will "consider how crisis is constituted as an object of 
knowledge...Through the term 'crisis,' the singularity of events is abstracted by a generic logic, 
making crisis a term that seems self-explanatory" (Roitman 2013: 3).  For my mortgage 
professional interlocutors and myself, the mortgage crisis provided a neat, temporally bounded 
explanation for the conditions of what they and I perceived to be a transformed mortgage finance 
 
 116 
market.  Yet mortgage professionals' own descriptions of their adaptive strategies for survival in 
the face of a constantly evolving mortgage finance market and customer base negates the crisis 
teleology.   
While mortgage lender Hank Cordon insisted to me that the current climate of "extreme 
overreach" by government regulators is exceptional, he also acknowledged that the movement 
between deregulation and re-regulation of the mortgage industry is recurring.  And he divided his 
own seventeen-year mortgage lending career into cycles, asserting that each new cycle makes his 
industry anew. "It’s not like a lawyer who can say he has seventeen years of experience, because 
he’s working in the same environment with most of the same laws year after year.  In mortgage 
lending, there are “different fundamentals for every economic cycle” he explained.  When I 
asked why and how these cycles occurred, he said that it was because of economic swings, but 
that “the fundamentals change time and again because politicians will regulate the hell out of the 
industry and then leave us alone.”  Hank clearly resented when the pendulum swung toward 
more regulations, and, as a self-described believer in the free market, he saw market 
interventions as inefficient. But that did not mean he did not understand and rise to meet their 
challenge.  
 Similarly, mortgage lender Mario Abruzzo described how he had to "reinvent" himself 
after the crisis because his main client base, small business owners who tended to report losses 
on their tax returns to avoid taxes, could no longer obtain financing. Below, he explains how his 
approach to lending continues to evolve as he predicts what group of buyers he should target in 
the following year:    
What’s great is, as the refis fall out, coming into 2012, so 2011, my number one 
focus was to do less refinancings and more purchase loans. So in 2012 92.5% of 
my business was purchase loans. My competition was maybe doing 50% purchase 
loans, 50% refi and that real number, if you were to look at people’s production 
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rather than what they tell you, was probably 80% refi 20% purchase. So I geared 
up early to spend my time building relationships with real estate agents.  As the 
refis fall out, these other mortgage bankers are trying to build relationships with 
my [real estate] agents, but because they’re just now getting into it, they’re not as 
familiar on how to service those clients and that loan as well as I am.  So I might 
lose a deal because that guys there, but he’ll trip over his feet, which validates 
what I do.  Right, and it makes that realtor go “wow, I didn’t really realize how 
much value was in [Mario], and this guy reminded me.” And then I see almost 
twice the amount of referrals this year than I did the previous year. Cause I took 
the time to look forward into the market and see where it’s heading and change 
my approach to the business. You have to.  So I just try to look as far forward as I 
can...I think [my secret] is being in it, all day, every day.  If you have your eyes 
open, it’s unavoidable.  You know it’s coming.  You just have to mentally change 
and do it, and change.   
 
What becomes clear in the market framings of Mario and Hank is that while the mortgage market 
and its customers evolve and change in response to broader economic transformations, mortgage 
professionals who are skilled market middlemen can assert themselves in the fray and find ways 
to earn an income by connecting the right types of borrowers with the financing opportunities 
currently available to them.   
From this market making perspective, the mortgage crisis remains a relevant object of 
broker knowledge, but it is one that exists within, rather than outside of, recurring cycles of 
market expansion and freedom and market contraction and regulation.  Mortgage brokers who 
reacted to these cycles rather than anticipated them struggled, as Craig Reiss and Kip Bailey did, 
with the sense that the odds are stacked against them and that they are being judged by a harsher 
standard than their peers.  Like Katherine Canter, they sought to understand "what happened" in 
their industry and why they and their colleagues were being blamed for it. For them, the crisis 
was real and world transforming, rather than another cycle that could be anticipated, managed, 
and surmounted.   
 Just as the mortgage professionals at Darden Bank learned to comply with shifting 
federal regulations and stricter underwriting protocols in order to move their loans from the 
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application phase to the closing table, successful mortgage brokers read the exigencies of the 
current market, hone the skills necessary to meet its challenges, and "change and do it" as the 
market demands.  If they can adapt, as Mario did, they can continue to participate in the housing 
chain that stretches, through mortgage lending and securitization, from the individual homes and 
households to global circuits of financial capital (LiPuma and Lee 2004).  But like the realtors I 
describe in the next chapter, the market that mortgage lending professionals help constitute as 
market middlemen also constrains and confounds them. 
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CHAPTER 4: SELLING DREAMS: REALTORS AS MARKET MEDIATORS 
 
In this country all men are realtors.  As the prime symbol of our civilization, 
neither the pilgrim father, nor the pioneer, nor the captain of industry, suffices so 
well as the real estate man to explain certain habits of mind, certain ideals, and 
certain inconsistencies in the behavior of the American people.  
—Robert C. Binkeley, 1929 
 
If mortgage lenders are market middlemen, connecting individual borrowers with the 
financial capital they need to access homeownership and Wall Street investors with the securities 
fodder they demand, realtors are mediators of the middle space where households, homes, and 
local and global economies intersect.53 As such, they are crucial to both the perpetuation of the 
homeownership complex and especially vital to the taken-for-granted existence of 
homeownership as a social and economic good in the United States.  Their work requires people 
skills, networking abilities, confidence, and technical expertise. It also demands the management 
of conflicting interests and identities up and down the housing value chain, as real estate brokers 
must forge close connections with their customers as well as maintain knowledge of and 
connections to other professionals in “the market,” all while navigating the hierarchies of their 
industry and abiding by the codes of conduct and appearance that they proscribe.  
Throughout the home buying and selling process, realtors manage and strive to control 
the gaps in resources, knowledge, and interests that exist between buyers, sellers, other brokers, 
mortgage professionals, appraisers, inspectors, and other housing market stakeholders.  As the 
first point of contact for most buyers and sellers, they are uniquely positioned to guide their 
                                                 
53 realtor® is registered trademark of the National Association of Realtors (NAR), the real estate 
industry’s largest professional organization and lobbying group.  The NAR defines the term as 
only applicable to a professional member of its organization who abides by its strict code of 
ethics.  The more general term, real estate broker, is a person who acts as an agent for the sale 
and purchase of buildings and land. I use realtor here without the trademark because the term has 
become a part of the lexicon of the profession and is now used to describe non-NAR members.  
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customers through a series of market engagements and decisions, from what property to choose 
to what mortgage professional, attorney, and property inspector to work with.  If the real estate 
broker does her job well and has strong relationships with the other players in the process, the 
customer will experience these engagements as a smooth, straightforward path that ends with the 
successful purchase or sale of a property. But thanks to the public real estate listing search 
engines and services now available via the Internet, real estate brokers’ authority as the arbiters 
of market knowledge is now under threat.  While most buyers and sellers still hire a real estate 
broker to manage their interactions with the housing market, and real estate brokers still maintain 
exclusive access to the Multiple Listing System, real estate brokers no longer have a monopoly 
on the information that their customers receive about what properties are available to them. 54 
Buyers and sellers gather their own information and compare properties and prices on the 
Internet, undercutting key components of real estate brokers’ value in navigating the housing 
market. Real estate may be a prototypically “American” career, but its vulnerability to economic, 
social, and technological change is also emblematic of the challenges of making a living in a 
service-based, consumer-driven economy that is moving toward a gig mode best suited for 
“companies of one” who have mastered the art of selling themselves (Gershon 2017; Lane 2011).   
In this chapter, I briefly describe the evolution of real estate broking into an organized, 
reputable profession. From there, I use my own experience with real estate education and 
licensing to reflect on the accessibility and exclusivity of the real estate profession. I then move 
into a discussion of the role that creating and maintaining relationships plays in real estate 
brokers’ successes and failures, which leads into an analysis of the professional trajectories of 
                                                 
54 A shared, member-populated database of all properties for sale that allows dues-paying 
members to search for properties for their clients, research and generate comparative market 
analyses and other reports, and share commissions, 
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my interlocutors, in which I consider how their experiences in real estate has intersected with 
technological developments and economic shifts and the twists and turns of their own lives, 
which are in turn shaped by their racial, ethnic, and class identities (cf. Abelmann 2003). I close 
with a discussion of the ways in which some real estate brokers use real estate investment to 
hedge against their professional precarity and maintain a sense of freedom and autonomy.   
 
Real Estate Broking as a Profession 
While private property ownership has been a cornerstone of the United States’ political 
and social organization and economic flourishing since the arrival of the first European settlers in 
North America in the 1600s, the buying, selling, and financing of real estate as an identifiable 
profession is a relatively new phenomenon.  Real estate brokerages became professionalized at 
the turn of the 20th century, when a group of residential and commercial real estate brokers and 
developers “…made a concerted effort to organize their occupation into a ‘profession’ on the 
national level[,]…motivated both by their desire to rehabilitate real estate as a commodity in the 
wake of the depression of the 1890s and by their desire for ‘unification of thought and purpose 
among the country’s real estate interests,’” (Hornstein 2005: 1).   Those early efforts have grown 
into a national organization that includes over 1.1 million dues-paying members and 1,222 local 
organizations.55   
As historian of the industry Jeffrey Hornstein (2005) illuminates, real estate has long 
offered the kind of open-ended upward mobility that has long been appealing to aspiring 
members of the middle class in the United States.  In a story published in the Saturday Evening 
Post in 1912, the author presents real estate as a field that “…a young man would find satisfying 




because it would both test him and allow him to express the full range of his talents.  He could 
find in real estate brokerage the excitement, occupational autonomy, and potential pecuniary 
rewards of entrepreneurship, as well as the prestige and ethical standards of white collar ‘head 
work’” (Hornstein 2005: 6). At the same time, as a commission-based sales field without the 
benefits and security associated with white-collar professions in the U.S. throughout the 20th 
century (Mills 1952), the real estate field has also been a refuge for those ill-suited, unqualified 
for, or shut out from other, more respectable and secure professions.56 The peripatetic work 
histories of most real estate brokers are not unique (cf. Lane 2013; Newman 1999), but they do 
index the tradeoffs inherent in industries that require their workers to become “companies of 
one.”   
In the twentieth century, real estate organizations successfully created a professional 
image and code of ethics for themselves, standardized licensing and commissions requirements, 
and expanded their ranks considerably.  In 1908, they had twenty local associations and 1,646 
members. At the height of the real estate market in 2006, they had 1,445 local associations and 
1,338,001 members.57  From my own research with real estate brokers in Chicago in 2014 and 
2015, I found that real estate drew in the entrepreneurially minded but not necessarily successful, 
disenchanted salesmen in information technology, advertising, insurance, and other fields, 
stymied low-level bankers, young, hopeful real estate investors, stalled mid-level managers and 
creative professionals, and ambitious but aimless twenty- and thirty-something men and women 
looking to launch a career without substantial investment in further training and education. Real 
                                                 
56 For example, real estate was one of the first professions that was completely open to both 
married and single women, a distinction that facilitated women’s upward mobility and financial 
independence and, as is often the case when professions become more “feminized,” undoubtedly 
detracted from its prestige (cf. Freeman 2000; Lugo 2008). 
57 Data gathered from the National Association of Realtors Historic Membership Report. 
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estate brokers in the U.S. earned a median income of $42,500 in 2016,58 more than $16,000 less 
than the median household income for the country as a whole.59 While earning high levels of 
compensation is possible, and often seems tantalizingly within reach for real estate brokers who 
are just starting out, it is by no means guaranteed. At the same time, the process for becoming a 
real estate broker, which I outline below, is relatively inexpensive, quick, and straightforward.  
Real estate’s ease of entry and its opportunities to access autonomy and financial reward through 
participation in the housing value chain continue to draw new entrants to the field.  However, 
whether these entrants find success or not depends on their access to social and financial capital 
and their ability to navigate the conditions of their local housing market.   
 
How to become a real estate broker 
To become a real estate broker licensed by the state of Illinois, you must be at least 21 
years of age and hold a high school diploma or G.E.D. equivalent.  You must pay approximately 
$500 to enroll in and complete a ninety-hour, state-approved pre-licensing program, fifteen hours 
of which must be “interactive” in a classroom or webinar setting. Next, you must register and 
pay a $45 fee for a multiple-choice exam that is taken on a computer at a registered state 
licensing testing center. You will have three opportunities to pass. If you fail three times, you 
must re-enroll in a pre-licensing program.  Once you pass the exam, you must pay a $115 
licensing fee, which gives you a license for three years. You must also join a professional 
association of real estate brokers, such as the National Association of Real estate brokers (only 
members may call themselves Real estate brokers), or the Chicago Association of Real estate 
brokers, and join the aforementioned Multiple Listing System (“MLS”) in order to have access to 
                                                 
58Data gathered from the National Association of Realtors Quick Real Estate Statistics 2017. 
59 Data gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau Household Income: 2016 Report 
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the professional network through which real estate professionals advertise their listings and find 
properties of interest to their clients.  The combined cost of MLS access and association dues is 
approximately $1000 per year.  You must also pay a fee to “hang a license” under a managing 
broker in the state of Illinois.60 The cost of hanging a license varies, but on average real estate 
brokers pay anywhere from $250 to $500 a month.  These are the fixed, necessary costs of doing 
business.  Real estate brokers can also anticipate spending in excess of $1000 per year on 
marketing expenses, staging supplies, and so forth.     
The school that I chose for my pre-licensing program was located in a small, family-
owned real estate brokerage on the North Side of Chicago.  All of the instructors were also 
licensed real estate brokers at this same brokerage firm. On the first day of class, a Tuesday 
evening in September 2014, I arrived and was directed to a somewhat cramped, beige carpeted 
area in the basement. I walked into an open area just down the stairs from the front lobby. Four 
rows of chairs with attached desks were arranged on either side of a central aisle and facing a 
digital projection screen.  A faux wood table with a wheeled office chair behind it faced the 
desks. Behind the class space, I could see a few empty interior offices and small conference 
rooms. As we were underground, there was little to no natural light. It seemed to be a fitting, 
sleep-inducing setting for twelve weeks of real estate licensing instruction.   
Having arrived a few minutes before the start time, I had the opportunity to glance around 
at my fellow students.  On the first day, there were twenty-three of us: ten men and thirteen 
women. We ranged in age from our mid-twenties to mid-fifties. Our gender breakdown was 
                                                 
60 Real estate brokers must have two years of experience and complete additional educational 
requirements before they can become managing brokers. Managing brokers accept sales 
commissions on the behalf of the brokers who work under them and take out a portion of those 
commissions (often 30%).  In exchange, managing brokers provide errors and omissions 
insurance and an organizational umbrella, which may include office space, advertising materials, 
branding, email access, etc.   
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relatively close to the gender distribution of the field, which is now 63% women, according to 
the National Association of Realtors (NAR).61  Most of us were white and U.S. born, but there 
were a few Latino and African American students in their twenties and thirties, as well as one 
South Asian man in his forties, a Polish woman in her fifties, and a man from Ireland in his late 
thirties. In 2016, NAR found that the average real estate broker age was fifty-three with ten years 
of experience, so the class skewed a bit younger than was typical of the field.62 
Our instructor on that first day, and for much of the course, was named Bernard.  A short, 
mustachioed white man with a rooster’s swagger, he told us that our textbook, Modern Real 
Estate (Galaty et al. 2014), should be our bible for the duration of the course.   He told us that we 
would need to know how to do math to pass the state exam, and asked, sarcastically, for a show 
of hands from people who couldn’t do math.  No one raised their hand, but he told us that we 
would all need to practice math anyway so we wouldn’t be surprised when we had to do it for the 
exam.  He also said there would be a lot of esoteric legal material to memorize, too, but added 
“My thought is that if you got out of 8th grade you should be able to be a real estate agent,” a 
comment that seemed designed to both put us at ease and belittle our intellectual capacities.   
The class format consisted of a review of the chapters assigned for that day and 
completion and grading of the end of the chapter quizzes, punctuated by advice and more or less 
relevant anecdotes about the real estate profession from our instructors.  Bernard loved to tell 
stories from his own career.  While they were meant to illustrate the principles and pitfalls of the 
real estate profession, his tales annoyed some of the other students, as did his brusque, strangely 
                                                 
61 While real estate began as a male-dominated field (women made up only 2% of the total 
number of realtors in 1910), it became one of the first jobs that older married women held, and 
by 1980, the gender composition of the field was evenly split (Hornstein 2005: 200) 
62 Although real estate has long been an older field due to its “second career” appeal, this late 
average age and extensive average experience may also be symptomatic of the contraction of the 
field during the mortgage crisis and financial recession. 
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confrontational demeanor when they asked questions that he deemed irrelevant.  In stark contrast 
to Bernard’s embellishments, our other primary instructor, James, a slim white man in his mid-
twenties who looked even younger than he was and favored bowties, read aloud to us from the 
textbook in a monotone voice, only pausing when someone asked a question.  James was also the 
brokerage office manager, and had only recently obtained his own real estate license.  To me, he 
was the least effective instructor, but my classmates Malcolm, an Irish American man in his 
early forties, and Sergio, a Latino man in his thirties, told me they appreciated James’s 
straightforward approach.63  For one thing, because we covered the textbook material and 
nothing else, we were always let out of class early when James taught.  
The pre-licensing course I took, despite being taught in person rather than over the 
internet, required minimal class participation. Our instructors told us again and again that all we 
needed to know to pass the state exam could be found in our textbook.  This emphasis on rote 
memorization made it easy to understand why many real estate licensing courses were now 
offered online, despite the fact that real estate is an interpersonal profession that seems to require 
an almost limitless amount of extroverted engagement, emotional labor, and keen perception.  In 
each class we would cover two-to-three chapters from the textbook that we were supposed to 
have read beforehand but after a few weeks, I stopped preparing in this way.  It seemed pointless, 
considering that the instructor would go over the material, if not word for word, as James did, 
then very close to it.  Sergio told me that he did not read from the textbook at all until it was time 
to study for the exam. Another young white woman classmate, Kelly, who was from rural 
Indiana and had once been a retail banker but now worked as a bartender, reported that she 
                                                 
63 Both Malcolm and Sergio held real estate licenses previously but left the field after the 
mortgage crisis. From their perspectives (and presumably those of other classmates) the real 
estate licensing classes were tedious hurdles in their professional trajectories, rather than the 
opportunities for participant observation that I found them to be.   
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stopped reading after the second class.  Attendance was not mandatory and dwindled as the 
weeks went by.  After starting with twenty-three students, after the first week our class size 
fluctuated around ten.  
After meeting every Tuesday and Thursday from 6 PM to 9 PM for ten weeks, we took a 
hundred-question multiple-choice exam that covered the textbook contents, and, we were told, 
mirrored what we could expect on the state exam.  We had to pass this test in order to move to 
the next and final phase of the licensing course.  Several students did not pass on the first try and 
had to arrange to retake it on an alternate date.  They could not register to take the state exam 
until they passed the in-class one and completed the last three weeks of the course, which 
consisted of fifteen hours of interactive instruction.   
I was looking forward to the final phase of the course, which involved solving common 
real estate dilemmas, many of which had a professional ethics component, in a group setting. For 
this part of the course, in-person attendance was required.  The dilemmas were meant to be 
interactive.  We were told to talk amongst ourselves to find solutions to such complex problems 
as what to do if a client doesn’t listen to your advice and wants your help in refusing to sell to a 
minority home buyer. However, the agenda was still tightly aligned with what kinds of questions 
the instructors felt we needed to be prepared for on the state exam, and what multiple choice 
answer would give us the points we needed to pass and obtain our license. They quickly 
dismissed the possibility that there might be multiple ways to resolve the complex issues 
presented to us.  
From the perspective of the instructors, it seemed that the state exam, and the ninety 
hours of course instruction that was a prerequisite before taking it, were hoops to jump through 
rather than an opportunity to educate, shape the professional identities, and instill ethical 
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standards in the next generation of real estate brokers.  This is not to say that the instructors 
portrayed real estate as an easy or intuitive profession.  Bernard especially was filled with stories 
of how inexperienced real estate brokers could get tripped up or taken advantage of by clients or 
other real estate brokers if they were not careful.  But, in spite of his role as a licensing 
instructor, he seemed to be very much in the “experience is the best teacher” camp.64   
The bureaucratic apparatus of the real estate profession, which includes the license and 
the state regulatory board that oversees it, the pre-licensing class, exam, continuing education 
hours requirements, and state licensing fees, the ethics board, the powerful professional 
membership organization that charges dues, helps real estate brokers construct an identity for 
themselves as professional, ethical, and educated. But it also creates temporal and financial 
hurdles that pose challenges for new real estate brokers hoping to enter the profession. Further, 
the expertise that real estate brokers cultivate and display in order to convince their clients that 
they are the right people to guide them through the complex process of buying or selling a home 
is not accessible through a book but, rather, through experience, professional savvy, social 
capital and networking abilities, and emotional labor.  
Over the course of twelve weeks of twice-weekly meetings, we learned the basics of fair 
housing laws and how to avoid violating them.65  We learned that real estate brokers have an 
agency relationship with their clients, and about real estate contracts and how to fill them out 
properly, as well about private property and inheritance laws that impact real estate sales 
                                                 
64 The establishment of professional licensing requirements, a state regulatory structure, and an 
educational program were key components in the 20th century development of real estate as 
respectable, middle class profession (Hornstein 2005). I found that in practice, realtors both 
resented their industry’s rules and regulations, such as the licensing course, and relied upon the 
veneer of authority and knowledge they provided to convince clients of their own expertise and 
competency. 
65 Although the real estate licensing course I took was advertised as ninety hours of education, by 
my calculations, we only spent 72 hours together in the classroom. 
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transactions.  We learned how to name a real estate parcel using metes and bounds 
measurements, and to calculate the area of a real estate lot, both of which, instructors assured us, 
we would most likely never do in our future careers.66  We learned about the different 
professions one could pursue as a licensed real estate broker and their responsibilities, as well as 
our instructors’ opinions about which of these positions was worth pursuing.  Commercial real 
estate, we were told, was the most lucrative, but most of the people indicated they wanted to be 
residential real estate brokers.  We found out how to calculate the return on investment for a 
commercial property.  We discovered what other professionals, such as real estate attorneys, 
appraisers, and home inspectors, do in the sales process.  We were lectured by a guest real estate 
attorney on the importance of not overstepping our roles and inadvertently practicing law 
without a license.  We learned about the nature of the client-broker relationship and what we 
could and could not do when party to it.  Some of the material we covered seemed relevant.  
Other parts seemed obscure.  But it was all presented as facts to be memorized and filed away for 
retrieval on test day—even if we never used it again.   
 I had no problem with what the course required of me as a student and successfully passed 
the in-class test and the state exam.  But the class and course content did present problems for 
many of my classmates.  Complex material was presented to us in a rapid, top-down fashion, 
with little time or patience for follow-up questions or concerns.  When students did ask 
questions, the instructor often deflected the query, gave a short, not very helpful answer, or 
openly mocked them for their ignorance.  Students could, and sometimes did, ask questions of 
                                                 
66 Metes and bounds are a surveyor’s way of describing a parcel of real property “using carefully 
measured desistance, angles, and directions, which results in what is called a ‘legal description of 





the instructor privately during breaks or before or after class, or discussed difficult quiz problems 
among themselves.  But it was not an environment with easy access to assistance.  Perhaps this 
was good preparation for the field we were about to enter; Bernard warned us against providing 
information to clients or assistance to other housing professionals without obtaining 
compensation for it. This concern with protecting and restricting the flow of information, I 
discovered, was a key dimension of the way that real estate brokers were able to both “add 
value” as expert navigators of the housing market and “extract value” through the commissions 
they received from their clients.   
 When our real estate licensing class covered “Chapter 2: Agency,” which outlined the 
duties that real estate brokers have as “agents,” Bernard brought up a slide that explained that the 
Latin root of agent, agere, means “to do, to drive, to act.”  He said that a term most often 
associated with agent is “fiduciary,” which also has Latin roots that link it to terms like “trust,” 
“trustee,” “to trust.”  The historical duties of an agent are “care, obedience, accounting, and 
disclosure,” and an agent can be defined as “one who carries out the wishes of another in a 
faithful and trustworthy manner” (Galaty et al. 2014: 42).   
 Bernard stressed that the loyalty an agent owes to his client should “rise above any 
personal interests of the agent.”  “Some people have a problem with that,” he said, disparagingly, 
because “we’ve been trained since birth to think ‘me, me, me!’” At the same time, he insisted, 
real estate brokers do not owe all people they interact with the same level of care. Bernard 
described the amorphous difference between a consumer, a customer, and a client/principal.  You 
can perform “ministerial services” for consumers—answering basic questions about a property at 
an open house, returning phone calls, etc., but the client is “the only one to whom you owe your 
loyalty, and whom you advise and counsel.” For Bernard, real estate knowledge was a precious 
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commodity not to be shared unless you were sure you would be compensated for it. “You gotta 
be careful,” he told us, “because people walk around just getting free info from anyone they 
can…” To protect yourself from giving counsel to people who are not going to pay you, “Are 
you working with anybody?’ should always be your first question…you want to get it straight 
with people before you jump in a car [and show them properties].” 
 In a commission-based field such as real estate, wasting time with customers who will not 
actually buy anything is a constant concern, and it made sense that Bernard would want to warn 
us against being too trusting of both customers and our competitors. “The important thing is for 
you to teach your client what [the broker-client agency relationship] means.  When you don’t do 
that, you run into trouble,” he said.  If a home buying client does not understand that working 
with you means he cannot have other agents show him properties, or understands but does not 
care, he may cast you aside for another agent at any moment.  And, according to Bernard, other 
agents will be more than happy to serve your wayward client and screw you over in the process. 
 From Bernard’s perspective, real estate brokers have to both educate their clients about the 
nature of the agency relationship and continually demonstrated the “value” they add through 
their services.  But it is “more and more difficult to demonstrate your skills and expertise with 
Zillow [and other real estate internet sites]…If your buyer starts quoting you [listing information 
they got from] some site and doesn’t listen to you, you gotta stop that quick,” he said. You have 
to tell them that the MLS offers the most accurate and up-to-date information, and thus that they 
still need you, because only real estate brokers have access to the MLS.  If you cannot make 
them understand your value, Bernard said “they’re gonna lead you around like this [held his own 
nose between his fingers and walks around, demonstrating ‘lead you around by the nose’] and 
then you’re not an agent, you’re a sheep… You have to counsel them and you have to teach them. 
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 It’s very difficult now.”   
While real estate has relatively low barriers to entry compared to other fields, the format 
and cost of the pre-licensing course and state exam perform a gate-keeping function for the 
industry. Licensed real estate brokers’ state-regulated professional credential and exclusive 
access to the multiple listing service creates hierarchies of expertise and knowledge between real 
estate brokers and the public.  But the requirement that prospective real estate brokers take a 
course, pass a one hundred question multiple-choice exam, and then pay a series of fees to 
become an active participant in real estate also creates barriers.  Many people who graduate with 
a high school diploma or GED, the one formal educational prerequisite for a real estate license, 
do not have a firm grasp of basic mathematical concepts and lack strong reading comprehension 
skills.  Some have learning disabilities that make it difficult to sit in a classroom for long periods 
of time or to memorize and retain large amounts of information.  While some of these issues 
might affect their ability to eventually practice real estate and represent their clients’ interests 
successfully, most of it was rote memorization that has very little to do with what is required of 
real estate brokers on a day-to-day basis.  And yet the course and the exam depend upon people 
possessing these academic skills, even if most, if not all real estate brokers would agree that the 
practice of real estate requires a different set of capacities altogether.   
According to Jeffrey Hornstein the real estate historian, early in the 20th century, wealthy, 
high-class real estate men sought to organize their profession in part to keep out land sharks and 
low class speculators from tarnishing their image.  “Publicly, the real estate men declared a role 
for themselves as protectors of society—implicitly marked feminine, childlike, or working 
class—against the unscrupulous, nefarious swindler who populated the ranks of the 
commonplace real estate agent” (2005: 33).  But in the process, they also created licensing 
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requirements that kept aspiring real estate brokers with less social capital and disposable time 
and income from succeeding.   
In addition to the hurdles of the licensing course and exam, entering the real estate 
profession comes with substantial upfront costs and potentially years of “paying one’s dues” if 
one does not have connections to client or referral sources and substantial capital to start. New 
real estate brokers are urged to have enough savings to sustain them for the first six months. This 
advice reflects the time lag of compensation in real estate transactions and the pecking order and 
insularity of the industry.67 Most new real estate brokers begin their careers as “buyer’s agents,” 
meaning that they represent prospective home buyers looking for a new home rather than current 
home owners who wish to sell a property. This pattern has implications for the speed at which 
they will be compensated and the amount of work they will have to put in before they receive 
their first commission check.  Buyer’s agents may show clients dozens of properties over the 
course of several weeks or months before the client even makes an offer.   
Seller’s agents, in contrast, have much more control over the time commitments and costs 
of their work, and they have the opportunity to negotiate their compensation with the seller who 
is their client.  They may host a few open houses, or enlist newer members of their real estate 
brokerage to do it for them.  They may take buyer’s agents and their customers through their 
properties, or give them a key code and let the buyer’s agent let themselves in.  And while there 
are, of course, exceptions to every rule, in general people do not list their properties for sale 
unless they intend to sell them.  In contrast, many people begin looking to buy a home when they 
are not financially or psychologically prepared to do so. As a result, real estate brokers who 
                                                 
67 Real estate brokers and mortgage lenders are compensated when the property sale they are 
working on closes, an event that is often scheduled a month to six weeks after first drawing up a 
sales contract.   
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represent sellers often have motivated clients who are more likely to conclude their transaction 
and compensate their real estate broker so long as she secures them an adequate sale price. More 
established agents are also able to restrict the geographic area in which they work, developing an 
expertise in specific neighborhoods or suburbs, types and price ranges of housing.68 New real 
estate brokers, in contrast, are often so desperate for clients that they will spend their time and 
money taking buyers all around the city before they generate commission from a single sale.   
 On paper, becoming a real estate broker seems straightforward, something that, as Bernard 
told us, anyone with an 8th grade education could easily accomplish.  But in Bernard’s anecdotes 
and asides, the questions and conflicts of what practicing real estate meant in practice loomed.  
You can receive your real estate broker’s license fairly easily if you have the time and financial 
resources to take a class, study for the exam, take it, and pay the licensing fee.  The perceived 
opportunity of high commissions and a recovering housing market beckons many people to do 
just that.  However, being a real estate broker requires much more financial and social capital 
than most of the aspiring real estate brokers I met had anticipated.   
 
Twisting Career Paths  
When I asked what drew my real estate broker interlocutors to real estate, they described 
it as a fallback option: they were dissatisfied with their current jobs and in need of a fresh start.  
Like some of the mortgage-lending professionals who I spoke to, many had interpersonal 
connections with those in the real estate field, and the success and autonomy they saw those 
connections enjoying seemed appealing.  For those who entered the field during for the early 
                                                 
68For example, a realtor might specialize in one-bedroom condos in high-rise apartment 
buildings in Chicago’s River North and Streeterville neighborhoods.  If successful, she would 
not have to travel far or expend many resources to meet clients, show properties, and receive a 
steady stream of new and repeat business.   
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2000s housing boom, the autonomy they enjoyed became less than desirable when the financial 
crisis hit, their customers disappeared, and credit markets froze, making it next to impossible to 
maintain their previous levels of income.69 Yet most of my interlocutors stayed in the field, 
weathering their income loss with the help of a spouse’s income or a sideline, such as rental 
property leasing or management, to sustain them. Although most of my interviewees saw the 
market as on an upswing in 2014 and 2015, they were still grappling with changed market 
conditions and consumer expectations. In spite of these challenges, I also encountered several 
new entrants to the housing field: women and men who, like earlier generations of housing 
professionals before them, were drawn in by the prospect of “being one’s own boss.”  
Like homeownership itself, residential real estate beckons individuals in search of an 
accessible portal to the upward mobility they imagine that the housing value chain can provide.  
Within the housing market, they can find opportunity and, if they are lucky, clever, and/or well-
connected, substantial reward.  That they promise their customers access to the same things 
through the commodity and ideal they sell, the house and homeownership, indexes their mutually 
constitutive relationship with the housing market.  They make the housing market by packaging 
and selling the dream of ownership to their customers. Yet they themselves are also market 
made. They depend upon the housing market to sustain them financially, give them a sense of 
professional purpose and identity, and provide a space where they can exercise power, freedom, 
and autonomy.   
Roberto, a short, powerfully built Puerto Rican man in his late forties who rides a 
motorcycle and dresses for the part in black leather jacket, boots, and dark jeans, became a real 
                                                 
69 In the years following the crash, the National Association of Realtors lost close to 300,000 




estate broker after just about everyone else in his family had already become involved in the 
field. I met him through a friend who brought me to a meeting of a community and economic 
development group that focuses on strengthening the cultural and business impact of Puerto 
Ricans in Chicago.  He graduated college with a degree in Political Science and a minor in Latin 
American History, and prior to becoming a realtor, he worked at a university-based institute 
focusing on improving Latino health outcomes and then as the director of a health-focused not-
for-profit agency. He said he got into real estate in 1996 because he “wanted something 
different.”  Although he thought the work he had been doing was necessary and important, he 
was bogged down by funding and bureaucratic demands.  He wanted more freedom, and felt he 
could serve his community in other ways.   
He started at Century 21, where he worked for a year or a year and a half, and then 
moved to Re/Max.70  While there, he got his managing broker’s license and was asked to head 
up a new office in Chicago’s Southwest Side.  From 2000 to 2003 he managed a Re/Max office 
in Chicago’s West Side, but in 2003, even though, according to him, he was successfully 
managing a brokerage with fifteen agents, Re/Max did not renew his franchise license.  After 
that, he had his own brokerage with twenty-three agents under him.  He did that until the bottom 
dropped out of the market in 2007-2008, and now he is on his own with no one working for him.  
He stayed in the industry through the mortgage crisis, but he is not reliant on his real estate sales 
commissions alone.  He is also a licensed property inspector and owns some rental properties.  
                                                 
70 Re/Max, LLC short for “real estate maximums,” was founded in 1973 as a franchise-based real 
estate brokerage system that allowed realtors to keep almost all of their commissions and pay 
their managing broker a share of office expenses rather than a fixed percentage of their 
commissions.  It is now an international company with over 100,000 members and 6,800 
franchises.   
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He explained that these other activities, while also in real estate, allowed him to diversify his 
income sources and ride out the lean times.  
Terrence, a mild-mannered, middle-aged white real estate broker, told me that he fell into 
real estate in his late 20s after coming to the conclusion that his passion, music, was not a 
sustainable career path for someone who wanted to provide for his family. He said he thought 
about going back to school, but looked at the successes of his stepdad, who had his own real 
estate brokerage, and decided to try it out.  He said his stepdad was skeptical of him at first, 
because he didn’t think Terrence had the personality to be a real estate broker.  I could see what 
he might have meant—Terrence is quiet, low key.  There is nothing of the hyper-confident, 
magnetic salesman in his demeanor. He himself had worried that real estate might not be for 
him—he thought it would be about research and paperwork and, while there is some of that, he 
said that it was more about relationships.  To his surprise, he was good at it from the very 
beginning.  He said that having connections to his stepdad and other people at the brokerage who 
were like family was helpful, but he was not “ handed” business. In fact, he felt there was more 
pressure on him to succeed and prove himself to show people that he wasn’t coasting as the 
boss’s son.  Yet he said there was pressure for anyone in this business, because “you can’t float 
or you won’t get paid.”  
Terrence attributed his success to “effort.”  “I try,” he told me seriously.  And he saw 
having a positive attitude as important, too.  “If you get up and go to work every morning, 
something good will happen.  And you can’t get too down about stuff.”  He said he was lucky 
because when he started, his wife had a job with a good income and they didn’t have kids yet, so 
he did not feel much pressure to be financially successful right away, which allowed him to put 
the work in and build up his business.  I asked him what the market was like when he started, and 
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he said he found it to be challenging, but later someone told him that he was lucky to be coming 
in then because the market was good.  Years later he could see that it was on an “upswing.”  
Then the market got “really good after I had enough experience,” he said.   
During the boom years Terrence said he was “just experienced enough to really get the 
ball rolling… And then it ended.”  I asked him how the crash affected his business, and he said it 
affected everything.  “I literally remember the day the phone stopped ringing,” he said. “It was in 
April or May. I had been super busy up to that point, so busy, in fact, that the phone used to ring 
off the hook and I was almost frustrated when someone called with another listing because I just 
didn’t want to do any more.  But then the phone stopped ringing, and didn’t start again.”  In the 
beginning, he thought he could just change strategies. At this point, he had moved up from 
selling modest homes to more expensive properties in the upscale Northwest Suburbs.  Because 
each listing was worth more, he could get by with fewer at a time.  When the housing market 
started to slow down, he initially thought he could just revert back to his old approach.  “At first, 
I thought I just need fifty listings instead of twenty [to make ends meet], so I went out and got 
more listings.  But none would sell.  It got to the point where I just didn’t care.”  He said he got 
through that period by “not looking up, and at the end of the each year, even though it was really 
hard, I still did okay. Even after two good years (2013 and 2014), he said he still had that 
mentality, and told me he felt needed to “get out of that mindset” and be more optimistic.    
Archie Dalton, a tall white man in his late thirties who projected the energy and 
earnestness of an overgrown kid, became a fulltime real estate broker after losing money and 
properties in his previous real estate pursuits, mortgage lending and real estate investing.  While 
in college at a public university in Illinois, he had majored in accounting, and did two seasons of 
audit work at a large tax firm before he realized that the field was not for him.  He could not pass 
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his CPA exams, and he said he didn’t want to be behind a desk all day. He got work elsewhere, 
but then fate intervened: his parents helped him buy a condo in Chicago, and one of his new 
neighbors was a mortgage broker who was about to start his own company.  Initially he brought 
Archie in as a kind of office manager who handled all of the hiring, ordered office supplies and 
did book keeping.  But eventually, his neighbor’s partner in the business, Eddie, started to resent 
Archie and the salary he drew without bringing any direct revenue of his own.  Archie recalls a 
pivotal moment when Eddie came into his office, brusquely asking him questions about what he 
brought to the table and making fun of his speech impediment, a mild stutter.   
Archie told me that that encounter, in which Eddie belittled him, was a professional 
turning point. Partially to prove that Eddie was wrong about his lack of abilities, Archie quit his 
salaried job and asked a competitor for a job as a mortgage loan originator. From then on, Archie 
said, “he lived by the sword and died by the sword”: his fortunes rose and fell with the housing 
market. Below, he recounts how he weathered the housing market’s ups and downs:  
It was probably easier to enter that industry [in the early 2000s] than at other 
times…[because] lending standards were so low, and it wasn’t hard to find a 
customer…[A few years later] I got introduced to a developer that was a client of 
the bank, and he says [Archie], you need to become a developer, the first thing we 
need to do is build you a single family house.  This was kinda toward the end…of 
the real estate boom if you will. And uh, I said okay…I was doing well in money, 
so I went to the bank that he told me to go to, and said I guess we’re going to 
build a 3500 square foot single family house right in Bucktown.  So I was very 
happy, very excited.  Yeah, so [the developer] was like my pseudo partner, 
nothing on paper, but he was kinda like my partner, mentor. So that [house] went 
up and during that time, I was buying up other properties as well and I got my real 
estate license so I could bird dog properties and make commissions off them, as 
well…So that’s how, that’s how I was able to hold, that’s when I held two 
licenses… 
  
Well, [the housing market] crashed, right? So at the time I got—I was holding 
five properties... [J]ust to stay even on the properties was about $20,000 dollars, a 
month…I wasn’t doing it—well at that time, I lost all my business, it was uh…so 
[tone changes to strangely chipper] foreclosure, bankruptcy…So once that 
happened [I was still standing and]… I had great support from my family, I 
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moved back home in my thirties, for…almost a year. Got back on my feet.  I was 
living in the basement of one of my foreclosed properties, one of them was a three 
unit, so, I was able to like, get rent out of a couple units, which is uh, an ethical 
battle inside of itself, you’re going through foreclosure yet you’re still collecting 
rent… [Y]ou’re just fighting for your, you’re fighting for your own, you own, you 
don’t know, it’s just so crazy.  Uh, and then just, just, it’s been three, four, five 
years now, you just kinda work yourself out of it. So here I am. I do mostly real 
estate now, probably about 95% real estate… I work for [Real Estate One], a great 
brand in Chicago, and…I keep on doubling my income…It’s been four or five 
years now.  I think we’re—at least stabilized. I think I’m stabilized to say the 
least.  
 
For Archie, real estate initially offered opportunities for freedom and wealth building that he 
could not find in more corporate structured setting. But his forays from mortgage lending to 
holding a real estate license and buying and developing his own investment properties—a 
common strategy I will discuss further in Chapter 5—also exposed him to increased levels of 
market risk.   
Much like Roberto and Terrence, Archie’s path in real estate began with interpersonal 
connections.  He entered the field because others he knew were there, and seemed to be finding 
both financial success and fulfillment, ingredients that were missing in his own professional life.  
But unlike the other two real estate brokers, these connections eventually led Archie to over-
invest in the housing market and extract value as an investor, developer, real estate broker, and a 
broker simultaneously.  After foreclosures and bankruptcy, he was now focusing on one thing: 
being a real estate broker.  He told me he liked being a real estate broker because he liked 
“making people happy.”  He described how his affable, “disarming” attitude helped diffuse tense 
negotiations between buyers and sellers, and explained that he was able to make his clients feel 
that they were being heard and respected.  Unlike the frenetic pace of the housing market when 
he was in the mortgage lending business, he said that the market in 2014 was a more reasonable 
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pace, allowing him to take the time to guide clients through the home buying process without 
strong-arming them.    
Unlike professions such as law, medicine, or education that require an investment of time 
and financial resources to achieve the educational credentials necessary, real estate professionals 
enter their field quickly and with comparatively little upfront cost.  “Neither a professional in the 
accepted sense nor a white-collar cog in a corporate machine or a strictly autonomous 
entrepreneur, the ‘professional’ real estate broker [once] hinted at a potential new paradigm for 
staking a claim to a middle-class identity” (Hornstein 2005: 8).  But this new paradigm has come 
with pitfalls.  As independent contractors, real estate brokers have no guaranteed salary or 
benefits.  This does not matter when things are going well, but as Terrence, Roberto, and 
Archie’s experiences during the recession illustrate, when the market contracts, so too does their 
ability to access and generate value in the housing market. While Terrence and Roberto were 
able to push through the crisis and remain in the field, their income from real estate broking 
declined significantly.  Although Terrance has focused his energies on rebuilding his business, 
he had to re-tool his approach just to stay afloat.  Roberto, burned by the end of his relationship 
with Re/Max and by the recession, now devotes more of his time and energy to real estate 
investing, although he keeps his license active.  Archie had his real estate license prior to the 
crash, but it was not until the financial crisis hit and he had to rebuild his professional life in the 
aftermath that he decided to commit himself to being a real estate broker first and foremost.   
Scholarship on the rise of “flexible” or contract-based employment and its effects on 
white-collar workers indicate that my interlocutors’ experiences of precarity during and after the 
2008 economic recession are by no means unique.  But like the laid-off tech workers Carrie Lane 
encounters in Dallas (2011), the investment bankers Karen Ho works alongside in New York 
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(2009) and the amateur day traders that Alex Preda follows (2017), I found that real estate 
brokers often placed a higher value on their professional independence and sense of autonomy 
than they did on an old-fashioned notion of long-term job security.  This was true even though 
they suffered more acutely than more elite, credentialed workers did when the housing market 
tanked. Without the steady paycheck, benefits, and severance packages that sustain white-collar 
workers through periods of market contraction and unemployment, real estate brokers, like the 
mortgage lending professionals I described in the last chapter, have to work constantly to access 
and maintain their position as valued mediators, guides, and gatekeepers in the home buying and 
selling process.   
So why did people continue to work in real estate during and after the mortgage crisis? 
Based on my findings, many continued in the field because they did not have anywhere else to 
go.  Unlike laid off bankers (Ho 2009) or computer network engineers (Lane 2011), real estate 
brokers had no reasonable expectation that, if things were not working out in one brokerage, they 
would be more successful elsewhere.  Like day traders, their fortunes rise and fall with their 
ability to tap into the housing value chain and successfully navigate the market on their clients’ 
behalf.  As such, there is no escaping personal responsibility for success and failure. As Alex 
Preda (2017) and Caitlin Zaloom (2005) both note in their studies of “amateur” retail traders and 
professional futures traders, respectively, there is something terrifying and rewarding about jobs 
that involve the assumption and management of risk.  Real estate brokers enter the market on 
behalf of their clients who wish to buy and sell real property. But they, too, engage in risk by 
tying their livelihoods to their ability to successfully navigate a complex, multifaceted 
marketplace.  Further, as was the case with Roberto, Archie, and other real estate brokers I spoke 
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with, they are compelled to involve themselves in the risks and opportunities of the market even 
more directly through becoming real estate investors themselves.   
 
Navigating Real Estate Networks 
Although real estate brokers operate outside of the confines of the corporate office 
environment, many continue to feel constrained by the hierarchical structures of compensation 
and representation in real estate and rely extensively on their relationships with others in the 
industry. Those who are successful draw on personal connections and existing or self-fashioned 
professional networks to draw the referrals necessary to propel their business forward.  Those 
who struggle (as the majority of my interlocutors did) attribute their difficulties to a lack of 
social and economic capital, which makes it difficult for them to cultivate strong referral sources, 
participate in professional networks, and pay for the advertising and promotional materials they 
hope to use in lieu of referrals.  In this sense, we can see real estate’s accessibility as a bit 
misleading: it is easy-to-enter yet insular, network-reliant yet difficult for novices to establish 
themselves as members who count. While it has low barriers to entry, it has high barriers to 
success.   
Part of the challenge is that while real estate brokers operate independently and have to 
reckon with relatively few authority figures in their day-to-day work, they are deeply dependent 
upon the referrals and square dealings of others in their industry to find customers, meet their 
needs, and close their deals.  Once a real estate broker has a steady client base, this can work out 
well.  Lindsey, a stylishly-dressed white woman real estate broker in her thirties who I 
interviewed on the recommendation of a colleague, said she had lucked out because, as soon as 
she got her license the real estate broker who had sold a house to her years ago and whom she 
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had recommended to many friends retired.  When he did, he sent most of his clients to her. He 
said he couldn’t think of a more fitting way of repaying her for her referrals over the years than 
by sending them back her way.  In her twelve years in the business, she said she has never had to 
do advertising or buy leads—it’s all been built on word of mouth.71 She said that “it’s all about 
finding people who trust you and have a similar vibe to you” and that she worked with a lot of 
artists, musicians, schoolteachers, and professors that seemed to feel more comfortable with her 
than they would with a more slick, corporate type of real estate broker.   
Lindsey told me that ninety percent of her clients are first-time home buyers, which she 
felt had to do with her time of life as much as anything else. She entered the field right as her 
friends and contemporaries were starting to purchase their first properties. She also reported that 
at her small brokerage in a hip section of Chicago, she had received great mentoring from the 
managing broker and from her more experienced co-workers.  Lindsey’s experience of real estate 
seemed shaped by the social capital she had brought into the field when she first entered it—
strong relationships with people who were ready to purchase homes and ready to recommend her 
to their friends and colleagues, too, as well as her personal “vibe” or brand (Gershon 2017). And 
her experiences jived with a directive that my classmates and I received in our real estate 
licensing course: “start by selling your services as a real estate broker to people already in your 
network.”  If you have a good network, and you play your cards right, you might never have to 
worry about hunting down business outside of it.   
                                                 
71 Real estate brokers in search of new customers can buy leads from real estate websites such as 
Zillow or Trulia, or from third party lead providers.  The leads include a potential customer’s 
name and contact info.  While real estate brokers may buy leads to begin with, many feel that the 
practice is a waste of money and should be avoided once you have built your business can 
generate leads from your repeat customers and their referrals instead.  
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From Lindsey’s own description of her entry into the business and her continued success, 
it sounds as if she had lived out the “it’s all about who you know” principle of professional 
success.  Unlike several of the other brokers I interviewed, I never felt that Lindsey slipped into 
pitch mode to “sell” me on homeownership or herself as a competent, successful real estate 
broker.  She told me she got into real estate because she loved the experience of buying her own 
home and was genuinely interested in helping other people find the right home for them and 
getting to see inside all these different houses along the way. I believed her, and her origin story 
added to an appealing sense that she was a salesperson who was not just in it for the money but 
rather genuinely wanted to help people buy and sell homes. Lindsey was attractive, 
knowledgeable, and well-spoken, but not in aggressive way that might have been off putting to 
her target audience: hip, relatively affluent, urban first-time home buyers.  
Other real estate brokers I spoke with had not had such an easy time.  Lenny Escobar, a 
Colombian American real estate broker in his early thirties who entered real estate after finding 
that he disliked his chosen career path of elementary education, spent a lot of our time together 
complaining about the corrupt business practices of others in his field.  “Only ten percent of real 
estate brokers are decent people,” he told me, and labeled himself as among the decent ten 
percent due to his Christian values and his volunteer commitments as a coach and mentor.  These 
attributes, he claimed, defined him far more than his professional identity as a real estate broker. 
Nonetheless, like Lindsey, he tried to use these attributes to market himself as a different, better 
version of a real estate broker; one that did not fit the slick, sleazy stereotype.     
I met Lenny in my real estate licensing class, where he was quick to introduce himself 
and tell me that he had been through the class before and had years of real estate experience.  He 
had obtained his real estate license previously and worked as a real estate broker from 2003 to 
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2007. Lenny got into the real estate business through a personal connection—his mother.  As a 
recently divorced mother of two who had emigrated to the United States from Colombia years 
earlier, she started selling real estate in the 1990s, had success, and eventually opened her own 
brokerage.  When Lenny started out as a real estate broker, he worked for her, and initially things 
went well.  But in 2007, it started getting harder for his clients to obtain financing.  He wasn’t 
making enough money selling houses, so he switched to acting as a rental agent, but this was 
difficult, as well.72  Eventually he left the field, first obtaining work as a benefits administrator 
and then finding a position as a real estate analyst within the REO property division of a major 
U.S. bank. 73  He decided to return real estate broking in 2014 because the market was improving 
and he was sick of dealing with the corporate banking world and the REO properties real estate 
niche, which he told me was rife with corrupt real estate dealings.  His decision to return to work 
as a real estate broker was aided by his new marital status: his wife had a stable, steady income 
as a public school teacher, something he had not had the benefit of when he worked as a real 
estate broker previously.   
 Other real estate brokers expressed similar criticisms of their industry to Lenny’s, and 
took pains to distinguish themselves and their working practices from the ways in which others 
did business.  This differentiation might be a business strategy—in an industry with a sullied 
reputation as far as ethical business practices are concerned, it behooves real estate brokers to 
convince potential clients that they (1) have a strong sense of ethics; (2) that others in the field do 
                                                 
72 This was a common financial survival strategy for urban realtors during the recession. The 
commissions for a rental broker are much smaller (usually one month’s rent), but when the credit 
markets were tight, the rental market boomed and provided real estate brokers a much-needed 
opportunity to earn compensation. 
73 Banks’ REO divisions managed their inventory of “real estate owned,” most of which were 
properties that the bank had repossessed after foreclosure proceedings.  Real estate analysts like 
Lenny managed the sale of these properties by hiring outside real estate brokers and acting as the 
bank’s representative in negotiating the sale of the REO properties.    
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not; and (3) that they can protect their clients from the bad faith dealings of other real estate 
brokers, buyers, sellers, and mortgage lenders.  But their complaints about others’ behavior also 
reflect discomfiture with the competitive nature of their field and their own sense of marginality 
within it.   
My real estate classmate Kelly Burton had a college degree but was working as a 
bartender as she tried to establish herself in real estate. When I met up with her in February 2015, 
she had just passed the real estate licensing exam and told me excitedly that she had found a 
mentor, an older, more established male agent whom she knew through a friend of a friend.  He 
had real estate licenses in Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and he’d based much of his 
business around the second home market.  He said that if Kelly helped him out and handled his 
clients’ transactions in Illinois, they could split the commissions.  When I met her for coffee six 
months later, she was depressed about her future prospects in real estate and hoping to move to 
Colorado for a fresh start.  She told me that her mentor had been anything but helpful, passing 
off his most difficult clients for her to deal with, hiring his buddies to do shoddy construction 
work and clean a client’s house in preparation for listing photos, and then refusing to refund her 
when the client was dissatisfied and Kelly had already paid for the work out of her own pocket.  
Teaming up with him lost her business, she said, but she felt she lacked the connections, 
financial resources, and experience to do it on her own.  
As a newcomer to real estate, Kelly told me she felt betrayed by someone she had 
considered a mentor and ignored by the other real estate brokers she’d met.  When she’d do 
showings of a property, she’d ask the other real estate brokers for feedback and get no response.  
She said her brokerage had all these social events to promote networking within the brokerage, 
like golf outings and casino nights, but she didn’t have the money to attend them. She’d already 
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borrowed thousands of dollars from her dad to pay for the licensing class and to become a 
member of the National Association of Real estate brokers so she could get access to the MLS.  
She didn’t want to spend more money with no hope of a return.  When I checked in with her 
again several months later (and a little over a year after she’d passed her licensing exam) she told 
me she was moving back home to Indiana.   
Another new real estate broker I met, Edison, was similarly frustrated by the behavior of 
others in his field. Edison is a black man in his late twenties who decided to pursue his real estate 
license after launching a men’s clothing store and then a gourmet popcorn business that he 
hadn’t been able to scale up successfully, then working as a manager for several years at a 
national rental car company.  Edison had entrepreneurial and managerial experience and skills, 
but he said what had surprised him in his first month in real estate was the isolation.   
 “You’re in this by yourself,” he told me.  “There are no people holding your hand or 
ensuring your success.”  He explained that he had sent out emails to the top four brokers in his 
office when he started working, introducing himself and offering himself up as someone who 
could assist them in exchange for some guidance.  He even told them that they didn’t have to 
split their commission with him: he would work for free.  Two of them responded saying “good 
luck but I don’t like to work with anyone else.”  The other two didn’t respond at all. Then he sent 
emails to all 200 brokers in his firm, basically offering the same thing.  Eight people responded 
and said welcome, good luck.  But nobody took him up on his offer.  Given that he had chosen to 
join that particular brokerage in part because of their reputation for professional development 
and mentorship, he was disappointed and already thinking about how to go out on his own as 
soon as possible. 
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 Even real estate brokers who seemed relatively successful talked about other agents who 
backstabbed them, misrepresented properties, or refused to speak to them.  Roberto Jimenez said 
he often didn’t get callbacks on properties he’d inquire about for clients, a professional 
discourtesy he attributed in part to his Latino-sounding name.  Lenny Escobar told me he thought 
his Latino heritage worked against him, as well. Bernard, one of the instructors from my real 
estate licensing course, frequently regaled our class with tales of other real estate brokers who 
tried to put one over on him or his clients.  While younger real estate brokers like Kelly and 
Edison expressed dismay at other real estate brokers’ behavior, Bernard seemed to consider his 
ability to ferret out shady dealings to be part of his skill set as an experienced professional.   
 
Presentations of a Professional Self 
Even as real estate brokers complained about others’ unethical or unkind behavior, most 
presented a united façade of professional courtesy and competence when interacting with one 
another in front of clients.  This “team” performance belied a far more vexing set of professional 
relationships and interests beneath the surface.  Whatever their feelings about other members of 
their profession, or their identification, or lack thereof, with the professional organizational 
structures and norms of their industries, they must “perform” a professional identity that is in 
keeping with the accepted values, dispositions, and appearances that the general public expects 
of a member of their profession.  As Erving Goffman writes “…one finds that service personnel, 
whether in profession, bureaucracy, or craft, enliven their manner with movements which 
express proficiency and integrity, but…often its major purpose is to establish a favorable 
definition of their service or product” (1959: 77).  This need to maintain a unified professional 
front cuts against real estate brokers who find themselves in the unenviable position of being 
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aware of professional misconduct or fraud in real estate transactions but being loathe to report it 
to their client, their professional organization, or to state authorities for fear of tarnishing an 
image of professional ethics that they themselves rely on to earn a livelihood.   
Although we were told in our real estate licensing course how to report suspected 
instances of real estate misconduct or mortgage fraud, and those I spoke with named instances in 
which they were uncomfortable with the conduct of other housing professionals, no one told me 
that they had ever reported on a fellow real estate broker.  Lenny Escobar talked about this at 
length with me, because he had many negative experiences, both when he was working as a real 
estate broker and managing the REO properties for a national bank and dealing with real estate 
brokers in that context.  He even told me the names of people who he believed had done 
unethical things, such as covertly removed appliances from an REO property they were assigned 
by Lenny’s bank to sell. Lenny said he could not do anything about these wrongdoings, because 
it was the type of industry where you would be blackballed if you were a whistleblower.  But he 
seemed to think that I, as an outside researcher, could write a kind of exposé that would air all 
the dirty laundry, and called me a couple of times after our interviews when he was angry about 
what someone had done. While I got the impression that Lenny was a bit melodramatic, and I 
had to tell him that he should not expect a doctoral dissertation to right real estate’s wrongs, his 
sense of anger and relative powerlessness is telling.  Real estate brokers tacitly accept unethical, 
shoddy work from their fellow brokers, or from the home inspectors, mortgage lenders, and title 
companies to whom they refer their clients because they want to get their deals closed.  In the 
short-term, whistleblowing gums up the works of home buying and selling and, as such, most 
real estate brokers avoid it. But not reporting bad behavior comes with its own pitfalls if you 
want your clients to value your expert guidance.   
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  Even when they are interacting with customers, real estate brokers are faced with 
conflicting responsibilities to balance and perform.  They must emphasize their professional 
expertise in order to present themselves as uniquely qualified for the work that they do.  And yet 
they must also convey that they are willing to go above and to serve their clients and meet their 
emotional needs for support, encouragement, and validation in the home buying and selling 
processes.  The emotional labor this self-presentation demands is akin to the work that Arlie 
Russell Hochschild notes is required of flight attendants in The Managed Heart: 
Commercialization of Human Feeling (1983), as real estate professionals must pivot between a 
deeply interpersonal, empathetic, “service” orientation toward their customers’ wants and needs 
and an ‘expert” stance through the enactment of technical competence and experience as 
negotiators, deal finders, and market-savvy, well-connected businesswomen and men.  
Rosalyn, a white woman realtor in her sixties who came into the field after decades of 
running her own executive recruiting firm, strongly emphasized the “service” component of her 
job in our interview, and I observed her performing the dual roles of service provider and 
housing market expert in her interactions with clients.  She had a way of authoritatively 
conveying important information to clients while making them feel that they themselves had 
already come to the same conclusion.  For example, a prospective buyer once asked her about the 
high condo association assessments in an apartment where she was holding an open house.  
“You’ve noticed that this is a very well-maintained building,” she replied.  “The owners take a 
lot of pride in keeping it up, and they do not want to have to special assessments, so they like to 
keep strong association reserves.  You understand, no one likes to be hit with a special 
assessment.”   She was representing the seller, and she told me that she knew that the building’s 
high assessments were deterring buyers from what was a reasonably-priced condo.  But she 
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made the prospective buyer who questioned her feel that she was on their side, and in agreement 
with them about the importance of building upkeep and strong association reserves, so of course 
they understood, together, that the assessments had to be rather high.  Rosalyn also skillfully 
built rapport with small talk; asking buyers where they were from, whether they had children, 
and praising them for their forethought in looking for a property like the one she was trying to 
sell them.   
 When a real estate broker is skillful and confident, like Rosalyn, she can handle clients 
and guide their expectations and preferences without them feeling that they are being strong-
armed.  But real estate brokers who are not in control of their clients (perhaps because they do 
not have the social capital and financial success to make them feel in control of their own 
financial destinies) must also hide their insecurities or go on the offensive when things are not 
going well.  Archie, the real estate broker who had been a mortgage broker before the housing 
market crash, likened his relationships with clients to the perils of the dating world, noting that 
over time he had to become adept at “reading the signs” that the client was dissatisfied and 
wanted to end the relationship. He said that when the client went out of communication, or “went 
rogue” and stopped respecting his professional advice, the relationship was over.  Bernard the 
real estate instructor told our class that we should never let ungrateful clients lead us around “by 
the nose.”  Real estate brokers that did not master these skills, he suggested, would end up asking 
“how do you like your coffee?” because they would be out of a job in real estate in short order.  
 
Selling Indispensability in a Changing Marketplace 
The balance that real estate brokers strive to maintain between presenting themselves as 
service-oriented and ready and willing to follow the client’s instructions, and as experts capable 
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of taking the reins from start to finish, has become difficult to manage in an age of rapid 
economic and technological change. In a world of consumers who fancy themselves educated in 
the inner workings of the real estate market by conducting research on the Internet or watching 
CNN, the ease with which someone can become a real estate broker or a broker presents these 
professions with an identity problem. How do you make something that seems easy to do and has 
few prerequisites apart from a high school degree and a passing grade on a multiple choice test 
seem like a legitimate career that requires intelligence, expert knowledge, business savvy, and 
experience?  
The challenge real estate brokers face in proving their worth and value is by no means 
unique in the current service-based, consumption-driven iteration of the U.S economy.  In Down 
and Out in the New Economy: How People Find (or Don’t Find) Work Today (2017), Ilana 
Gershon explores the lengths to which job seekers and workers of all stripes must go to “sell” 
themselves and demonstrate their worth in an economy where one’s “personal brand” and the 
appearance of professional success, skill, and mastery that it connotes, may matter far more than 
traditionally desirable worker attributes, such as educational background, employment history, 
work ethic, or the ability to learn new skills.  In a way, a focus on self-presentation makes sense 
in a field that does not consider fancy credentials or exhaustive experience to be prerequisites for 
success.  But effective presentations of oneself as a service-oriented advisor, expert negotiator, 
and industry gatekeeper become all the more fraught when the real estate broker trying to convey 
these things is struggling in an industry in the midst of a technology-driven transformation.   
Real estate brokers perform a service in helping clients navigate the complex processes of 
buying and selling properties, and they receive commission-based compensation for their efforts.  
But their role as housing market mediators and deal finders is under threat from internet-based 
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search engines and full service platforms like Redfin, which combine property listings, agents 
who will show clients properties on demand, and listing brokers who charge less commission 
because they receive part of their compensation from Redfin in the form of a salary.  These 
companies offer the same basic suite of services that a real estate broker who is an independent 
contractor and works with a traditional brokerage provides, but in more convenient, well-
advertised, and sometimes cheaper packages.  In the face of such competition, real estate brokers 
spoke of the ever-greater necessity of proving their value to prospective clients, something that 
many (particularly those who were middle-aged and older) resented having to do after so many 
years in the profession. Real estate brokers had to fight to demonstrate the value of their services 
to cautious clients in a housing market still reeling from the mortgage crisis.   
After accompanying Roberto on several property showings with his client, Marisol, who 
was looking to buy an investment property, he complained to me about the effects of real estate 
websites on the client-real estate broker relationship.  He said that Marisol was constantly 
sending him listings from real estate search engines such as Zillow or Trulia and asking why he 
had not sent them to her himself through his MLS-generated search.  She seemed to think he was 
slacking, but he said that the listings from those sites were often expired or filled with 
misinformation.  
As much as Roberto resented Marisol’s suggestions of properties to see, from my 
observations over the course of a couple of meetings with Roberto and observations of Roberto’s 
interactions with Marisol in the fall 2014, he was indeed struggling to find a property that met 
her specifications. Marisol was paying cash thanks to an inheritance from her grandfather, who 
had also been a real estate investor, but this was to be her first property and she was planning to 
live in one unit and rent out the other units to tenants.  This meant that she was more cautious 
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and particular about the location and type of property she wanted than the typical rental property 
investor, and she ended up backing out of a home she had put in an offer on because after the 
inspection she determined that the sellers were being dishonest about the timeline of repairs they 
had made on the building.  Roberto was an experienced realtor and Marisol was new to the 
housing market, but the balance of power in their interactions, at least those that I observed, 
suggested that Roberto felt his expertise was discounted. He said he was glad that clients were 
now more educated about the home buying process, but now “they want to control the whole 
transaction” and “think they know everything.” 
 There are a number of converging trends that undermine real estate brokers’ position as 
the trusted market mediators and gatekeepers that all home buyers and sellers need.  The housing 
industry is still coping with the aftermath of a sharp market contraction.  When an economic 
downturn occurs and workers are laid off (or in the case of real estate brokers, leave a field of 
their own volition because they cannot make enough money) the field often adjusts to be able to 
sustain itself with a smaller labor force. In real estate, this market contraction coincided with a 
period of technological change and a move toward Internet and app-based (often peer-to-peer) 
service-on-demand that has impacted many industries other than real estate (taxis, restaurants, 
rental cars, grocery stores, and the hospitality industry).  For professionals who pride themselves 
on their ability to cultivate and maintain interpersonal relationships through phone calls, letters, 
and lunches, these developments, and their implications for the way many people now prefer to 
buy and sell homes, has been a rude awakening.   
 Some real estate brokers I interviewed have found ways to adjust to this new 
technologically-mediated housing landscape.  No longer gatekeepers with exclusive access to 
property listings, real estate brokers have stressed their continued value as experienced 
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dealmakers and client confidantes.  And some have expanded the types of services they offer and 
the ways they present them to clients.  One pair of white, middle-aged real estate brokers who 
operated an independent brokerage in one of Chicago’s gentrifying far North Side neighborhoods 
I met offer current and prospective clients guided bike tours of historic Chicago neighborhoods.  
Another young Latina real estate broker, who complained about the stodgy, technologically 
adverse older real estate brokers in her brokerage, posts YouTube videos with home buying tips 
and advertises her listings on Twitter and Facebook.  Many of the younger real estate brokers I 
have met use Facebook to post articles and stories related to home buying, as well as advertise 
their listings and call attention to the properties they have sold. Some also use “client 
testimonials,” posted on Facebook or a personal website, to act as anonymous references that 
speak to the high quality of their services.  Other real estate brokers drum up business by 
speaking at pre-purchase classes offered by housing counseling organizations or hosting them at 
their own offices.  And one real estate broker I met embraced the changes in his industry 
wholeheartedly by joining a “cloud-based” brokerage.  While his brokerage had no physical 
office or infrastructure, he participated in trainings and meetings with his fellow real estate 
brokers in a strange virtual world in which each real estate broker chose and operated their own 
avatar.   
While not all real estate brokers and brokers are moving online, their industry is evolving 
in response to new technologies and new client expectations that have been shaped by both the 
2008 crisis and by generational differences in technology use and consumption preferences.  As 
the 2017 Real Estate in a Digital Age Report from the National Association of Realtors details,  
In 1981, 22 percent of home buyers read newspaper ads to find a home and eight 
percent used friends as an information source. In 2016, 44 percent looked for 
properties online first. The world we live in today is a digital one and searching 
for a home is no different. Buyers now have apps that let them search by location 
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and neighborhoods. Online listings have virtual tours so viewers can look at a 
bunch of potential homes while narrowing down their search to a select few in the 
effort to save time. Online searching maximizes the ability to compare and 
contrast homes on the market by selected features. Most of this is done before a 
potential home buyer connects with a real estate agent. [NAR 2017] 
 
 Although the National Association of Realtors’ report acknowledges that the ways 
information is disseminated has changed, they go on to stress that real estate brokers are still key 
figures the home buying and selling process, even though how they connect to and communicate 
with clients has changed.  Successful real estate brokers, they suggest, are ones that find ways to 
engage with and embrace with the new horizons that “the digital age” presents.   
In 2016, buyers worked with an agent 88 percent of the time to find their home, so 
trust in a Realtor® is still king. While the initial process may start online, home 
buyers turn to the advice from a trusted real estate agent. The difference is that 
home buyers are entering the process more educated about the market before they 
speak to a home seller or an agent. n addition to the home buying process, 
Realtors® also utilize technology in their everyday business practices. Staying up 
to date with new technology is important, but also cited as one of the biggest 
challenges for firms in the next two years. 
 
Over 90 percent of real estate firms have websites, and the most common feature 
on their websites were property listings. Along with web use, Realtors® are also 
using their mobile devices for a multitude of different activities, with the primary 
being to communicate with their clients. [NAR 2017] 
 
In spite of the NAR report’s relative optimism about the future of their industry in the digital age, 
existential threats exist in the traditional model of real estate brokerages, which have long sought 
to limit buyers and sellers’ access to information in order to maintain a high-value role for the 
real estate broker and the brokerage firm for which she works. As such, it is unsurprising that 
many of my real estate broker interlocutors were thinking about expanding their access to the 




Selling Real Estate as a Way Up and Out of the Wage-Based Economy 
While many of my interviewees stressed the pleasure and sense of accomplishment they 
felt in helping others navigate the housing market, I found that the appeal of working in the real 
estate field endures in spite of market ups and downs because it can be used as launch pad/point 
of access for other, more lucrative prospects.  Just as many of the real estate brokers and lenders 
I spoke with were coming from other lines of work, many had visions of what they could do 
afterward, as well.  For example, most of the young real estate brokers I spoke with saw working 
as a real estate broker as a steppingstone into a future professional identity as a real estate 
investor and owner of rental buildings.  
Edison Martin, the black real estate broker in his late twenties who was disappointed by 
the lack of mentorship at his brokerage told me that his end goal is not to be a broker, but he said 
he realized that “real estate is the best way to come up with capital to invest in real estate.”  For 
him, real estate offered autonomy. “I want to take my career in my own hands.  I don’t want to 
bug other people to make money.  I want to be in control of my life,” he said. His professional 
trajectory reflected this goal.  He told that after he realized he could not scale up his popcorn 
business in the way that he would need to do if he wanted to take it to the next level, he decided 
to go work for a rental car company that had a strong management-training program.  He said he 
knew he could have gone back to school for that kind of stuff, but he saw himself as a “hands-on 
learner, so [learning on the job] was good.”  He learned a lot at the rental car company, he said, 
but real estate was always in the back of his mind. When he had enough money saved up to pay 
for six months of living expenses without a paycheck, he took the leap and quit his job.  He 
enrolled in a real estate licensing course, failed the course final twice and had to retake it, then 
took the state test, which he passed on his third try.  
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Edison told me he had a vision board where he lists out short-term and long-term goals so 
he knows what he needs to do. He said he only planned to be at his brokerage for two years.74 
After that, he would take the exam to become a managing broker and go out on his own.  He said 
that he would run his own shop a little differently, but that selling real estate would eventually 
become a sort of sideline thing, second to his own real estate investments, and perhaps, 
eventually, real estate development. .  His goal is just to “be successful,” not just financially but 
to help people, and help his family.  He talked about helping families get into properties in good 
neighborhoods where the schools would be good, ever an issue for mostly non-white Chicagoans 
living on the city’s South and West Sides.   Edison shared his real estate licensing instructor’s 
advice: 
Use the first [commission] checks you get to pay forward on bills, so then if you 
don’t get another check for three months, you’re okay, you’re not desperate.  And 
then once you do that you start saving to invest in real estate.  You start out by 
buying $20K buildings and fixing them up a little to make them rentable. And you 
just keep doing that, always paying cash, so your costs don’t get too high.  And 
then with the rentals, you have the steady income that real estate doesn’t provide, 
but the real estate broking, if you’re successful, is what gives you fairly quick 
access to the capital you need to start investing.”   
 
Sitting across from Edison in a South Side coffee shop, his enthusiasm was infectious.  The plan 
seemed compellingly achievable to me, too: financial autonomy through a climb up the housing 
value chain.  You began as real estate broker, moved up by investing in and renting out one, two, 
and then several rental properties, and then maybe climbed further still by becoming a developer. 
I had already interviewed Archie the failed real estate investor at this point, but it was easy to put 
his misfortunes out of my mind.  Archie had been hapless, and relied on the advice of the wrong 
people.  Edison, in contrast, laid out a plan I believed in.   
                                                 
74 In Illinois, there are three levels of real estate licensure: rental real estate agent, real estate 
broker, and managing real estate broker. You must have your real estate broker license for two 
years before you can take additional courses and another exam in order to be a managing broker.  
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Another young real estate broker I interviewed, Vivian Hernandez, a Latina woman in 
her mid-twenties who dressed in formal, conservative pantsuits that contrasted with her youthful 
face, also saw her work as a real estate broker as a step toward her imagined future identity as a 
property investor. She came into the real estate field in 2010, after a couple of years working in 
retail sales.  She did not have a car or savings, so it was a struggle in the beginning, and she’s 
still struggling, although she’s optimistic about the market improving.  When I asked her if she 
thought that this was going to be her career in the long term, she said she goes back and forth 
about that, but she knows one way or another she wants to be involved in real estate.  There are 
other investments, she acknowledged, “but not ones that appreciate like property.”   
Vivian’s goal to be an investor means that she does not have as much free time or 
disposable income, but she knows what she wants, and it forces her to “be responsible.”  She also 
feels a sense of obligation to her parents, who she said “managed to raise four kids and send 
them to college [while living in] neighborhoods where that was very difficult.”  The most 
important thing to her, she said, is “freedom.”  Her parents didn’t have much—they worked 
opposite shifts so someone could always be home with the kids, and they didn’t have much spare 
time.  And they are still working.  She wants to alleviate that burden for them.  In the next five 
years, she told me that she wants to buy and rent out two or three investment properties.  She 
said she would like to be a cash buyer but now she will have to rely on mortgage financing.  For 
her, the goal is owning and managing rentals—a home of her own is something for the down the 
road, after those go through and are working well.   
Felix Abbott, a white real estate broker in his early thirties who previously worked for his 
uncle, a property investor and flipper who made a fortune buying and selling foreclosed 
properties in Hawaii, expressed a similar desire to achieve freedom and autonomy through real 
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estate.  He told me that his goal was to be able to buy up enough rental properties to generate 
sufficient passive income for his girlfriend and himself to move to Latin America, where he 
could go surfing and give back through charity work.  He contrasted his own reasons for working 
as pecuniary compared to his girlfriend’s vocation, medicine.  To him, real estate broking was a 
means to tap into the housing market, make connections, and generate enough income through is 
commissions to buy investment properties, eventually putting him in a position where he would 
no longer have to work at all and could make his move southward.75 
Many of the older, more established real estate brokers I met had already made the move 
into owning and managing rental properties, mostly successfully.  While they still worked, 
owning rental properties provided them with a steady income stream that helped them through 
the lean times that all experienced once in awhile. Still, the frequency of my interlocutors’ 
reports of their current and planned real estate investments speaks to the overlapping 
opportunities and uncertainties that housing professionals perceive and try to manage in the 
housing market they inhabit and help create. They want to become investors with income-
generating rental properties because they believe that will insulate them from the ups and downs 
they experience as real estate brokers.  And investing in real estate themselves offers them a way 
to benefit more directly from their market expertise and access.  But becoming an investor also 
demands that they assume a much higher level of personal financial risk than acting on a buyer 
or seller’s behalf.   
 That real estate is a fallback option that, in turn, may require that its practitioners develop 
still more fallback options to make ends meet or move to the next level economically indexes the 
                                                 
75 I have stayed in loose touch with Felix through friends of friends and social media. He has not 
yet moved to Latin America, but he has switched jobs: now he works for a real estate investment 
firm that buys and sells foreclosed and devalued properties on Chicago’s South and West sides.   
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insecurity many workers experience in the contemporary moment. The difficulties of finding and 
keeping clients, navigating insular real estate networks, fending off competition, and proving 
one’s value shapes real estate brokers’ attitudes about the market, their customers, and others in 
their profession.  And these attitudes have consequences. Suspicious of other real estate brokers 
and acutely aware of their transgressions, my interlocutors were nonetheless loath to report 
anybody to the state real estate board’s ethics committee, because they did not want to be seen as 
backstabbing a colleague. But by turning a blind eye to unethical behavior in their industry, real 
estate brokers hurt consumers and undermine their own professional integrity. Real estate 
brokerage’s compensation structure also has the potential to harm consumers.  Because real 
estate brokers are only paid commissions when their sale goes through, they may do everything 
in their power to see that deals close as fast as possible, even when waiting or backing out of the 
deal entirely may be more beneficial for their home buying client.  This is because although they 
work “for” the buyer, their commission check actually comes from the property seller via the 
seller’s real estate broker, creating a conflict between what real estate brokers purport to do, put 
their client’s interests above their own, and what the structures of their profession encourage.   
Although the housing market was improving during my research, many of my 
interlocutors were jaded, cynical, and frustrated: with their clients, with other real estate brokers, 
and with the mortgage brokers, appraisers, and inspectors who slowed down their deals.  They 
were surviving, but they felt themselves besieged on all sides.  And yet, as I mention above, 
many continued to see investing in real estate as a way to supplement and eventually supplant 
their incomes as real estate brokers. My interlocutors’ visions of opportunity through real estate 
investment speaks to the continued power of the homeownership complex, but also to the ways 
in which shifting market conditions and attitudes toward ownership may affect the perspectives 
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of actors integral to the complex’s perpetuation, but do not necessarily undercut their deeply held 
belief in housing as a source of economic value.  That real estate brokers, already engaged in the 
challenging work of managing and mediating real estate market risk for their clients, still aspire 
to invest their earnings in the same market they rely on for income is worthy of note.  It suggests 
that real estate remains a space of real and imagined possibility in an often bleak and bewildering 
U.S. economic landscape, even for those who are intimately aware of its pitfalls.  As Chapters 5 
and 6 will illuminate, such spaces continue to be in high demand, both for ordinary folks hoping 
to build wealth and achieve financial freedom and for communities seeking a path to economic 
and social investment and revitalization.   
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FRAME III: MORE OWNERSHIP! 
 
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I illuminated the experiences and perspectives of mortgage and real 
estate professionals working at the mesoscale of the U.S. economy to broker connections 
between individual homeowners and national and global financial and political institutions. Both 
real estate brokers and mortgage lenders see the housing market as a space of possibility and 
freedom but also of risk, competition, and crisis.  Their training and experiences as market 
middlemen, gatekeepers, and mediators prepares them to navigate the housing value chain and, if 
they have sufficient savvy, luck, and financial and social capital, to extract value from it by 
offering their services to home buyers and sellers in need of guidance. Their work does more 
than generate a livelihood; it is an integral component to the homeownership complex. 
 But mortgage finance and real estate are not the only arenas where housing stakeholders 
seek to leverage market knowledge to achieve their individual goals, yet also participate in the 
construction of the market itself (Granovetter 1985; Preda 2017; Zaloom 2005).  In the next two 
chapters, I explore two other spaces in which the housing market is framed and constructed as a 
site of freedom and opportunity: real estate investment seminars and a community-based housing 
market recovery program in Chicago.  As we saw in Chapter 2, residential property ownership 
has long been used as an engine for achieving household wealth and economic growth as well as 
a political response to intractable social problems. But how is an ownership solution packaged 
for sale on the private market today, and how is it received and taken up by people with different 
financial circumstances and in local contexts?  This section explores what it means and does 
when the proffered answer to a stagnant local economy, a vacant property problem, or an 




The pro-homeownership ideology that circulates in investment seminars and in 
community development circles may, on the surface, seem to be worlds apart.  After all, 
investment seminar attendees are looking to buy houses so that they can get rich through asset 
wealth, profiting off of others’ unmet affordable housing needs or personal crises.  Community 
development organizations, not-for-profits, and housing policymakers, on the other hand, 
promote homeownership as a solution to the intractable problems of urban disinvestment, 
poverty, and segregation. While their intents may be different, both groups use homeownership 
to address profound social and economic inequalities evident in the housing landscape.  Yet 
more ownership is only a cure for those who can buy properties and become homeowners, real 
estate investors, or landlords in a time and place where property values will appreciate or at least 
stay steady.  For prospective real estate investors that do not have the means to access 
conventional mortgage financing or the knowledge to make sound investment decisions, the 
chances of economic transformation and freedom through ownership are slim.  Those chances 
may be even slimmer for the low-to-moderate income prospective first-time home buyers who 
are the targets of a Chicago housing market recovery program.  These buyers must fit within 
narrow income criteria and purchase a home in a neighborhood that is already struggling with 
vacant buildings and depressed property values in order to qualify for the down payment 
assistance many require in order to become homeowners.  Both arenas illustrate how the promise 
of homeownership as a cultural ideal and a source of economic benefit depends upon a baseline 
of inequality. Producing new homeowners, as the homeownership complex does, may generate 
opportunity, freedom, and growth for some individuals in some places and times, but it also 









“How many people here have 401Ks?” The question reverberates through a half-filled 
hotel ballroom in a Southwestern suburb of Chicago in the spring of 2015.  The questioner, 
Wendell, a tanned, barrel-chested white man in his fifties with slicked-back, salt-and-pepper hair 
and gleaming white teeth, pauses and waits for a response.  Only ten people out of an audience of 
two hundred, mostly middle-aged and older, raise their hands.  Wendell furrows his brow, not at 
the majority of his audience who lack private retirement accounts, but at the handful of people 
who raised their hands in the affirmative.  “Do rich people have 401Ks?” he inquired, his voice 
half-incredulous, half-accusatory.  “No?” the audience replied, a bit hesitantly.  “What’s the rate 
of return on a 401K?” he asked.  When he didn’t get an immediate answer, he provided us with 
one: “Five to eight percent,” he said, then paused, waiting for those numbers to register with te 
audience as unacceptably low.  “Is that enough?” he asked.  “No!” The audience said decisively.   
Although Wendell was disappointed with those audience members who had invested 
their retirement money at such a low rate of return, he said that he didn’t blame us.  We just 
hadn’t learned that “saving and investing for retirement are two different things…We were 
taught to save, save, save and work, work, work and then retire at 65, but that’s not working,” he 
said with a grimace.  Later on in the presentation, Wendell reiterated his plea for a new way of 
thinking about investing, asking the audience,  “Why are you here today?”  There were murmurs 
from the audience, but “the money” appeared to be the consensus answer.  “That’s fine,” he said, 
“but what does [the money] give you?” After waiting a beat for a rousing response that didn’t 
come, he answered for us: “financial freedom.”  He told us that having that freedom would mean 
things like no longer holding back bills or living paycheck to paycheck.  “So long as you work 
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for someone else, he said, “you’re working on someone else’s financial freedom, not yours… 
Entrepreneurship is the number one way to become financially successful.”   
The particular pathway to financial freedom for which Wendell was shilling, residential 
real estate investment, is predicated on the expectation that “real estate always goes up,” and thus 
is a savvy financial decision, regardless of whatever the prevailing market conditions may be.  
This expectation has become a taken-for-granted part of the imperative toward ownership in the 
United States, an imperative fueled by the homeownership complex.  But in the wake of an 
international mortgage meltdown that sent the global financial system into a tailspin and resulted 
in the loss of millions of homes and billions of dollars in household wealth, the ubiquity and 
resilience of Americans’ faith in ever-climbing real estate values on display at the real estate 
investment seminars I attended in 2014 and 2015 takes on a new valance.  
Seminars such as the one where I encountered Wendell promise to teach ordinary folks 
“financial freedom” through the pursuit of a variety of real estate investing strategies, including 
house flipping, wholesaling, and investments in rental properties and tax liens.  In the six 
seminars I observed across Chicagoland, presenters promised to teach audience members how to 
turn the devalued homes and ruined lives of the mortgage crisis into opportunities for their own 
mobility and wealth building.  That they insisted that the post-crisis moment is the ideal time to 
invest aggressively in real estate speaks to longstanding ideas about the simultaneity of crisis and 
opportunity and to the valorization of “self-made” wealth in U.S. culture. As I described in the 
introduction, the success of the homeownership complex in the United States has turned 
residential real estate into a relatively safe, accessible, and respectable venue for individual 
households to invest and potentially grow wealth through the purchase and occupancy of a 
“family home.”  But, as we will see, it has also played a part in emboldening ordinary folks to 
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purchase residential property for investment purposes rather than to provide a home for 
themselves and their families, and to expect a good return on their investment.     
As the United States has weathered the transition from an agrarian, to an industrial, and 
now a predominantly service-based economy where secure, well-paid jobs are a rarity for most, 
increased exposure to financial insecurity has often been met with a prescription for greater self-
reliance and actualization (Franklin 2015 [1789]; Lane 2011; Newman 1993). While some 
workers have rejected this devolution of responsibility to the individual and reasserted the need 
for a safety net to help them weather macroeconomic change, others have embraced the call to 
become financially self-reliant wholeheartedly.  Some of these entrepreneurially minded 
“companies of one” (Lane 2011: 45) have sought novel ways to improve their own economic 
standing outside of the confines of wage labor.   
Real estate investment seminars tap into this moment of job insecurity and financial 
upheaval, capitalize on the continued valorization of the “self-made” man, and offer to help 
ordinary folks realize their full economic potential. It might seem strange to frame real estate as a 
path to “financial freedom” in the aftermath of a housing crisis, but the promise it makes—to 
help ordinary folks unlock the door to wealth, autonomy, and power is especially appealing 
during periods of economic flux. Real estate investment seminars offer their audiences an 
accessible, contemporary version of the rags-to-riches, Horatio Alger-style formula for economic 
transformation. When the familiar middle class pathways to stability and success—higher 
education, a solid work history, frugality, and careful investment strategies—seem precarious 
and uncertain, residential real estate emerges as an unique opportunity hidden in plain sight.      
Social scientific analyses of high finance have observed that pervasive high-risk, high-
reward messaging about how to be financially successful has far-reaching, often deleterious 
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consequences for the national and global economy and its participants (Ho 2009; LiPuma and 
Lee 2004).  Less attention has been paid to how, when, and where these calls to embrace 
financial insecurity circulate, or how they are taken up by the downwardly mobile middle and 
working classes as a rational response to systemic insecurity (cf. Dudley 2002; Ehrenreich 1989; 
Newman 1993). But in the face of layoffs, pay cuts, foreclosures, illnesses, and other hurdles, 
people with varying degrees of social and economic capital are being urged to “pull themselves 
up by their bootstraps” and turn risks and crises into opportunities for greater autonomy and 
economic self-determination (Dudley 1994; Zaloom 2003).   
Some social commentators have suggested that the downwardly mobile are dupes when 
they spend their time, energy, and money pursuing the real estate version of “a get rich quick” 
scheme rather than petitioning for better societal and economic conditions for themselves and 
their fellow citizens (Ehrenreich 1989; Frank 2004).  But we might also see the appeal of 
property ownership as evidence of a keen awareness of the limits of traditional paths to upward 
mobility, the unacknowledged “stickiness” of the U.S. socioeconomic hierarchy and the 
privileged place of property owners within it.  Faith in the transformative potential of ownership 
may let corporate and government entities off the hook for their role in reproducing financial 
precarity and also potentially give people a hard-won sense of control over and optimism about 
their financial futures.   
In this chapter, I focus on the ways in which an ideology of risk-embracing self-
actualization finds fertile soil in the world of residential real estate investment, a world made all 
the more appealing by the machinations of the homeownership complex and the housing value 
chain it produces. In a post-recession United States, I argue that real estate investment seminars 
provide a space in which economic uncertainty can be refashioned into a site of economic 
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opportunity for those willing to seize it by paying for and learning how to invest in real estate. 
By participating in the seminars, ordinary people can position themselves as active participants 
in market-making processes (cf. Orta 2018; Preda 2017; Zaloom 2006).  By investing in real 
estate, passive consumers can become market makers and wealth creators.  Through this logic, 
market crisis can become part of the natural order of things in a capitalist economy where there 
are always winners and losers, makers and takers, self-made men and women and lowly drones 
working paycheck to paycheck for others’ benefit.  Once this occurs, real estate can be 
repackaged and sold as a path to financial freedom for those with the knowledge and financial 
savvy (if not always the capital) to make use of it.  
 
Making the Self-Made Man 
 A critical precursor to an economy where taking speculative financial risks is seen as a 
necessary, enabling condition for individual wealth creation is the development of a widespread 
belief that individuals are wholly responsible for their own economic successes and failures.  In 
the United States, such a belief is longstanding, but it is made anew in different ways at different 
historical junctures. Early in the colonial history of the United States, it came from the 
intertwining of capitalism with the Protestant ethic, which dictated that our ultimate fates are 
predetermined yet opaque, making wealth accumulation through hard work and self-denial 
predictive of who was amongst God’s chosen elect (Weber 2002 [1905]). Later generations of 
social scientists interested in explaining inequality in the United States have treated 
socioeconomic differences as a measure of differences in culture, natural ability, and, most 
recently “grit” (cf. Duckworth 2016; Hernstein and Murray 1996; Lewis 1961). However it is 
currently framed and justified, the ideology that economic success is due to an individual’s drive 
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and hard work, and economic failure is due to an individual’s shortcomings, is central to the 
elision of structural inequality and class conflict that is the foundation of capitalism.   
The current iteration of capitalist ideology at work in the United States holds that one’s 
economic circumstances are infinitely malleable and in each person’s control.  This individual 
assumption of responsibility for one’s successes and failures has important consequences for the 
ways that many people perceive and respond to their own economic circumstances and 
understand the circumstances of others. If character, hustle, charisma, desire, or discipline is 
what separates the haves and have-nots, the have-nots may feel they must always be on the cusp 
of transformation and blame themselves if they are not able to self-launch into a new 
socioeconomic category. Or they may be labeled as “losers” for failing to succeed in what is 
purported to be a free and open economy (Trump 2015).  Belief in the ideology of the self-made 
man, then, is also an acceptance of inequality as part of the natural order of things.  
 Formulas for how individuals can make the best out of abysmal circumstances and 
achieve great things can be found in the popular psychology and self-help canons, which first 
captured the attentions and pocketbooks of a wide swathe of the U.S. population during the dark 
days of the Great Depression.  But these works, most notably Dale Carnegie’s How to Win 
Friends and Influence People (1937), built upon an enduring fascination with both real and 
fictional “rags to riches” narratives in the United States. While Horatio Alger offer a series of 
popular stories of ambitious men of modest means rising to the top, Benjamin Franklin and P.T. 
Barnum provided readers with their own autobiographies as instructive templates for pulling 
oneself out of poverty and obscurity and into wealth and fame (Alger 2008 [1868]; Barnum 
1871; Franklin 2015 [1789]). In contrast to these exceptional cases of dramatic upward mobility, 
Carnegie suggested that the key to self-transformation was to project a positive image of 
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extroverted success in order to seize control of their lives and make them feel and eventually be 
better.  Still a bestseller, Carnegie’s advice builds on a “Manifest Destiny-esque belief in the 
power of individuals to “achieve their maximum potential” and create the version of the world 
they desire through “making people like you” and “winning them over to your way of thinking” 
(1937: 3). 
How to Win Friends and Influence People (Carnegie 1937) went through editions in its 
first year and went on to sell thirty million copies worldwide.  In spite of, or perhaps because of, 
the bleakness of the U.S. labor market in the 1930s, Carnegie’s central premise, that individuals 
have the power to will themselves into greater success and fulfillment, resonated and continues 
to resonate with audiences in search of a way to think their way out of bad economic 
circumstances and view setbacks and inequities as obstacles to be conquered individually rather 
than collectively dismantled.   The individuation of success and failure has had important effects 
on the ways in which ordinary people perceive and respond to systemic problems, such as 
poverty, sexism, or racism.   
Social commentator Barbara Ehrenreich suggests that the relentless imperative for 
positivity, as well as a belief in its transformative power, obscures human suffering (economic, 
psychic, and physical) and enables inequality.  In Bright-Sided (2009), Ehrenreich describes how 
after the most recent recession, downsized workers were urged to embrace risk and insecurity. 
 In the highly polarized 1920s, there had been plenty of labor organizers and 
radical activists to rail about the excesses of the rich and the misery of the poor.  
In the twenty-first century, a very different and more numerous breed of 
ideologues promulgated the opposite message—that all was well with our deeply 
unequal society, and, for those willing to make the effort, about to get much, 
much better.  The motivators and other purveyors of positive thinking had good 
news for people facing economic ruin from the constant churning of the job 
market: embrace ‘change,’ no matter how terrifying; grasp it as an opportunity.  A 
2004 business self-help book by Harvey MacKay bore the defiant title We Got 




Ehrenreich makes an important point about the appeal of feeling in control of one’s own 
economic destiny: it allows us to be positive and empowered rather than pessimistic and dejected 
about our economic circumstances.  And for many, that feels good, at least to start with.  What 
continues to be important in the self-help genre is that it honors the human impulse to do 
something concrete to change one’s own fate.  In this framing, economic misfortune is not 
something that individuals have to passively accept; rather, they are empowered to seize upon it 
as an opportunity for transformation through economic self-actualization. They are fired, yes, but 
they are now also free to pursue wealth in their own way and on their own terms.   
According to Ehrenreich, who traces positivity in religion, psychology, self-help, public 
policy, and medicine after being confronted with relentless demands to be optimistic in the face 
of her own cancer diagnosis, messages of self-actualization resonate in the face of unanticipated 
and bewildering change.  Carrie Lane describes how the laid-off tech workers and managers she 
studied in the early 2000s come to accept and even embrace a corporate culture in which 
company loyalty and long-term, secure employment are things of the past and not even worth 
mourning.  One of her interlocutors, Daniel, critiqued what he saw as an old-fashioned reliance 
on a company to “take care” of its employees:  
I think some employees sometimes complain that their career growth isn’t 
managed here [at his current company]. That always annoys me because I feel 
like, you guys aren’t children.  You need to manage your own careers.  We can 
help you, but if you don’t take responsibility for your career growth then you’re 
hurting yourself.  Why should a company have to do that for you? [Lane 2011: 
44] 
 
As Daniel’s sentiment indicates, uncertainty, even for white-collar tech workers, has become 
normal.  Lane identifies a new philosophy at work among her interlocutors—career 
management—which serves “…simultaneously as a mental model of work and the labor market, 
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a set of behavioral guidelines, and a badge of identification for its loyal adherents…At its core, 
career management entails seeing oneself not as an employee, even when traditionally 
employed, but as an independent entrepreneur, as, in the words of one job-seeker, ‘a company of 
one.’” (45).   
 The imperative that workers “manage” their own careers travels up and down the 
socioeconomic ladder and exists in good economic times as well in downturns.  But it seems 
especially ubiquitous in moments of macroeconomic transition, when whole industries (and their 
workers) are abruptly made obsolete.  For example, Kathryn Dudley finds these ideals thrust 
upon midwestern farmers during the farm crisis as well as on laid-off factory workers when U.S 
manufacturers move overseas (2000; 1994).  Both farmers and factory workers are criticized for 
laziness, greed, and complacency for not having the foresight to know that change was on the 
horizon and prepare themselves for it beforehand.   Some workers, such as the middle and upper-
middle class professionals that Carrie Lane (2010), Ilana Gershon (2017), and Katherine 
Newman (1999) study, take this recriminating message to heart and incorporate into their sense 
of themselves and their responsibilities as workers who must consistently prove their value to 
climb the economic ladder. In these contexts, the attitudes that Ehrenreich identifies as 
“positivity” can also be read as a kind of pessimistic, one foot out the door pragmatism, borne 
out of experiences of economic insecurity and a material imperative to not only manage them, 
but use them as fodder for self advancement that is hindered rather than helped by a continued 
reliance on a paycheck.  While accepting personal responsibility for structural inequality might 
seem to be a defeatist, self-sabotaging act, when combined with cultural and economic capital 
and entrepreneurial zeal, it may also feel refreshing, empowering, and transformational.   
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 Thus far, the literature I’ve described focuses on the spread of “positivity” and its 
connection to neoliberal ideals of self-management and actualization in the context of a changing 
and increasingly insecure workplace.  I now move to an analysis of how these messages continue 
to resonate outside of the wage labor context.  While managerial seminars and self-help books 
might urge workers of all stripes to think and act like a manager, business owner, or successful 
entrepreneur, real estate investment seminars insist that even novice investors should be able to 
abandon their jobs in short order if they followed the program’s dictates and have the drive to do 
so.  In this way, the familiar meritocratic rhetoric of self-help and improvement are pushed 
outside the wage-stagnant and insecure workplace and into the still alluring frontiers of financial 
and real estate investment; typically the purview of the already wealthy and powerful. Ordinary 
folks can learn to be like the rich, leave the perils of wage dependency behind, and make money 
for themselves rather than enrich others as employees, so the logic goes. 
 
As Seen on Reality TV 
 Houses have long been an object of fascination as a space for both the performance of 
one’s social and economic status and site for achieving the transformation of the same.  On 
television, elaborate rituals of home improvement, renovation, and decorating visually represent 
these feats.  Initially, home-focused shows such as “This Old House” featured seasoned experts 
advising amateur carpenters, furniture refinishers, and do-it-yourselfers on how to take care of 
and improve their family homes.  But in the late 1990s, a fledgling cable television network, 
Home and Garden Television (“HGTV”), began experimenting with a new kind of programming 
that had hitherto been restricted to youth-driven networks such as MTV and VH1: reality 
television.  Unlike the use of the medium on other networks, which featured young, good-
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looking people thrown together in situations that all but guaranteed high emotions, drunkenness, 
and drama, HGTV initially featured the mundane “reality” of home improvement as performed 
by bland, middle-America relatable, white, middle class hosts.  This formula began to change 
when shows started featuring the purchase and resale of homes as the central storyline.  “House 
Hunters,” launched in 1999, focused on homebuyers, most often couples, who were searching for 
their first family home.  Viewers were educated by the buyers’ preferences and compromises in 
the home buying process, which often seemed to reveal as much about the buyers’ relationship as 
it did about the homes they toured.  Shows ended with the new owners happily ensconced in 
their “dream homes,” ready to begin their happy lives together in a property that was conducive 
to just that with respect to the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, proximity to work, schools, 
parks, and other “must haves.”  Although the house-hunting couples were buying homes to live 
in themselves, their concern with layout, finishes, location, and the like helped viewers begin to 
see their homes as investment vehicles they should tend to and modify with the expectation of 
financial appreciation and profit-driven resale in mind.  On “House Hunters” and its ilk, buyers 
often rejected houses that were overly “customized” in favor of neutral, updated homes.  After 
just a few episodes, viewers learned to participate in their decision-making processes vicariously, 
arguing with spouses, parents, and friends over which home the buyers should choose and why, 
and berating the shows’ protagonists when they felt they did not choose the “right” home.76   
Seizing upon a winning formula, HGTV and later A&E expanded their reality show 
offerings to shows that featured real estate investors (or, as they became widely known, “house 
flippers”).  The extension made sense for a number of reasons, not least of all because it allowed 
producers to follow a single set of protagonists over the course of multiple buying, renovating, 
                                                 
76 HGTV’s target audience for “House Hunters” is women ages 25-54 (Steinberg 2010).  
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and selling experiences, each of which could be featured in a single half hour to an hour episode.  
Each episode featured at least one or two pitfalls, most typically some variation on the familiar 
“money pit” theme that the house purchased had more extensive problems than the house 
flipping team had anticipated.  But much like the shows that followed the home buying process 
of first time buyers and other owner occupants, all problems were resolved and the homes were 
almost always sold for a good profit by the time each episode came to a close.   
Just as “House Hunters” helped educate its viewership into viewing their housing as a 
commodity with attributes that could be easily discerned and weighted as price, location, size, 
and layout, “Flip This House” and the copycats and spinoffs it spawned showed viewers an 
accessible, commonsensical version of real estate investment that appealed to both their sense of 
aesthetics (how the home would be “finished” and furnished was always a featured element) and 
their armchair entrepreneurial zeal. Each episode walked viewers through a version of the steps 
and stages of residential real estate investment as an achievable strategy for building wealth 
rather than working for a paycheck.  And although the genre was just as heavily produced and 
edited as other reality shows, the veneer of the “real” that house flipping shows projected gave 
viewers the sense that they understood the potential problems of home renovation and flipping as 
surely as if they had experienced these things themselves (.  And sometimes it inspired them to 
do more than casually imagine themselves redoing the family rooms and “opening up” the 
kitchens of the houses featured on TV, but rather to enter into the world of real estate investment 
in real life.   
 I include this analysis of the real estate reality show genre because of its important role in 
making real estate investment seem approachable, achievable, and desirable for the average 
person (Maciak 2014).  It was not enough for people in the United States to believe that “real 
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estate always goes up” and thus that their purchase of a single family home for themselves and 
their families would inevitably be fiscally prudent as well as socially desirable.  They also had to 
be willing to extend that logic beyond their own housing needs and into the realm of real estate 
investment as a wealth building strategy that could augment and even replace other forms of 
making ends meet and climbing the proverbial socioeconomic ladder. I suggest that the 
popularity of house flipping shows in the early 2000s played an important role in making 
speculative forms of real estate investment seem accessible, desirable, and importantly, fun to 
U.S. television viewers.  As I will explain, by featuring real estate reality television stars as their 
spokespeople and founders, the real estate investment seminars I attended explicitly connected 
their offerings to the successes that they presumed their audience members were already familiar 
with from reality television.   
 
Buying Homes and Building Wealth 
I attended my first real estate investment seminar on a whim; a targeted advertisement for 
one popped up on my Facebook feed, presumably fueled by my many real estate-related Internet 
searches.  But after one event, I was hooked.  Here was a space where a re-instantiation of 
homeownership’s value and the housing market’s economic possibilities was taking place in real 
time.  The seminars drew on existing ideas about real estate as the ideal vessel for financial 
investment that were themselves predicated on the failure of other types of investments. In 
urging the purchase of residential real estate for investment purposes rather than for owner 
occupancy, the seminars both built on the appeal of homeownership in the United States while 
also insisting that real estate’s true potential as a vehicle for economic mobility lay beyond a 
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home of one’s own.   The seminar speakers urged attendees to buy multiple properties and build 
wealth as landlords, house flippers, and speculators.   
Real estate investment seminars are sponsored by organizations billing themselves as 
“real estate education companies,” which often have a reality television personality from a real 
estate flipping or home renovation show as their dynamic (but hardly ever present) front man or 
woman.  For example, one company whose events I attended, Fortune Builders, was founded in 
2006 by Than Merrill, a Yale graduate and former football player with a brief career in the NFL 
who hosted three seasons of the New Haven-version of the A&E reality television series “Flip 
this House” in the mid 2000s. Another seminar boasted the now-ex-husband and wife team of 
“Flip or Flop” fame as their spokespeople.   
Each real estate investment company has its own origin story, but all promise similar 
things to their audiences: come to us, learn how to be a real estate investor, and unlock the keys 
to potential wealth that will transform your life in a way that a job, higher education, or any other 
kind of financial investment simply cannot do.  They advertise their free two-to-three-hour 
seminars on local radio and television stations, billboards, and via Facebook, and once you have 
attended one event, they also advertise through telemarketing (sometimes using your own area 
code as a way to improve their chances you will pick up) and glossy “invitations” and “tickets” 
for future events in your area that they send via U.S. mail.  These first events, while billed as real 
estate seminars, are more akin to live-action infomercials and pitch sessions for the companies’ 
main offering: a 3-day real estate education course that ranges in price from a couple hundred 
dollars to over $1000. The companies also offer more select “coaching” plans for those who have 
the time and resources (around $35,000 for a Fortune Builders private coaching plan, for 
 
 180 
example).   The idea of the free seminars is to give audiences just enough information to garner 
the excitement and enthusiasm necessary to pay for the next round of real estate education.   
The six real estate investment seminars I attended were held in hotel ballrooms of various 
degrees of grandeur and size in the city of Chicago and surrounding suburbs.  The seminar 
presenters, who, in my sample, were all white, middle-aged, carefully coiffed, and suntanned 
men, with the exception of one white woman in her mid-thirties, offer attendees an opportunity 
to enjoy “financial freedom” through the mastery of different strategies of largely speculative 
real estate investment.  That amorphous term, “financial freedom,” was widely used and 
variously defined by seminar speakers. But the core idea seems to be that those who achieve 
“financial freedom” are free from the constraints of wage labor and no longer dependent on 
government or corporate welfare for their long-term financial wellbeing.  They can travel, spend 
time with family, or, as the seminar presenters claimed their reality television front men and 
women were doing, share their good fortune by passing along the gospel of real estate 
investment to seminar attendees.   
Seminar speakers used the relatively fresh horrors of the 2008 financial crisis to convey 
the urgency of achieving financial freedom through becoming real estate investors to their 
audiences, as other income sources were, as evidenced by the crisis, insecure, but they also 
played on the culturally specific aspirations of “building one’s own business” and “working for 
oneself rather than working for a paycheck.”  If they were dedicated and disciplined enough, 
attendees were promised a life of ease. For example, the lone woman presenter, Anastasia, whose 
dubious claim to fame in 2015 was that she had been a contestant on The Apprentice, showed us 
photos of herself and her fiancé vacationing in the Amalfi Coast while money from her real 
estate investments continued to pour in. She said that what made this possible was that as an 
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investor, she need never be physically present to make money. Investors “make money while 
they sleep.”    
To illustrate what she meant, Anastasia put up a slide with four quadrants. On the left 
side were the letters E and S, and on the right side were the letters B and I.  She asked if we 
knew what it was. When no one said they did, she explained that the letters stood for different 
ways to make an income:  “E= Employee. You have a job. S=Self-employed. You own a job. 
B=Business Owner. You own a system that works for you! and I=Investor. Money works for 
you.”  She then asked the audience where we were now.   
There were some people who were self-employed, some people who were business 
owners, and maybe one or two who identified as investors.  But most of us were employees.  
“Could you be an employee and be a millionaire?” Anastasia asked.  “Yes,” we said, but she told 
us it wasn’t common.  She gave actors and athletes as examples of millionaire employees, but 
then cited some statistics on how many athletes file for bankruptcy after they retire, and she cited 
the actor Nicholas Cage’s bankruptcy, too.  She also cited how many lottery winners file for 
bankruptcy, asking us, “Can you imagine?”  And “why do you think that is?”  People said it was 
because they had too many hangers on and didn’t know how to manage their money. She 
accepted this explanation.  Then she cited a statistic that 87% to 97% of millionaires are real 
estate investors, implying, although not stating, that real estate was the bedrock of the wealthy 
people’s financial success.  
Anastasia told us that what separated real estate investment-based wealth from income-
based wealth or owning a business or franchise is “the freedom.  And if you want, you can 
outsource everything.”  Although Anastasia herself had been more hands on when she first 
started buying and managing real estate as an investment strategy, she told us that she now had 
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several rental properties with long-term tenants, allowing her to collect rent through direct 
deposit and enjoy financial security and financial freedom simultaneously.   
The idea that Anastasia and other seminar speakers put forward—that an ordinary person 
with no special skills or resources might be able to disentangle themselves from a workaday 
reliance upon a paycheck, a pension, or a 401K—is undeniably appealing. This is particularly 
true for the many people in the United States who possess few other avenues to reach long-term 
financial security. Most of the seminar attendees I observed appeared to be middle-aged and 
older, and many audience members self-identified as having little to no investing or ownership 
experience, limited or nonexistent savings, and poor credit.  Yet according to the seminar 
speakers who elicited public confessions of the audience’s financial insecurity by asking us, 
“How many people have a 401K? How many people own property? How many people have bad 
credit?’ none of these issues are barriers to entry in the real estate investing field.   
In fact, one of the first lessons that attendees were told they would learn is how to find 
and utilize “OPM” (an acronym for “Other People’s Money”) to achieve their financial goals. 
 Suggested sources of OPM included hard moneylenders,77 and other real estate investors like 
themselves that had the capital to buy properties but did not want to bother with finding them 
and arranging for their purchase.78  For the latter group, seminar attendees could “flip the paper,” 
a real estate transaction in which one party bids on and goes under contract for a property but 
                                                 
77 Shadowy non-bank entities subject to few, if any, consumer protection regulations and charge 
high interest rates for short-term loans best suited for a quick property purchase, cosmetic rehab, 
and resale. 
78 Then-presidential candidate Donald Trump boasted about using OPM to fund his real estate 
developments on the campaign trail in the fall of 2016. While a variety of sources of OPM exist, 
their accessibility and usefulness depends heavily upon the borrowers’ financial and social 
capital.  Like entering the real estate profession and achieving homeownership itself, using OPM 
to launch a new investment scheme may be easy for some people at some times, but it is not as 
straightforward of an opportunity as it may initially appear.   
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then transfers their interest to another party before the sale goes through for a fee.  The 
difficulties and risks of either sort of arrangement in order to gain access to other people’s money 
were glossed over; what was conveyed to audience members was that they need not currently be 
rich, experienced, or even financially secure to enter the world of real estate and tap into the 
housing value chain that it offered.  They need only be educated and have the right mindset, a 
mindset that was open to possibilities and opportunities and ready to seize the day.   
Attendees were urged to make sure they surrounded themselves with other likeminded, 
supportive people, beginning with the person they chose to bring to the next round of real estate 
training (all seminars offered two admissions for the price of one deals).  Aligning with the 
“positivity” message and the promises of bestselling self-help books like The Secret (Byrne 
2006), in which readers were coached on how to unlock the power of visualization to make their 
dreams come true, seminar speakers suggested that the only real obstacle standing between them 
and real estate-based wealth accumulation were their own fears, doubts, and hang ups.  Financial 
freedom was within reach if audience members were willing to grasp it.  But the seminar 
speakers insisted to us that the time to do so was now. Immediate action was required.  The 
audience needed to enroll and pay for the next round of seminars so that their real estate 
investment success could begin.   
According to Anastasia, there were three keys to success: “Opportunity; Knowledge; and 
Action.” To illustrate the importance of taking action, she held up a book on investment secrets 
and told the audience that while the book cost $99, she’d give it to the first person that “took 
action” and grabbed it.  In an instance, three people leapt from their seats, and a man and a 
woman both grabbed it at the same time.  She gave books to both of them.  The third person 
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lamented that he’d been “too polite,” and the next time she showed us a book he stood up as if to 
grab it, even though she wasn’t doing another “take action” offer. 
To hammer her point home, Anastasia put up an inspirational quote from Rich Dad Poor 
Dad (Kiwosaki and Lechter 1996) self-help guru Robert Kiwosaki: “Knowing you need to make 
a change isn’t enough.  You’ve got to find the guts to do it.”  And with that, she revealed the next 
seminar’s pricing scheme, $495 for a 3-day real estate investment training, $299 for the more 
general Rich Dad training, but on site, today, we could get both for $299 for us and a guest.  She 
had told us about her own experiences and successes, demonstrated that fast actors reap rewards, 
and offered us a great deal on a set of trainings that held out the promise of self-transformation 
and financial freedom.  How could we say no?   
 
Becoming a Price Maker 
The flip side of seminar speakers’ message of empowerment, positivity and boundless 
opportunity lay in their diagnosis of the remainder of the U.S. economic landscape. They almost 
gleefully assured their audiences that the normative path to financial security—a college degree, 
a well-paying, secure job, and accruing retirement savings through a defined-benefit pension or a 
401K—was no longer a viable option.  And while the conclusion that real estate was the best 
place to invest might have been dubious, seminar speakers’ assessments of the ways that other 
investment vehicles, the job market, and the government-backed social safety net have failed 
ordinary folks was accurate.   
In fact, there is plenty of evidence upon which to make the case that traditional paths for 
achieving upward mobility or even financial security are narrowing or disappearing entirely for 
all but the most affluent.  From 1979 to 2015, for example, real wages declined 5% for low-
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income households and only rose 6% for middle-income households. The top 10 percent of 
earners, in contrast, experienced a wage growth of 41%.  After the Great Recession, journalists, 
academics, policymakers, and activist groups drew attention to the problem of rising income 
inequality (Gottesdiener 2013; Graeber 2011; Piketty 2013) and poked holes in the cherished 
meritocracy myth of the United States (McNamee and Miller 2009). And the financial recovery 
yielded far greater returns for the wealthy and for white households than for the poor and middle 
class or non-white households (Rothstein 2017).   
However, in order to entice their audiences to pay $200 to $1000 for the next round of 
real estate education, real estate investment seminars also need to find ways to help audiences 
see themselves as nascent entrepreneurs who can rise above the fray and seize control of their 
own financial futures.  The successful speakers I observed were skilled ego boosters; they 
seemed to realize that after their gloomy descriptions of the current economic landscape, they 
needed to quickly pivot to the opportunities that that same bleak space presents to those with the 
foresight and savvy to seek out and take advantages of opportunities where others fail.   
In an investment seminar I attended in January 2015 in a Northern suburb of Chicago, the 
presenter, Michael, began the event with an overview of the roots of the financial crisis, which 
he attributed to the excesses of Wall Street, shoddy lending practices, and poor regulatory 
oversight.  Standing in front of a slide entitled “crisis and opportunity,” he told the audience that 
the time to buy property was here.  He noted that the same Wall Street firms who blew up the 
economy were now creating real estate investment funds with thousands of properties, which 
they will hold onto and collect rent from until the market peaks, then sell for astronomical 
profits.  Michael stressed that if Wall Street investors could create opportunity in the midst of 
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crisis, so could ordinary people—it was all about having the confidence and foresight to buy low 
and sell high. 
To demonstrate this strategy, he held a plastic water bottle aloft and asked the audience 
what it was.  After we answered, he asked us how much it would cost us for this one bottle if we 
bought it in a pack of twenty-four at Costco or Sam’s Club.  Someone said 25 cents, and he 
lowered the bottle to knee height.  Then he asked how much it would cost for this same bottle if 
a street vendor were selling it on the side of the road.  Someone said a dollar.  Someone else said 
two dollars.  “I’ve been told it depends on the temperature, ha ha, but let’s say $2,” Michael said. 
 He raised the bottle to his thighs.  “What if you were to buy this same bottle of water at a Cubs 
or White Sox game?” he asked. “$5,” someone said. He moved the bottle to his waist.  “What 
about in one of those fancy hotel mini bars?” he asked.  Someone said $10.  “And probably for a 
smaller bottle, right?” Mike laughed.  At this point he was holding the bottle high above his 
head.  “Now,” he said, “Let me ask you this:  do people buy water for all these prices?”  “Yes,” 
the audience said.  We were beginning to get what he was driving at.  Sensing our understanding, 
he drove it home, asking “and do people buy houses at all of these prices?” as he gestured up and 
down the length of his body. “Yes,” we said, a little more forcefully.  “Well,” he told us,  “that is 
what this seminar is all about: teaching you how to buy down here, wholesale” (he gestured at 
his feet with the bottle) “and sell at whatever point you want” (he moved the bottle up his body). 
  
The analogy was powerful; I could feel the audience around me shifting in their seats, 
giving Michael more of their attention.  With the water bottle, Michael illustrated the difference 
between being price takers, as all consumers are, and price makers, as he suggested we, the 
audience, could become, and he did so in a way that seemed to be both commonsensical and an 
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insider secret.  By referencing the current investing strategies of Wall Street firms in buying up 
large swathes of devalued residential real estate, Michael intimated that the escalating process he 
described was already underway, and if we wanted to avoid being the kind of dupes who were 
forced to buy five dollar bottles of water at the baseball game, we needed to get a hold of some 
properties now.  In this visioning, the difficulties of real estate investing—finding properties, 
securing capital, finding tenants, finding new buyers, or managing rental properties—faded into 
the background.  What mattered was that we, as investors, have the foresight to buy low and sell 
high.  If we did that, others’ losses would become our gain. 
 
Turning Crisis into Opportunity 
While the seminar speakers I observed did everything they could to convince their 
audiences of the boundless opportunities for wealth building that awaited us in real estate, they 
gave a bleak picture of the state of U.S. economy in general.  Yet the lack of financial 
opportunities in the economy as a whole served to frame real estate investing as that much more 
essential of a wealth-building strategy.  Explaining the benefits of rental property investment for 
those nearing retirement age, Lance, the speaker at a seminar I attended in the Western Suburbs 
of Chicago, insisted that “real estate is the only asset, [the only] commodity that we can really 
trust to go up.  What are the other choices?  Social security, 401ks, IRAs?” he scoffed.   
 But like the water bottle analogy, in which Michael suggested that we might become 
price makers rather than price takers with the appropriate know-how, the entrepreneurial pursuits 
that Lance went on to describe were predicated on a housing value chain that produced market 
inequality, inequality that generated the types of household-level economic crises that we, as 
investors, would be trained to seek out and make use of. The homeownership complex’s 
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successful framings of housing market gaps and breakdowns as opportunities to be seized echoes 
the practice of financial arbitrage, in which experienced traders (and increasingly, financial 
algorithms) find and exploit gaps in information, time, and space to make money (cf. Miyazaki 
2013; Preda 2017; Zaloom 2005). 
 Arbitrage traders exploit gaps that are mediated by “the market,” and therefore seem 
somewhat disconnected from the on-the-ground disparity that differences in market value 
represent.  But real estate investment seminars promote a less-removed version of financial 
speculation when they advocate for preying upon the vulnerabilities of home-owning 
households.  One of the insider tools that another seminar speaker, Wendell promised we would 
receive as part of our real estate education package was a compilation of sources for “distressed 
properties,” culled from lists of real estate entangled in bankruptcies, evictions, delinquent taxes, 
probate courts, building code violations, and divorce decrees.  Wendell suggested that rather than 
searching the multiple listing service for properties, a pathway available to anyone with a real 
estate license, these sources were a kind of “honey hole” that offered savvy investors the chance 
to acquire properties with “less competition and higher profits.” Wendell’s “honey hole” of 
property listings was predicated on finding legally, economically and socially vulnerable owners 
and convincing them that their best option would be to part with their holdings at a below-market 
value price.   
To illustrate the success that might await us in pursuing this distressed property 
acquisition strategy, Wendell showed us a smiling photo and testimonial from a retirement-aged 
couple that had successfully purchased a property stuck in probate from an out-of-state owner 
and sold it for a $45,000 profit.  The couple’s catchphrase was “good deals and good deeds,” 
Wendell said, because they were helping people by investing in real estate that its owners didn’t 
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have the resources or the desire to manage.  “This isn’t about reinventing the wheel,” he 
reminded us.  “This is about tapping into what’s already going on.”  
Another seminar speaker offered audience members a chance to capitalize on other 
people’s housing woes through a more extenuated form of real estate investment: tax liens.  In 
many states, when a homeowner fails to pay their state property taxes, the state government puts 
a lien for the overdue amount against the property in question. Typically, the lien is paid off 
when the homeowner pays the back taxes off or when the house is sold and part of the owner’s 
profit is diverted to paying off the lien (just as occurs when a house sale pays off the former 
owner’s existing mortgage before going into their own bank account).  But a secondary market 
exists for tax liens.  Investors can buy a tax lien certificate from a state authority that gives them 
the right to charge the property owner interest on the amount of taxes they owe until the owner 
pays off the tax debt or sells the property.  If a period of time elapses and the owner still does not 
pay their taxes and interest, tax lien certificate holders can also purchase the property outright 
from the state for the amount of back taxes owed.   
During one of the seminars I attended, the real estate tax lien investment strategy was 
introduced at the tail end of the presentation.  The tax lien investing champion, Carl, was a silver 
haired, bearded man in his sixties wearing a blue suit with an open-collared white shirt.  He told 
us that the celebrity founders of the seminar program, Tarek and Christina of the reality 
television program “Flip or Flop,” had asked him to come today to share a real estate investment 
strategy that was “one of the fastest strategies: three to seven days and two to six hours of work.” 
He admitted that tax lien investing would not yield “…big profits, but what’s nice is that I’ve 
been able to do 300 deals, and because they’re small deals, they require less work.”  He said we 
could expect along the lines of $2000 to $8000 per month, but asked the audience, “wouldn’t you 
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agree that small deals add up?” “Yes,” we said.  In spite of the somewhat complicated nature of 
the strategy he pitched, the audience liked Carl.  We were excited to hear what he had to tell us.   
Carl told us that we were in the same position he was in before he became a tax lien investor.  
He was working as a construction worker in Providence, Rhode Island, and he had to borrow 
money from his sister to get started as a tax lien certificate investor.  He was like us, he said, in 
that his wife and he built up their business from the smaller deals onward. He said this strategy 
was especially good for his wife and he because she was a stay-at-home mom and she could do 
this work while raising their children.  He asked the audience how many of us liked the idea of 
working from home.  Many people raised their hands.   
Carl showed us a slide of a nice single family home, purchased through tax liens for 
$5,789.85.  Next he put up a slide entitled “Tax Liens” with bullet points:  
• Government guaranteed program 
• Been around for 100s of years (“The wealthy have been keeping it very quiet, passing 
it down [amongst themselves] for hundreds of years,” Carl said.) 
• Banks, insurance companies and hedge funds (According to Carl, all of these entities 
invest in tax liens) 
• Oldest recorded tax lien from 1629  
• Best kept secret because most don’t understand how to do it or how to work it 
 
The next slide had some more facts: 
• Government guaranteed 16-50% ROI 
• Backed by free and clear properties 
• Work from home 2-4 hours per week 
• Need computer and phone (he emphasized again how ideal the strategy was for stay at 
home moms, people that “aren’t mobile” or “don’t want to leave the house.”   
 
Every year, Carl told us, seven to ten billion in tax lien certificates and properties become 
available in the United States.   If we bought them, he said, “you’re gonna basically move your 
family to the next level.”  And, he promised, we would learn how to do so if we signed up for the 




Tapping Into the Housing Value Chain 
In the world of real estate investment seminars, fairly complex, speculative investing 
strategies, such as “flipping the deed” and the tax lien certificate investing strategy I just 
described, are turned into straightforward, commonsensical ways to turn other people’s housing 
mistakes and misfortunes into your investment opportunities.  Again and again, the seminar 
presenters I encountered framed the strategies they were explaining as things that those “in the 
know” were already doing.  They were not asking audience members to embark on anything too 
new or scary, but rather to pay them for the knowledge and networks to identify opportunities 
and take action to seize them.    
The “tapping in” that the seminar speakers advocated is a form of social arbitrage  that is 
dependent upon existing, systemic inequality, inequality that is only made worse by the kinds of 
speculative real estate investment practices that the seminars advocated that their audiences 
pursue (cf. Orta 2018; Preda 2017).  And there are layers of “tapping in” at work—both the 
imagined “tapping in” to others’ misfortunes that these prospective investors will be trained to 
do, and the “tapping in” that the real estate investing seminars themselves accomplish by 
attracting prospective investors and selling them the tools of “financial freedom.”  
Instead of railing against the types of real estate practices that lead up to the crisis—
house flipping, land speculation, predatory lending and reverse redlining—real estate investment 
seminars promise to let ordinary working and middle-class people into the game.  Further, they 
suggest that such participation, almost all of which involves preying upon desperate or 
uninformed property owners’ vulnerabilities, is actually productive—even a “good deed,” as the 
happy and successful alums of a Fortune Builders seminar claim.  Such a framing makes 
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inequality, crisis and uncertainty seem productive, even for the economic vulnerable audience 
members of the seminars.   
Real estate investment seminars’ rhetoric relies upon the homeownership complex-
facilitated approachability of residential real estate as a space for financial investment to draw in 
their audience members.  But the kinds of investment they describe range from “vanilla” (buying 
and managing a few residential properties as rentals to earn a modest passive income and 
potentially generate a solid return on investment when sold many years down the road) to truly 
speculative (buying up deeds for back property taxes from states and municipalities that offer the 
highest rates of return for tax liens, “flipping the paper” by facilitating others’ real estate 
transactions, or purchasing foreclosed properties or properties in probate for cash at auction, 
sight unseen, and then unloading them once minor cosmetic repairs have been completed).  They 
outline strategies on both ends of the spectrum to illustrate that, just as was true in the mortgage-
backed securities market prior to the mortgage crisis of 2008, there is a strategy for every type of 
appetite.  In this sense, seminars make use of and reproduce the two qualities of the housing 
market that uneasily coexist with one another: the opportunities for wealth building that it 
provides, and the risks of catastrophic loss that exist alongside of and co-create those 
opportunities.   What they purport to sell to their audience is the expertise to navigate and make 
use of the housing market’s pitfalls in order to reap its ample rewards 
While earlier generations of insecure financial subjects might have railed against the end 
of Fordist employment practices or blamed themselves for becoming expendable company men 
(Dudley 1994; Newman 1999), real estate investment seminars seem to speak to an audience 
embedded in and responding to a different iteration of inequality.  This audience knows that the 
normative strategy to combat an uncertain financial future is not available for all, and comes with 
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fewer and fewer guarantees.  But that does not mean that “financial freedom” doesn’t beckon to 
them.  It just might require learning how to “tap into” (in exchange for a fee) the very inequities 
that may no longer seem worth the effort of combating.   
 
Returning to Residential Real Estate—and Capitalism—as Usual 
 The Great Recession eviscerated social and financial investments that millions of people 
in the United States made in homeownership.  As the breadth and depth of the crisis became 
known, newspaper articles, special programs, documentaries, feature films, and books on the 
bitter fruit of our overinvestment in real estate abounded. This was the handwringing, watershed 
moment that made me want to study homeownership in the aftermath of what I took to be a total, 
earth-shattering transformation.  And yet, less than a decade passed before familiar messages 
about the housing market and the opportunities therein started to re-circulate. Mortgage interest 
rates were low; foreclosed, abandoned, and devalued homes were being sold on the cheap. 
Federal and state programs offering down payment assistance grants or first-time-home-buyer 
tax credits came into the market, as well.  And buying homes started to seem safe, and natural, 
and fiscally prudent once again, particularly in the many cities (including Chicago) where rental 
prices were soaring.  The risks and rewards of residential real estate, it seemed, were just too 
compelling to let go, and too deeply entrenched in our economy to be reworked.  
The real estate investment seminars I observed in 2014 and 2015 tapped into this 
moment—a moment in which uncertainty reigned, traditional pathways to wealth-building 
seemed obsolete, and we suspect that other people are breaking free from the chains of a 
paycheck and making money doing something that seems simple and yet also exciting: buying 
and selling houses.  Seminars promise audience members the tools to take hold of their own 
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destinies, transform crisis into opportunity, and achieve financial freedom.  I hold that that 
promise is dangerously familiar.  It speaks to the homeownership complex’s enduring, pervasive 
power, as well as the homeownership complex’s complicity with inequality as long as one 
person’s housing loss becomes the next buyer’s golden opportunity.  In the next chapter, I 
consider how the complex’s power resonates in a program that promotes homeownership as a 




CHAPTER 6: HOMEOWNERSHIP AS A CURE FOR HOUSING VACANCY 
 
The hope is that stabilization, like chaos, will radiate out to surrounding areas. 
-—Sam Lawson, 201479 
 
In order for real property investment to be a worthwhile proposition, as the real estate 
seminar speakers make clear, its value must increase over time.  But it is not only the condition 
and attributes of the house itself that make up property value—the appraised and perceived 
values of residential and commercial property in the surrounding neighborhood impinge upon 
what an individual house is worth, and shape whether its value will rise or fall in the future.  
Widespread housing vacancy decreases property value—not just in the vacant property itself but 
in all of the properties that surround it, as well.  As such, widespread vacancy can undercut 
homeownership by diminishing or destroying its value as an economic investment and cultural 
ideal.  Yet a neighborhood-based housing market recovery initiative in Chicago, the Program for 
Community Revitalization (PCR), aims to turn the contagion of housing devaluation around and 
radiate “stabilization” through owner-occupied homeownership rather than the “chaos” 
associated with housing vacancy and blight.  The PCR uses widening opportunities for 
homeownership through the reoccupation of vacant buildings as a cure for post-crisis housing 
vacancy and its deleterious effects on property values, community safety, wellbeing, and 
investment.  How does a community’s housing market failure become a platform to generate 
new homeownership? What can such an initiative tell us about the persistence of the 
homeownership complex through cycles of housing market expansion and contraction? 
                                                 
79 Director of the Program for Community Revitalization 
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To answer these questions, I focus on the homeownership-focused vision and 
implementation of the PCR, a program that formed after the financial crisis of 2007-2009 to 
address Chicago’s vacant building problem.80  While locally managed and implemented, the 
PCR receives funds from federal agencies and is thus influenced by the national pro-ownership 
policy agenda I outlined in Chapter 2.  It also draws inspiration from a Baltimore-based program 
that centered on promoting struggling neighborhoods’ existing strengths and encouraging 
residential “pride of place” as a way of fomenting real estate value appreciation and investment 
(Ashton 2009).81  In 2013, when the PCR chose to intervene in neighborhoods that were 
grappling with vacancy, foreclosure, and high unemployment rates, it targeted small geographic 
areas that had valuable features, such as parks, college campuses, or historically significant 
architecture, as well as a legacy of homeownership. Program creators believed that these assets 
could be used as to keep existing homeowners and renters in their homes and to attract new 
owners who would bring both social and financial capital into their neighborhoods and boost the 
perceived and appraised value of the housing stock in so doing.  
Over the course of my research, I attended a variety of PCR events, partner meetings, 
housing fairs, trolley tours, and workshops that promoted the institution of homeownership (and, 
to a lesser extent, residential property investment) as the solution to Chicago’s vacant building 
                                                 
80 Chicago has struggled with population loss, economic disinvestment, and related property 
abandonment since the 1970s, but the mortgage crisis of 2007-2009 undoubtedly intensified the 
issue.  After the mortgage crisis, the PCR was able to marshal public and private resources and 
attention to a growing (but by no means new) issue.   
81 Beginning in 1998, the program, Belair-Edison Neighborhood, Inc., “adopted a model for 
strengthening undervalued middle market communities developed by Healthy Neighborhoods, 
Inc., an intermediary community development organization in Baltimore. A central goal of the 
Healthy Neighborhoods approach is to drive a trend of real estate appreciation in undervalued 
middle market communities, beginning with the strongest blocks and assets in a community, 
while also creating programs that strengthen a neighborhood’s social fabric and residents’ pride 
of place” (Ashton 2009) 
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problem.  I observed that the PCR trains and provides funding and technical support for 
neighborhood-based organizations to support and facilitate first-time low-income 
homeownership.  In this regard, it performs one of the homeownership complex’s central tenets: 
homeownership, no matter where or when it occurs or for whom, is an opportunity for economic 
growth, mobility, and freedom.  But this performance butts up against Chicago’s longstanding 
inequalities, inequalities that are embedded in the landscape and disrupt attempts to transform 
vacant housing into an equalizing platform for community revitalization.  
I see the PCR’s activities in Chicago as in line with the interventions described by Julia 
Elyachar in Markets of Dispossession (2005), in which the Egyptian government, international 
NGOs, and a global development agenda came together to encourage poor Egyptians to 
participate in NGO-led training and microfinance programs and become small-scale 
“entrepreneurs.” The idea was that by teaching the poor how to become more active participants 
in a global marketplace, they would reap the benefits of globalization in new ways and become 
new kinds of citizens/market agents. Although PCR focused on homeownership as a lever for 
market growth and stability rather than on entrepreneurship, it was similarly interested creating 
both new markets and new market subjectivities.  But, as happened in Elyachar’s case, PCR 
architects and those charged with its implementation found that their target areas were more 
diverse and complex and that the objects of their intervention were less malleable than they had 
anticipated. The power and promise of homeownership as performed by the PCR did not 
ameliorate the material and social inequalities that shape Chicago’s housing market. As such, the 
program largely fed into the nexus of opportunity and crisis essential to both the perpetuation of 
the homeownership complex and to elite capitalist profit making through the housing value 
chain. The PCR architects hoped to radiate “stability” through their interventions in the housing 
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market, and in some areas, they succeeded.  Vacancy rates declined, property values crept slowly 
up.  But the PCR did not foment an inclusive, people-centered, neighborhood-driven recovery.   
 In this chapter, I describe the Program for Community Revitalization and what it does 
and frame it in the context of federal efforts to respond to the detritus of the mortgage crisis of 
2007-2009. Next, I outline the role of measurement in the PCR’s performance of a housing 
market recovery. After considering the particular challenge that vacancy poses to market 
recovery and homeownership more generally, I zoom out to offer a brief overview of federal 
housing recovery initiatives after the financial crisis, including the impetus for and structure of 
the PCR.  From there, I use ethnographic snapshots from three different PCR target areas to 
show how the program’s performances of opportunity-laden ownership obscure but cannot 
transform local histories and complexities.   
 
The PCR 
The PCR is a program with a variety of stakeholders, interests, resources, plans, and 
effects.  As such, it is useful to think of it as an agencement, or bundle of human and non-human 
skills, capacities, and agencies (Callon 1995). Callon uses the agencement concept to highlight 
how people, practices, and ideas come together, sometimes solidify into institutional forms, and 
come to seem, in a sense akin to Bourdieu’s notions of doxa and habitus, natural and inevitable.  
Callon draws attention to the mixing of human and non-human elements in agency to push back 
against the perceptions that agencements are inevitable. I am also interested in situating these 
bundles of human and non-human agency in place and time but, like Pierre Bourdieu and 
Antonio Gramsci (Boggs 1976), I am more concerned with understanding the political, cultural, 
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and economic conditions through which agencements such as the PCR form and come to seen as 
legitimate, as well as what social and economic possibilities they produce.     
The PCR provides modest funding for community-based “sister” agencies to conduct 
surveys, monitor, and address vacant buildings in 13 geographical areas; host events for 
prospective and current homeowners; and spread the word about the program and its benefits to 
locally active real estate brokers, bankers, and developers.  Program staff also convene monthly 
meetings with each sister agency to gauge their progress and address problems, as well as 
quarterly program-wide trainings in which all sister agencies participate.  They provide direct 
assistance in the form of forgivable loans for current homeowners’ exterior property repairs and 
new homeowners’ down payments if they purchased a vacant home within the target area.   
While some PCR participants see the program as forming in response to a distinctly local 
set of housing problems and challenges related to the 2008 financial crisis, this is only part of the 
story. In 2011, the city of Chicago tried and failed to get the investors, government entities, and 
banks that held thousands of foreclosed and vacant houses to register and maintain them (Gallun 
and Maidenburg 2013).  Neighborhood leaders, residents, police officers, and social scientists 
proclaimed that vacancy was a threat to neighborhood safety, public health, and property values 
(Podmolik 2013).  And a longstanding ideology of ownership made an ownership-focused 
response to housing vacancy economically viable and politically appealing (Rohe and Watson 
2007). Finally, federal money became available for housing recovery programs through the 
Troubled Asset Relief Fund.   
While the PCR was created to respond to housing vacancy and promote neighborhood 
stabilization after the mortgage crisis of 2007-2009, the form it took, its funding sources, its 
agenda, capacities, and goals, and the “positions and position-takings” (Bourdieu 1983: 30) that 
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it facilitated and foreclosed exceeded a particular post-crisis moment. In the introduction, I drew 
on Janet Roitman’s critique of the ways in which applying a “crisis” label to a single event 
obscures the existence and impact of ongoing social and economic processes.  If something is 
judged to be a “crisis,” it becomes an aberration that could not have been reasonably anticipated 
and avoided.  It may demand certain kinds of intervention while making deeper forms of 
critique, analysis, and transformation impossible to achieve.  Across Chicago, widespread 
housing vacancy is an ongoing condition, symptomatic of deeply rooted racialized and 
racializing inequalities that can be mapped geographically as well as economically.  It is not a 
sudden, abrupt event. And yet, by tying these problems to a crisis moment, the PCR marshaled 
some ownership-focused resources and solutions to vacancy, but did not disrupt the workings of 
the homeownership complex or challenge the ideology of ownership it produces and makes 
manifest.   
 
Addressing Housing Vacancy as a Problem That Homeownership Can Solve 
The first federal endeavor to address foreclosure-related abandoned, vacant housing in 
the United States, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (“NSP”), involved an initial 
allocation of $3.92 billion dollars to purchase and rehab houses in areas with high numbers of 
vacant and abandoned properties.  From its inception, NSP ran into difficulties.  First, there was 
little federal-local coordination involved in choosing the properties to be purchased, rehabbed, 
and demolished.  Second, there was minimal planning for how to maximize the strategic impact 
of the program.  Local development groups applied for NSP funds, purchased, and rehabbed 
vacant properties, and then often watched them sit vacant or sell for a low price that reflected the 
surrounding property values rather enhanced them.   
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Sam Lawson, a middle-aged white man who has spent his career at the interstices of the 
public and private housing market as an architect, and now serves as the director of the PCR, 
said that the initial round of NSP funding in Chicago was a waste of resources because it was too 
scattershot in its approach. Because one third of Chicago was eligible, those agencies that 
received NSP money were buying properties and doing rehabs in a haphazard fashion. From his 
perspective, this lessened the effectiveness of the dollars they spent.  
To Lawson, the housing crisis was “a perfect storm that snowballed…” and “cities were 
not prepared to absorb [federal aid] money in strategic ways.”  He said that those in charge of 
NSP were looking to acquire, rehab and reoccupy buildings, but because they did so without 
incorporating or attending to the neighborhood context, their efforts were often not sustainable. 
 This is because of the powerful effect of the surrounding neighborhood on property value.  For 
example, if an agency purchases and rehabs a vacant house with NSP funds but there are three 
foreclosures down the block, they will not be able to recoup their acquisition and rehab costs 
with a quick sale, and the new owner, if any, is more likely to get discouraged by their 
plummeting property values and empty neighborhood and may walk away, the homes nearby 
that are occupied will not see an increase in property values from your efforts, and the nearby 
vacant homes will remain vacant.  And beyond its ineffectiveness, such an intervention is also 
incredibly expensive and time-consuming.  
To address the problems observed with NSP, the city of Chicago developed the PCR.  In 
2012, the city received $169 million from the federal government through second and third 
rounds of NSP funding allocation and an additional $20 million from a private foundation to 
address its substantial housing problems—over 100,000 foreclosed properties, compounded by 
vast swathes of vacant buildings and land in the South and West Sides, areas that have been 
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experiencing a population exodus since the 1970s.   Because of limited funds, Gabriel Lautner, 
the city planner that oversaw the program’s start, argued that since "[w]e can’t do everything 
everywhere…Let’s focus our resources, let’s focus our activities and try and make this spot 
better."  His plans are in alignment with asset-based community development theory (Krietzman 
and McKnight 1993), which urges communities to identify existing neighborhood assets and turn 
them into “anchor” institutions from which a broader community revitalization endeavor can be 
launched.   
 As Helen Mercer, in charge of data collection and assessment for the PCR, saw it, the 
PCR improved upon the NSP model by engaging in ongoing, collaborative relationships and 
focusing its efforts on small, manageable target areas where an impact could be made. “The 
program builds on existing community expertise and takes a block-by-block approach to the 
vacant property problem in specific areas of Chicago where a market turnaround was deemed to 
be both necessary and achievable [emphasis added],” she explained.  But how can the conditions 
for a “necessary and achievable” housing market turnaround be adequately assessed?    
 
Measuring and Performing Housing Recovery in Chicago 
Just as labeling a longstanding, multifaceted problem as the product of a singular crisis 
shapes how we respond to it, measurement matters in the construction and performance of a 
housing market recovery plan.  By tracking buildings’ trajectories from occupied, to vacant, to 
boarded-up, demolished, or reoccupied, PCR makes certain housing market problems visible and 
actionable while obscuring others.   This issue is compounded by the varying amounts, durations, 
and root causes of vacancy in PCR target areas.  In the predominantly Latino and Eastern 
European immigrant community of Brickville, for example, high rates of vacancy were relatively 
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short-lived and directly connected to the housing boom and bust that precipitated the 2007 to 
2009 financial crisis.  But in the predominantly African American neighborhood of Jamesville, 
on the other hand, vacancy was a long-term problem tied to white flight, red lining, the 1968 
riots following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and decades of economic 
depression, property abandonment, and population loss.   
In spite of the diverse nature of vacancy in the PCR’s target areas, the Program offers the 
same tools as a solution to all areas.  One of its primary tools is measurement.  While the 
Program tracks a number of outcomes, its primary metric and goal is building reoccupation.  But 
achieving reoccupation need not involve the PCR at all.  Indeed, when a buyer purchases and 
reoccupies and/or resells or rents out a building without PCR assistance that is the most desirable 
end to the building’s trajectory, according to Helen Mercer.  This is true because it costs nothing 
and also is taken as evidence by program directors that the PCR has been successful in 
rehabilitating the image of its selected neighborhoods and making them appear “safe” for private 
investment. Ownership (and the occupancy of and care for the building and the community it 
implies, but does not always deliver) is the outcome that matters.  
Why does measuring the number of building reoccupations matter more to the PCR than 
who buys, fixes, rents out, occupies, or tears these buildings down? As historian Theodore Porter 
points out, quantification is a “technology of distance” (1995: ix).  By using reoccupation 
numbers to assess the program’s success, PCR administrators smooth out, on paper at least, the 
variances between different target areas and the diverse reasons for their vacant building 
problems. Success can be measured within and between different PCR target areas and compared 
to reoccupation rates in areas outside of the program as well as citywide. 
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Helen Mercer held that the collection and analysis of quantitative housing data allowed 
the PCR to be evidence-based in its approach to housing recovery.  She explained,   
Now what I think is really unique about [the PCR] is that it does leverage community 
groups, technical assistance providers, and all these folks individually working on 
different aspects of the community development and housing puzzle and helps them work 
with each other, share best practices, and gives them some resources and tools, and then 
pulls together a consolidated program that we have common goals, we share both our 
data and what’s happening on program problem properties in the database, we have set 
outcomes we’re shooting for, they’re really tangible and quantifiable outcomes...And 
then [the University Housing Center] actually tracks market trends, so…we can kinda 
say, “Yeah, well actually the market picked up in this area,” and we’d like to think we 
can look into it and say “Oh, we worked in this area, we reoccupied this number of 
properties, we assisted this many homeowners, and look what the market trend 
information is.” So what’s really cool to me is the program kinda goes from the 
beginning with very simple goals to this collaboration with all these groups, tools, 
technical outcomes, to tracking market trends, so I think that’s cool and unique that it’s 
very holistic. 
 
For Helen, gathering and analyzing quantitative data allowed the PCR to continually check its 
efficacy and make a powerful case for the impact of its relatively modest investments of human 
and financial capital.  From her perspective, if an action could not be counted and measured for 
its impact, it was not a real outcome.  “There’s a lot of feel good stuff [that organizations do], but 
then…people go, ‘what was your outcome?’ ‘Oh, we held this great seminar.’ Well great, but it’s 
a seminar or sharing, that’s not an outcome.  Great outcomes might come of it, but [that’s not an 
outcome in itself].” 
In Helen’s view, proper outcomes were tangible, numbers-based, and calculable.  If 
something could not be measured, how could future groups replicate it?  How could the PCR 
staff properly attribute their successes or failures?   But like the work of other housing 
stakeholders I have discussed, the PCR’s measurements and the numbers they produce also have 
performative power in the making of the housing market.  The PCR’s measurements highlight 
some characteristics of local housing markets and obscure others. Michel Callon notes, 
“[c]alculativeness couldn’t exist without calculating tools…The most interesting element is to be 
 
 205 
found in the relationship between what is to be measured and the tools used to measure it.  The 
latter do not merely record a reality independent of themselves, they contribute powerfully to 
shaping, simply by measuring it, the reality they measure” (1998: 23).  By making vacant 
buildings its object and using human and non-human technologies to observe, measure, and 
record numerically what became of them, PCR did not merely measure the housing market. It 
also participated in its transformation (Merry 2016; Power 1999; Strathern 2000).    
 
Houses in Place 
A vacant house is a prime example of the social entanglements and contingencies 
involved in creating, sustaining, or reconstituting market value.  It offers powerful evidence for 
the anthropological truism that “context matters.” The power of social context in establishing the 
value of an individual home and the perceived appeal of its surrounding neighborhood is 
intimately tied to the role that race, ethnicity, and class has played in the U.S. housing market.  
As I described in Chapter Two, the history of U.S. homeownership is inextricably linked to 
racial, ethnic, and class inequality, and Chicago is in many ways emblematic of this toxic mix.  
In the 19th century, Eastern European and Irish immigrants to the city were disparaged, 
monitored by public health officials, and often evicted and dispossessed of their properties for 
their “unhygienic” living habits in wooden-framed multifamily housing near Chicago’s 
slaughterhouses, factories, and smelting plants. Despite social reformers and wealthy business 
owners’ intense scrutiny of immigrant housing and daily habits, little attention was given to the 
social and economic forces that kept them isolated in substandard, often overcrowded dwellings.  
Instead, immigrants were subjected to housing discrimination and predation that only deepened 
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their marginal position in Chicago’s hierarchy and made it more difficult to maintain safe, secure 
housing (Garb 2005).   
Several decades later, Chicago’s swelling African American population from the Great 
Migration faced many of the same housing problems that newly arriving immigrants had faced in 
the late 1800s.  But their troubles were made worse by the racial barriers that circumscribed 
where they could and could not live in the city even further than the economic, linguistic, and 
social barriers that had kept new immigrants in poor housing conditions when they first arrived 
in the United States. In Black Metropolis (Drake and Cayton 2015 [1945]), University of 
Chicago anthropologists explain that Chicago’s “Black Belt” constituted “…a city within a 
city—a narrow tongue of land, seven miles in length and one and one-half in width, where more 
than 300,000 negroes are packed solidly—in the heart of Midwest Metropolis… Of Chicago’s 
337,000 Negroes, a bare 10 per cent are scattered among the white population” (2015 [1945]:12).  
The tight geographic boundaries of the Black Belt made overcrowding inevitable.  In addition, 
African American households were subjected to price gouging by white landlords.  Because so 
few neighborhoods were open to non-white households, landlords could charge outrageous 
amounts for poorly maintained apartments and get away with it because such places were scarce.  
 When Chicago’s black population reached a tipping point and could no longer be 
contained in the Black Belt, those seeking to purchase homes in formerly white communities 
encountered real estate speculators who charged high prices for older properties that black 
families were forced to buy “on contract.” Speculators seized upon a new scarcity problem—the 
refusal of financial institutions to lend money in black or racially mixed Chicago 
neighborhoods—and used it to extract high down payments from black buyers and then high 
monthly installments.  If the buyers missed a single payment, the seller could evict them and 
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keep their down payment money with no repercussions.  Even though black buyers paid a 
premium for these properties, they were “devalued” to the point of near worthlessness by 
financial institutions and home insurers.  Further, because paying for them was so costly, many 
households doubled up or failed to complete routine maintenance in order to make their home 
payments, which resulted in the physical deterioration of the properties they’d paid so dearly for 
and the continuation of their fall in value (Coates 2014; Satter 2010).   
 Although the fair housing legislation that I describe in Chapter 2 did offer new 
protections for minorities seeking access to adequate housing, it did not magically transform the 
housing stock in the communities where said minorities were forced to settle and do their best to 
maintain in Chicago.  Homes in much of Chicago’s South Side, where the majority of black 
families settled, continued to be worth less than homes in white areas, in part because their 
owners were housing cost burdened due to discrimination, and in part because discrimination 
kept the value of all properties in minority communities lower (Harris 1999).  And then the 
housing boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s hit, sending up prices and appraised values and 
flooding these communities with predatory and subprime mortgage and refinancing loan 
products. When the market crashed, so the standard crisis narrative goes, all that new “value” 
suddenly disappeared and prices came tumbling back down.82  Suddenly, long-term residents 
who had been edging closer to paying off initial, modest mortgages, owed $100,000 or more than 
their homes were worth.  Owners who had bought at the height of the market with low or 
nonexistent down payments were similarly upside down83 on their mortgages.  And as their 
                                                 
82 See Roitman 2014 for a critique of this framing of the mortgage crisis of 2007-2009 as a crisis 
of value.   
83 A homeowner is said to be “upside down” or “underwater” on their mortgage/house if they 
owe more on their mortgage loan than the house’s current market value.  If their financial 
circumstances change and they cannot make their mortgage loan payments, a foreclosure or a 
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neighbors lost their properties to foreclosure, their property values continued to fall, making the 
financial situation of even the most conservative property owners more and more precarious.   
I offer this truncated recap of European immigrant and then racial and ethnic minority 
housing woes in Chicago to convey the extent to which social marginalization and racial 
exclusion is inextricably entangled with where and how vacancy occurs.  It is no accident that all 
of the communities that PCR targeted had majority African American or Latino populations.  
Nor is the poor condition of the housing stock in many PCR target areas the natural result of less 
than conscientious property ownership by minority households.  Rather, in Chicago and many 
segregated towns and cities in the United States, housing conditions both reflect and deepen 
existing geographical hierarchies of race, ethnicity, and class.  These hierarchies do not destroy 
the housing value chain, but they do shape how and where can be extracted from it. 
Even the most robust housing market intervention cannot cleanse urban inequality and 
start fresh.  When the PCR attempted to spur recovery in its target areas, it acted within a 
landscape saturated with the signs and symptoms of racial and economic disparity. For example, 
PCR’s sister agencies ran directly into the value problem created by housing’s social and spatial 
entanglements.  Before any house can be sold, it is subject to multiple assessments: by 
professional appraisers who work for financial institutions and home insurers, by the real estate 
agents who represent buyers and sellers, by home inspectors, and by the buyers and sellers 
themselves. On the basis of those assessments, some weighted more heavily than others, a value 
is assigned, a sale price is reached, and a purchase price is negotiated (or not). This process 
works much less smoothly for vacant properties. The owner/seller is likely to be either absent or 
atypical (i.e., a bank or individual investor who may never have laid eyes on the property). The 
                                                                                                                                                             
short sale is all but inevitable as they cannot sell their home and pay off the mortgage loan in the 
process.   
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property may be stuck in legal limbo due to foreclosure, abandonment, or the owner’s death 
without a legal will.  And, if the property has been vacant for any length of time, it is likely to 
have problems that will make it difficult to appraise, and, as a result, to obtain mortgage 
financing for its purchase.   
As such, the fate of vacant buildings is deeply dependent upon the social, inter-subjective 
practices of value creation, assessment, and negotiation. Vacancy, and the broken windows, 
overgrown lawns, and piles of mildewed mail that index it, may place them into a functionally 
“unsellable” category.  And yet, that categorization also creates an opportunity, if not for a 
prototypical mortgage-financed home buyer, then for a real estate investor developer, a cash 
buyer, a community land bank, or a community development agency eager to acquire, rehab, and 
reoccupy them.  Buyers’ interest and ability to seize the opportunity vacancy presents is 
geographically contingent.  A vacant building can be acquired far more easily in a neighborhood 
inundated with them than in a neighborhood with only a few such properties, and yet the easily 
acquired building also presents a far more challenging value proposition if the buyer is not both 
well financed and well informed.   
While the PCR’s commitment to market stabilization through vacant property 
reoccupation acknowledges the role that place plays in creating or undercutting property and 
community value, its practitioners are not empowered to critically engage with the historical 
causes of vacancy or disrupt the uneven effects of “market-driven” development. Below I offer 
examples of the PCR’s activities and performances in different Chicago communities to give a 
sense of the ways in which history and social context impinge upon the imagined opportunities 
and market stabilizing effects of homeownership.  In the first, Brickville, we see that a limited 
number of vacancies, while more easily absorbable by the private market, does not mean that the 
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housing needs of existing community members can be met through PCR’s toolkit.   This is due to 
a mismatch in the market price of housing, even if vacant and in need of major repair, and the 
limited borrowing power of those who aspire to become first time homeowners in the 
neighborhood.  In the second neighborhood, Davis Park, we learn that PCR intervention is 
ineffective in areas with very high vacancy rates, but with different consequences.  In addition to 
the financial capacity problem outlined above, the experiences and opportunities of 
homeownership in Davis Park are distinct from those generated by homeownership in areas 
without high levels of vacancy.  The last PCR area I discuss, Geneva Square, shares much in 
common with Davis Park in terms of its population and its long-term struggles with 
unemployment, property abandonment, and economic disinvestment, but is more geographically 
isolated and thus less often the target of public and private market intervention.  However, 
Geneva Square’s marginality may open possibilities for transformation that other PCR areas do 
not have.   
 
Brickville 
Brickville is a working-class neighborhood of Chicago’s Northwest Side.  Originally 
settled by Eastern European immigrants who worked in the brickyards and foundries that once 
clustered in this corner of Chicago, the neighborhood is now mostly Latino.  It is still composed 
of blue-collar factory, construction, and service workers and their families.  Brickville is a bit 
isolated, geographically, from other parts of the city.  It lacks a train line, is primarily residential, 
and during my research period, seemed too far-flung to experience the waves of gentrification 
creeping into Chicago’s Northwest side since the mid-1990s. And yet, it is a lovely 
neighborhood.  Walking down its tree-lined, brick-bungalowed streets in the summer of 2014, it 
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was a hard to picture why it had been chosen for inclusion in the PCR in the first place, as most 
of the housing stock was well maintained and appeared occupied.  
Later, I learned that beneath its pleasant façade lurked some serious housing troubles. 
 Brickville experienced a flurry of real estate activity and rapid price increases during the 
housing bubble of 2004-2006, and suffered from extremely high rates of foreclosure from 2007 
to 2012, especially when compared to the city as a whole. And at the same time that property 
values were fluctuating, its residents, once stably lower-middle to middle class, lost economic 
ground in the form of income, and, with foreclosure, household wealth.   
In spite of its residents’ recent woes, Brickville had a solid housing stock of desirable 
single-family and two-to-three flat properties, several thriving commercial streets, a well-
maintained park and field house, several churches of different denominations with large 
congregations, and a few relatively high-ranking neighborhood public elementary schools. In 
other words, the neighborhood had the infrastructure that the PCR saw as necessary for a 
successful housing recovery, which, instead of placing it lower on the list of neighborhoods in 
need of help, made it all the more desirable as a program target (cf. Ashton 2009). This 
application of asset-based community development theory makes sense in a world of fiscal 
austerity and limited political will for neighborhood intervention.  But it can also reinforce 
residents’ uneven access to housing opportunities and pitfalls in different parts of a segregated 
city.   
My initial impression of the Brickville PCR was that it was a quiet neighborhood of 
mostly well-maintained bungalows, two and three-flat brick buildings, and larger corner 
apartment buildings.  But Leo, the PCR coordinator who gave me  a tour of his agency’s portion 
of the PCR target area, was quick to point out what he took to be evidence of a neighborhood in 
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crisis.  This house had broken windows that were not properly boarded.  That empty lot had 
housed a decrepit property that was recently demolished, he told me.  Those houses with huge 
red X’s across their facades were vacant and structurally unsound.  While not yet on the city’s 
long list of properties to be demolished, they would be near impossible to sell in that condition. 
 And, that alley, he told me, is where a teenaged schoolgirl was dragged, beaten, and raped on 
her way to school on a December morning in 2013.   
It was Leo’s job as a coordinator to walk or drive through the PCR-designated section of 
Brickville and assess the occupancy status and condition of each house within it as part of the 
vacant property survey he was responsible for completing every month.  He took photos of and 
made notes on any property that seemed to be vacant or visibly in need of repair.  When he 
returned to his office, he entered in the information he collected into a database that served as 
both a compendium of vacant properties and a portal through which each target neighborhood’s 
coordinator could communicate with the program-wide technical assistance and property 
acquisition teams, who researched the legal status of vacant properties that coordinators 
identified for possible purchase or demolition.  This team assessed whether the selected buildings 
were suitable candidates for the program to acquire and then sell to an eligible first time home 
buyer, and if so, helped coordinate with the PCR’s partner financing agency, which had a 
revolving loan fund for this purpose.   
During the time I spent in Brickville, the property acquisition dimension of the PCR had 
yet to be realized.  In the fall of 2014, I accompanied Leo when the PCR’s real estate manager 
came to the neighborhood to check out a property that he thought might be suitable for PCR 
acquisition, rehab, and sale to a low-income home buyer.  The house was a brick two flat with a 
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full basement, was boarded up but looked to be in decent shape. 84 It had what looked to be 
original hardwood floors and wooden trim, with generously sized rooms—two bedrooms on the 
first floor and three on the second.  The front bedroom on the second floor had a little balcony 
that looked out over the street.   Not everything was perfect: the interior paint was peeling and 
the floors need to be cleaned and possibly refinished.  The kitchens need to be redone, as did the 
bathrooms—one of which was missing a toilet.  Pigeons were living, molting, and defecating in 
the upstairs unit’s back porch.  
None of these things seemed to deter the PCR real estate manager, until we went into the 
basement, which appeared to have smoke and fire damage.  It was not a legal unit but it looked 
as if it had been used as a separate living space at one point—there was a kitchen and a bathroom 
and carpeting, although the carpet appeared to have been laid on top of cement dust, not a regular 
floor. The listing real estate broker, Leo and I were the first ones to see it, and the real estate 
broker got it into his head that maybe former residents or squatters had cooked 
methamphetamine there, and that would explain the smoke and fire damage all over the walls 
and ceilings and on the electrical boxes, too. I do not know on what basis, if any he was making 
that claim, or why, as a listing agent, he felt that sharing it would be a good thing to do with a 
prospective buyer.  More likely, the damage was due to some kind of an electrical fire, but his 
assumptions, poorly founded or not, made the place seem creepier.   
When we had finished the tour, the PCR real estate manager said she thought the price 
was way too high for the amount of work that needed to be done. She pointed out that the 
building’s brick facade was crooked and tilted in places.  I had not noticed, but from the side, 
there were places where the brick front was pulling away from the sides of the house.  She said 
                                                 
84 Flats are apartment units that usually take up an entire floor of a building.  Two flats and three 
flats, some with legal basement, or “garden,” units, are a common form of housing stock.   
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all that would have to be redone.  There also appeared to be a water leak near the back, over the 
kitchen. She called it a gut rehab.  She said if the PCR paid the asking price, they would have to 
price it in the $300Ks to break even after making all the necessary repairs.  If they got it for half 
of the listing price (like $70k) maybe it would be workable, but you’d still need a very strong 
buyer who qualified for a $100k loan at minimum, because even with the rehab loan it wouldn’t 
be enough to cover everything. And a strong buyer might make too much money to qualify for 
PCR’s assistance.  This was the issue that emerged again and again in Brickville: the buildings 
that were cheap enough for either the PCR or a PCR-qualified buyer to purchase were too run 
down to obtain financing, and often went to cash buyers, as a result.  The market was moving 
toward recovery and vacant property reoccupation, but it was not moving in a way that matched 
the PCR’s sister agencies’ affordable homeownership goals.   
When I shadowed Leo on his surveys of the Brickville target area in 2014, there were 
only a limited number of vacant properties, further complicating the PCR’s effort to make a 
significant impact on the market through vacant homes.  In the target area’s ten-block radius, 
there were roughly a dozen vacant properties, the majority in decent shape.  A few properties had 
boarded windows and doors, but in the world of PCR, being “boarded and secure” was a 
relatively desirable status to have—certainly better than “open.”85 There were fifteen or so 
occupied properties in visible need of some kind of repair, and Leo recounted trying to speak 
with the owners of these houses to explain that funds might be available to help them if they 
wanted to make exterior repairs86 to their houses, such as fix their porches, roofs, or front steps. 
                                                 
85 Open” meant that the property was accessible to anyone interested in spending time there, 
something that raised crime and safety concerns for neighbors and made it more difficult to sell. 
86 That PCR assistance was available to make repairs that would be visible from the street, but 
not for resolving issues in the homes’ interiors speaks to the program’s orientation toward 
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 The other part of his job, foreclosure outreach, involved speaking with owners of properties that 
were on a list of foreclosure filings that he received each month from the PCR’s technical 
assistance team.  For him and for the other coordinators I met, foreclosure outreach and the home 
repair program seemed to be low on the list of PCR priorities, a fact that reflects the declining 
numbers of foreclosures at the time of my research, as well as the PCR’s forward-looking 
program goal to generate new homeownership rather than sustain and support existing owners.87  
In addition to community outreach, surveying and reporting tasks, Leo and the other 
coordinators were also charged with organizing events to promote homeownership and 
community development within their areas. A couple of weeks after we first met, Leo and the 
other PCR coordinator for Brickville, Raul, organized a home buying fair and trolley tour, which 
I describe below in order to illustrate how the PCR encouraged performances of housing 
opportunity rather than accessible pathways to the same.   
On the July morning of Brickville’s inaugural Housing Fair and Trolley Tour, it was 
pouring rain and unseasonably cold. I arrived a few minutes early to help the two neighborhood 
coordinators, Raul and Leo, set up, but found the church basement was already decked out with a 
large amount red and blue balloons. Registration was near the entrance, with space for invited 
community partners, including the Illinois State’s Attorney’s office, the Community and 
Economic Development Association for Cook County, and a utility company that had recently 
begun offering energy saving tips and products to its customers.  In a larger room down the hall, 
                                                                                                                                                             
spurring housing market growth by making the neighborhood an appealing place to new home 
buyers.   
87 Following Baudrillard’s critique of the parallel concerns of Marxist and capitalist thinkers with 
production as the “only possible imaginary” in The Mirror of Production (), I assert that this 
focus on the future and on market perpetuation rather than stability is a hallmark of the 
homeownership complex and of capitalism, in general (Joseph 2014: 
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representatives from mortgage banks and real estate brokerages staffed half a dozen card tables 
festooned with their company insignia and promotional materials.   
After a few speeches welcoming us to the event, which promoted first-time 
homeownership and the community of Brickville in order to solve the neighborhood’s post-
mortgage crisis vacant property problem, attendees were encouraged to speak to representatives 
involved in the key steps along the path to ownership.  In fact, Raul and Leo had devised a 
scheme to make sure that people engaged with each step of the home buying process: in order to 
be eligible for entry for the raffle prizes at the end of the fair, they had to get stamps from a real 
estate broker, a mortgage banker, and the trolley tour driver on their event “passport.”   
Although I had come to the event with the understanding that I could help out if need be, 
I ended up being free to play prospective homebuyer and take the trolley tours with other fair 
attendees.88 On the first tour, we saw two properties: a vacant brick bungalow that needed 
kitchen and bathroom updates and a crowded brick two flat building with a (probably illegal) 
basement unit.89 The brick bungalow was listed at a good price, but the downstairs had an old-
fashioned layout rather than the “open floor plan” that most 21st century buyers strongly prefer 
and the upstairs was awkwardly configured (Emrath 2017).  Nobody in my group seemed too 
enthusiastic about it. The two-flat we saw was still partially occupied, in spite of its official 
“vacant” status.  When we entered the kitchen of the first floor unit, we found a ten-year-old girl 
                                                 
88 Preparations for the home buying fair and trolley tour marked the beginning of quasi-
internships I maintained with several of the PCR’s neighborhood partner agencies over the 
course of my fieldwork. 
89 Residential buildings are zoned by the number of legal units they contain.  Many Chicago 
buildings are zoned as single family or two or three flats, but also have a second or third 
occupable space, either in the basement or the attic, that is used to generate additional rental 
income or as an “in-law” suite.  Because this practice is so common, listing sheets with such 
additional spaces often state that the owner does not attest the legality of the extra unit (even 
when it is plain that they have been using it as such. 
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eating what might be the perfect kid lunch: a plate of French fries and a bowl of vanilla ice 
cream.  She didn’t seem perturbed by all the people traipsing through her home, but it was a little 
awkward.  The owner (maybe the girl’s father) told us that the property would make a great 
“family home,” but it did not appear to be used that way at the present, as only the first floor 
seemed to be occupied by a single household. In the basement unit, we saw several single 
mattresses with tangled sheets and a small, cluttered kitchen.  It seemed likely that the owner was 
using the space as a kind of boarding house for several tenants.90  The second floor unit was 
vacant and in the process of being rehabbed. I sensed that most of the tour goers were looking for 
single-family homes rather than more expensive multifamily investments, so there was not much 
interest here, either.   
 The second tour, which covered the north side of Brickville, was more crowded.  Feeling a 
little bolder than I had earlier in the day, I got into some conversations: first with a middle-aged 
Latina woman, Isamar, who wanted to buy her first home and move to a better area. She had 
gone through pre-purchase counseling and had a Section 8 voucher—so if she bought it would be 
through the Chicago Housing Authority’s Choose to Own program.91 She didn’t like the first two 
                                                 
90 Brickville has a large undocumented population, some of whom may live in arrangements 
such as the one we observed in the two flat with the illegal basement unit.  The colloquial term 
for sharing housing in this manner is “doubling up,” and agency partners often alluded to the 
doubling up phenomenon when discussing how low-income people had managed to stay in the 
area in spite of rising rents and home prices, as well as when discussing the chronic lack of street 
parking.   
91 The Choose to Own program allows Section 8 voucher holders in good standing to use their 
voucher (and some additional down payment assistance) to purchase a home and pay for a 
mortgage.  According to a housing counselor I spoke with, one of the challenges of the program 
is that women with children are often eligible to receive a large enough amount to participate 
when their children are young, but when the children grow up and/or move out, their voucher 
amount shrinks and they can no longer afford their mortgage.  The program is emblematic of 
what I call the “homeownership complex” in that it pushes even the most vulnerable into 
“choosing” ownership, even when such a status change may not be sustainable or make them 
more financially secure.   
 
 218 
places we looked at, but she liked a third property, a $269K bungalow that was freshly painted, 
had more updated, high-end bathrooms and kitchen, and was billed as “move-in ready.” I also 
talked to a Latino man in his 30s, Santos, and then to his wife as well. He and his wife, 
Alejandra, currently rent a two-bedroom condo in an adjacent neighborhood. Because they want 
to move away from Chicago after Alejandra’s daughter graduates from high school, and they like 
the place they are renting, they are hesitant about buying a property.  Given what they told me, it 
was unclear why they had chosen to go on the home buying tour.  
 For our next stop, we saw a house that served as a demonstration of what tour goers might 
be able to achieve through ownership: the home had been purchased with help from a now-
defunct down-payment assistance program, City Lift, and with rehab assistance money from the 
PCR.92 The homeowner, Sandra, told us how the PCR’s sister agency had helped her family get 
ready to purchase a home, helped with a down payment, and helped with rehab, and that they 
wouldn’t have been able to do it without that support.  The warm, inviting interior of her home 
spoke for itself.  After a morning of seeing empty, half-furnished, or cluttered homes that spoke 
to all the dangers lurking in ownership, this was an impressive, abundantly decorated and 
personalized property, and Sandra was obviously very proud of it.  Tour goers (myself included) 
responded to that.   
 When we returned to the housing fair, a barbeque was in full swing.  After lunch, we 
returned to the church basement for the announcement of the raffle prizes (including a tablet, 
Starbucks and Lowes’ gift cards, and a gas station gift card). People were excited to hear the 
numbers read but, after the winners were announced, there was a feeling of letdown.  The 
                                                 
92 City LIFT is a City of Chicago program that began in 2012. In collaboration with lenders such 
as Wells Fargo, it offered forgivable down payment assistance loans to qualified households 
making less than 80% of the area median income ($59,600 for a family of four). 
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imaginings we had engaged in on the trolley tour—picturing how we would fix up this or that 
room for a mother, a son, or a sibling, and what we would do to the kitchen—were over, and so 
too was the prospect of winning anything in the raffle.  The woman I’d chatted with on the 
trolley tour who hoped to buy a home through the Section 8 voucher program, Isamar, had been 
waiting around to hear the prize winners and left as soon as that was over, before I could say 
goodbye.   
At the end of the event, I helped the staff clean up, and then debriefed with the 
coordinators and an urban planning friend of mine at a local bar. There was disagreement about 
how successful the fair had been. While there were one hundred attendees in spite of the heavy 
rain, staff lamented that there were few people in attendance seemed prepared for 
homeownership.93 Given that observation, I wondered why the mortgage lenders and real estate 
brokers participated at all. When I asked Leo, the South Brickville neighborhood coordinator for 
the PCR, he said his friend who was a mortgage lender had told him that such community events 
were considered a waste of time, since no one was really ready to buy at them. It seemed that for 
most attendees and participants, the fair and home tours were a performance of affordable 
homeownership more than an actual pathway toward to it. 
That the housing fair and trolley tour were unsuccessful in generating first time 
homeownership speaks to a mismatch between a fundable housing goal, generating new 
homeowners to solve a vacant property problem, and Chicago’s ongoing, complex affordable 
housing needs.  When I began my research in 2014, the housing crisis was winding down. Not-
                                                 
93 This was a recurring theme in my research with housing agency staff, who received federal 
funding to put on home buying fairs and offer home pre-purchase classes and counseling, but 
often felt that the participants in these offerings did not have the savings or credit scores to 
become homeowners. In the housing fair context, staff made the determination that people were 
not ready because few people engaged the mortgage bankers, housing counselors, and realtors in 
attendance in serious conversations; 
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for-profit agencies such as those that partnered with the PCR and, more importantly, their 
funders, were already pivoting toward a new agenda: homeownership.  But the communities they 
served were not necessarily prepared to fulfill this new goal. Housing fair attendees were 
interested in exploring the concept of homeownership, trying out identities as homeowners via 
the open houses in the trolley tour, listening to success stories, and eating hamburgers and hot 
dogs alongside similarly situated people—but they were not ready, financially or 
psychologically, to doggedly pursue the actual achievement of ownership.   
 In the case of Brickville, rapidly increasing property values and high volumes of 
distressed property sales in the neighborhood compounded this lack of “buyer readiness.”  The 
properties that were priced affordably for the demographics PCR hoped to serve were often in 
bad shape and frequently could not pass the necessary inspections to secure mortgage financing. 
 On the other end of the spectrum, the growing stock of post-investor purchase and rehab, 
“move-in ready” properties in the neighborhood were priced too high for those who were renting 
in the area and qualified for PCR help to afford.  What made Brickville seem like an odd choice 
for market intervention, its desirable housing stock, leafy streets, good schools, and relative 
safety in the midst of a Northwest Side increasingly plagued by gang violence, also made it a 
difficult market to render accessible for first-time, often first-generation home buyers, a problem 
that would plague the PCR’s housing agency partners again and again. In this regard, the 
Brickville PCR’s struggle to match vacant buildings with new homeowners epitomizes the limits 
of an ownership-focused approach to Chicago’s recovery. Vacant housing in PCR target areas 
does present an opportunity for buyers that have the cash to buy the property outright or who 
qualify for down payment assistance due to their income yet also have the financial wherewithal 
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to become homeowners. But it is an opportunity that remains inaccessible for most people 
currently living and renting in PCR target areas.   
 
Davis Park 
From the very beginning of my research on the Chicago housing market, I encountered 
stories about the dire straits of Davis Park.  The neighborhood was once a middle-class 
community on the South Side, but it lost more than fifty percent of its population between 1970 
and 2000 as redlining and white flight spurred residential and commercial disinvestment and 
decline. It was now mostly referenced in relation to crime, gang activity, gun violence, school 
closures, and vacant housing and land.  Yet it was also the site of a recent multimillion-dollar 
investment by the city and private entities in a new shopping district and community college 
campus and well connected by public transit and highways to Chicago’s downtown.  And 
because it had an abundance of vacant, cheap housing and land, it had potential, from the PCR’s 
perspective, to be rehabilitated through the transformative power of new ownership and building 
reoccupation.   
But Davis Park presented different challenges for the PCR than Brickville. It had such a 
significant vacancy problem that it was difficult just to manage and track its buildings, let alone 
find new owners for them.94  In the spring of 2015, after attending many PCR events and 
speaking with several participants in the program, Helen Mercer, the PCR data manager, asked 
me if I’d like to assist Davis Park’s overworked neighborhood coordinator, Jesse Madden, in 
surveying the area.  After months of struggling to access the “action” of the housing recovery 
outside of Brickville, I accepted gladly.   
                                                 
94 In 2011, 3,500 buildings were vacant in the larger Davis Park community area (Oliven and 
Mullen et al. 2011). 
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 In our initial meeting at a PCR workshop, Jesse, who was in his late twenties at the time, 
struck me as quiet, smart, and thoughtful. He has a graduate degree in urban planning and 
seemed overqualified for his job. Most of the PCR coordinators I encountered were men in their 
twenties (although there were a few more senior men for whom the coordinator position was just 
one of many hats), and nearly all were Black, as Jesse was, or Latino.95 But only a few had as 
much education in urban planning and policy as Jesse did.  
Jesse and I met up at an independent coffee shop on one of Davis Park’s main drags.  I 
had been jittery in the drive down, wondering if I had been, in my effort to prove myself useful, 
too cavalier about the safety concerns, but was comforted (and embarrassed by my comfort) 
when I saw police cars parked on the street and a diverse group of people (women, men, white 
and black) calmly enjoying coffee and pastries inside.96   
After a brief meeting, Jesse drove us to the beginning of the survey route.  He parked his 
car on the South side of a two-block stretch that dead-ended at a little park tucked under the 
shadow of the highway.  The area was eerily quiet, with few cars parked on the street and several 
vacant lots.  We took our clipboards and walked down the block, pausing at each house, 
searching for its address on a spreadsheet printed on A1 paper that was maddeningly organized 
                                                 
95 The racial and ethnic demographics made sense in that they matched the demographics of 
PCR’s target communities, but the reasons for the gender disparity were a bit more opaque.  
Perhaps men were the ones interested in the positions. Perhaps the organizations that hired them 
(staffing decisions were made at the level of the sister agency, not by PCR administrators) 
believed that men would be less likely to be threatened or intimidated during their neighborhood 
survey duties. 
 
96 As I discuss in Chapter 1, my racial, class, and gender identity came into play when, at the 
encouragement of Helen Mercer, another white, middle class woman who was one of the key 
decision-makers at the PCR, I volunteered to assist with the Davis Park property survey.  
Perhaps because Davis Park is a predominantly African American community where white 
Chicagoans rarely go, Jesse’s boss, an African American woman in her 50s, was skeptical of my 
ability and willingness to competently survey the neighborhood’s vacant properties. 
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in numeric and alphabetical order rather than in the order of our route.  At each house on the list, 
we conferred with each other regarding whether to mark it as occupied or vacant.  
To determine whether a house is vacant or occupied requires observational and inferential 
skills. In areas with few vacancies, less skill is required.  This is because vacant properties in 
neighborhoods with high occupancy rates announce themselves. They have boarded up windows 
and doors, padlocks, damp piles of junk mail on their front porches, or eviction and utility 
shutoff notices pinned to the door. They stand out from their occupied neighbors, and a surveyor 
can count them, take photos of them, keep tabs of them, and enter all of their particulars into the 
PCR database.  From there, the coordinator can submit a request for research, and someone in 
the technical services division of the PCR can search other databases for information about their 
ownership, their legal status, and whether they are in foreclosure or not. During meetings of PCR 
directors and sister agency staff, possible plans can be discussed and crafted for these properties’ 
futures, and sometimes, those plans can be put in motion and brought to completion. Because 
there are not too many vacant buildings, each one can be treated as an actionable opportunity, 
and the PCR, in partnership with its sister agencies, funders, and a network of real estate 
investors and affordable housing developers, creates pathways through which these actions can 
be taken.   
Surveying in Davis Park, in contrast, Jesse and I were hard pressed to identify any houses 
that were obviously occupied.  We spent time weighing justifications for how to classify almost 
every house we passed.  One property we saw had a car (a sign of occupancy) but it was parked 
haphazardly in the bordering vacant lot and it did not have license plates. Jesse suggested that the 
lack of plates might indicate that the car was stolen and abandoned.  There was no mail heaped 
by the front door, and the windows were not boarded, but they were covered with blankets.  It 
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looked still and, to me, empty.  But based on Jesse’s more seasoned impressions, we listed it as 
occupied.   
In addition to determining whether each property was vacant, PCR surveyors are also 
supposed to assess if it is boarded and secure.  Jesse said we could mark houses as “secure” if 
they had boarded-up windows on the first floor and if the front door appeared to be locked or 
otherwise inaccessible.97 We were also supposed to check the rear of each building to see if it 
was open and/or if the back yards were being used as illegal garbage dumps. But during our 
surveys in Davis Park, citing safety concerns, Jesse said we would not fill out that category.  He 
also did not take new pictures if the property already had a picture in database, even though PCR 
surveyors had been trained by Helen to take photos as a way to document changes to properties 
over time.  When I asked about taking new photos, Jesse told me he did not want to spend too 
much time out in the open messing with his phone.  The PCR’s mobile app was slow, and he was 
concerned that neighbors might be suspicious or become aggressive if they saw him taking 
photos in their vicinity.  As a result, the data that Jesse collected on each vacant property was 
relatively thin: vacant, occupied, or under construction. Most of his entries only had one or two 
blurry photos from the first time the property was surveyed.   
To survey vacant houses in a way that turns their individual characteristics into an 
actionable problem, a problem that can be measured, tracked, and perhaps one day resolved, you 
have to keep track of them in a way that is legible across time and space.  Keeping track of 
vacancy does not work, for example, if the only record of a vacant building exists in a filing 
cabinet in a PCR sister agency.  A central database allows all the vacant properties in the PCR’s 
target communities to be tracked, discussed, counted, and, if possible, acted upon.  But someone 
                                                 




has to enter the observations and images that coordinators gather in their surveys into the forms 
and dropdown menu categories of the database.  This work takes time and translation abilities. 
The PCR database mobile app existed, in theory, so that coordinators could quickly enter data 
and take and upload photos of each property they surveyed in real time. In practice, coordinators 
waited to enter their data until the survey was over and they could access the database with a 
computer.  It was easier to navigate the database in this way, but often they let the information 
they had gathered from their surveys pile up before entering it.  Once they did take the time to do 
the necessary data entry, sometimes they ran into roadblocks.  To enter survey data into the 
database, you type the property addresses from the spreadsheet into a search box.  Since the 
program started in 2013, each property in the PCR target areas was supposed to have its own 
record in the database. Coordinators had to search for the record, then upload a new photo and 
complete the status update.   But when I attempted to do the data entry for Davis Park, many of 
the addresses of the properties on our survey list were not in the database. Some of the properties 
did not have Property Identification Numbers.98  It is difficult to track buildings in a database 
that does not recognize their existence, more difficult, still, if they are not in the county tax 
records, either.    
To survey vacant houses thoroughly, note all of their particulars, make plans for their 
futures, and take steps to bring those futures into being, the vast majority of the houses in the 
target area need to be occupied, or at least boarded and secure.  But this was not true in Davis 
Park, and that meant the same surveying rules that were followed in other target areas could not 
apply.  There was neither the time nor the resources to keep track of the vacancies with the same 
level of scrutiny, for one thing, and for another, what would be the point of such careful 
                                                 
98 Property Identification Numbers are used for property tax identification purposes.   
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monitoring of properties in an area considered to be so undesirable? The level of property 
abandonment in Davis Park challenged the methods and goals of the PCR and the defining 
premise of the homeownership complex: that becoming an owner was an accessible opportunity 
to create and sustain value, both for oneself and for one’s community.  In Davis Park, a housing 
value chain surely still existed, but it seemed to require more repair than the PCR or its sister 
agencies could offer.   
 
Geneva Square 
Located on Chicago’s West Side, the Geneva Square PCR had high unemployment and 
an abundance of vacant housing, but also beautiful, grand old homes that its boosters hoped 
might attract new buyers, close proximity to an express highway, if not to the affluent parts of 
Chicago proper, and lots of cheap, vacant commercial and residential property.  I came to the 
community late in my research, after already spending time in several other PCR areas, including 
Brickville and Davis Park.99 Geneva Square was no better or worse than these other places, but 
spending time there led me to some revisions in my assessments of the PCR and its ownership-
centered response to Chicago’s deep-seated housing vacancy problems.   
On a Saturday in July 2015, I presided over an inflatable bounce house in the middle of a 
park in a target area that had been “rebranded” as Geneva Square by the PCR marketing director 
                                                 
99 Brett Anderson, the director of the PCR sister agency in Oak Square, was a friend of a friend, 
and I contacted him when I was searching for additional points of contact with the PCR.  I 
conducted a few interviews in the community, and attended monthly Oak Square PCR advisory 
council meetings and PCR community events, but my knowledge of the community was not as 




in consultation with the local sister agency.100 I was there to attend the Geneva Square Housing 
Fair and Trolley Tour, the same type of event I had attended in several other PCR target areas in 
the year since I had begun my fieldwork.  I had even attended a PCR housing fair and trolley tour 
in Brickville earlier that same day.  But what I observed in Geneva Square was distinct from the 
homeownership events I had attended elsewhere. The components were the same.  As in other 
PCR target areas, the Geneva Square event featured available, vacant real estate in a trolley tour, 
the PCR sister agency in the target area hosted a barbeque, and real estate brokers, bankers, and 
representatives from city programs were in attendance, as were a group of neighborhood 
residents.  But the sister agency and the community it served turned a PCR-imposed and funded 
event to promote homeownership into something else.  
Across an expanse of grass in one direction, I could see a group of teenage steppers 
performing on stage for a small crowd.   A playground stood close by, and shoeless kids ran 
between the slide and swings and the bounce house.  At the far end of the park, the barbeque was 
underway, and the smell of charred burgers permeated the heavy air.  Between the barbeque and 
me, a few dozen people huddled in the shade, milling around card tables adorned with 
organizational logos and pamphlets.  
I was silently berating myself for agreeing to staff the bounce house, which seemed 
worlds away from what I imagined to be the home buying related “action” of the fair.  It was 
especially galling as I’d been in the park three days earlier, readying the space with a pointed 
trash collection stick and a rake, picking up soda and beer cans, empty cigarette packs, candy and 
chip wrappers, plastic and metal bottle caps, and lots of small plastic dime bags.  The park was 
beautiful, and like many in Chicago, surrounded on all sides by stately homes, some in good 
                                                 
100 One of PCR’s tactics to generate interest in some stigmatized areas was to rename them (in 
consultation with neighborhood stakeholders).  Oak Square was one such instance.   
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shape and some in disrepair.  But there was a lot of trash. It had been hot that day, too, but I had 
been looking forward to a solid afternoon of observing the housing fair and securing interviews 
with housing professionals and potential home buyers.  Instead, I was watching kids come in and 
out of the bounce house, warning them to remove their shoes and to be careful when jumping 
near younger children.  
From where I stood I could see and hear what happened on the stage across the park. 
After several performances by high-school girls, who interspersed their dancing and singing with 
calls for the youth to take back their community, stay in school, and stand up against violence, a 
woman from the hosting not-for-profit took the mike.  She said that the goal of the event was to 
“to bring residents and organizations together to stabilize the neighborhood.” Next, the alderman 
said a few words about how she saw the festival “bringing together the community” and 
highlighting “programs for young people” and providing “resources” and “opportunities to 
network.”  Lastly a woman from one of the event’s sponsoring banks told the crowd that “[our 
bank] supports this community.  This is our home, and we want to make it shine again.”  As far 
as I could tell, no one mentioned homeownership, even though that was ostensibly the purpose of 
the event.  
After an hour as bounce house monitor, I was relieved of my duties and made my way, 
finally, toward the main part of the housing fair.  I meandered around the card tables, speaking 
with the not-for-profit and government workers and the real estate brokers and bankers who 
staffed them, collecting business cards, and shooting the breeze. The housing vendors did not 
have many other visitors or much of interest to say, so I ate a hot dog, drank some water, and 
embarked on a fixture of a PCR-sponsored housing fair: the trolley tour around the 
neighborhood. We visited two homes for sale, neither of which seemed to generate much 
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attendee interest, and received an introduction to the neighborhood by two guides—one a not-
for-profit organization administrator, the other a minister with a local congregation.  Our guides 
pointed out schools, churches, and businesses, as well as the grand homes of several state 
government officials. They told us that Geneva Square was slated to receive money and technical 
assistance from a local university partner to redevelop a commercial corridor, and that it was 
home to one of the best public selective enrollment high schools in the state.  We detoured into 
an adjacent suburb so that the guides could demonstrate the similarity of Geneva Square’s 
housing stock and its proximity to suburban amenities such as the YMCA, grocery stores, shops, 
restaurants, parks, a skating rink, etc.  We could have access to all this, the guides told us, for a 
fraction of a suburban purchase price and property tax bill.  “Yeah, but with poor public schools 
and services” the man sitting next to me muttered.  He later told me that he was a real estate 
broker.  
When the trolley returned to the park, the housing fair was winding down, and vendors 
were packing away their pamphlets and card tables.  But the social aspect of the event continued. 
 I followed some other tour goers into a house that faced the park that was in the process of being 
fixed up but was not featured on the trolley tour. The owner seemed proud of the progress he had 
made.  There were still plenty of children enjoying the playground and bounce house. Live music 
was to start in a few hours, and people were setting up their own charcoal grills and picnics in 
anticipation.  Before leaving, I spoke briefly with Brett Anderson, the director of the PCR sister 
agency in Geneva Square. He had been involved in the planning of the day, and knew that I had 
attended the Brickville housing fair and trolley tour earlier in the day. He asked me how his 
neighborhood’s event compared to the ones I’d seen in other neighborhoods over the course of 
my research. “I bet theirs were more ‘homeownership-focused,” he mused.  “Yes,” I replied 
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cautiously, not wanting to offend him.  “But I’m not sure how many vacant homes will be 
reoccupied as a result of it.”   He seemed neither offended nor flattered by my judgment, and 
moved on to talk to someone else. 
Later, I recalled something Brett had said in the interview I had with him several months 
earlier.  I will quote him at length, because what he says speaks to the problems of a 
homeownership-focused recovery program to combat vacancy and the problems that precede and 
follow it, and also explains why the Geneva Square housing fair and trolley tour felt different to 
me.  In response to my question about why homeownership was important, Brett said, 
 Homeownership is definitely a national policy agenda.  And homeownership 
really ties into the health of the national economy. But really…neighborhood 
revitalization isn’t—the economy, the national economy can be very healthy with 
lots of decaying neighborhoods around the country…but [the Program for 
Community Revitalization] tries to fuse the two.  And they don’t necessarily mesh 
well together.  And it’s like are you really—are we really trying to revitalize these 
neighborhoods or are we really trying to just get people to buy houses? …We’re 
trying to like entice—you’re saying like—[LY: You’re saying you’re enticing 
people that don’t necessarily have a ton of resources toward ownership as this 
kind of--] Well…the likelihood of building wealth by buying a house, in [Geneva 
Square] is very low… it’s an extremely risky action...And we’re supposed to 
be…telling people like this is the opportunity, only, you gotta get in now. And so 
we turn into, in a way, we’re kinda turning into the sleazy people. 
 
Brett’s concern that in promoting first-time affordable homeownership in a community with 
declining property values, his organization (and the PCR as a whole) might be “turning into the 
sleazy people” strikes me as a recognition of the self-perpetuating tendencies of the 
homeownership complex.  While facilitating greater market participation, no matter what the 
terms, may be considered to be a boon for the poor and socially and economically marginalized 
(cf. Elyachar 2005; Williams 2004), it is a rarely a straightforward end to achieve, and even if 
achieved, may come with unanticipated and deleterious consequences.  Homeownership might 
come with opportunities for freedom, stability, and asset-based economic growth and investment, 
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but those opportunities are not equally available to all.  Brett recognized that, and the tone of the 
housing fair and trolley tour, which included PCR’s homeownership goals but did not oversell 
them, reflected his awareness.  
  During the time I spent attending PCR events, talking with PCR administrators and sister 
agency staff, and surveying vacant properties, I kept thinking about whether and how the PCR’s 
array of homeownership-focused interventions responded to the complex effects of racial and 
economic inequality in Chicago’s neighborhoods.   It was not just that trying to transform vacant 
buildings into spaces of opportunity for market and household stabilization and flourishing was a 
challenging task. It was that the PCR’s stock solution to vacancy, reoccupation through 
homeownership, was advertised and performed again and again in communities where the 
institution might be inaccessible or even detrimental to their social and economic wellbeing.  As 
Miranda Joseph notes in Debt to Society: Accounting for Life Under Capitalism (2014), a focus 
on investing for “the future” is a privilege that the poor do not have, although they are often 
admonished for their lack of financial planning and forethought (74).  Yet the PCR urges and 
does its best to facilitate new kinds of future-oriented market participation through 
homeownership, which they anticipate will encourage even more financial investment in the 
target areas in which they work.   
 At the beginning of the Chapter, I suggested that the vacancy that the PCR acts upon is 
evidence of market failure. But perhaps it is not failure, or at least, not of a kind that is 
debilitating to housing market reproduction.  Just as in the real estate seminars I describe in 
Chapter 5, the PCR’s devalued, vacant properties do present opportunities, although they may 
not be accessible to the first-time, low- and moderate-income buyers that the PCR imagined for 
them.  Instead, long-term residential vacancies, and the market interventions they seem to 
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require, may be opportunities for the reproduction of an unequal housing market: a market that 
facilitates the generation of household wealth and value in some communities, and forecloses it 
in others.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
[P]roblems stemming from the housing market do not solely represent market 
dysfunction but epitomize how housing routinely functions in Americans’ lives. 
Rethinking basic questions about renting and owning may allow consideration of 
how housing may play a more constructive and optimal role in pursing economic 
opportunities, redistribution, and justice in America. 
—Anne Shlay, 2015 
 
 
This dissertation examines the work that housing stakeholders do to sustain the U.S. 
housing market, as well as how that market-making work is bound up with the real and imagined 
value of homeownership as a cultural ideal and economic good.  I argued that homeownership’s 
enduring hegemony depends upon a homeownership complex of market stakeholders that make 
investments in and tap into a housing value chain that stretches from individual households to 
housing professionals, investors, policymakers, and global financial markets. But 
homeownership’s privileged position as part of the doxa of the United States does not mean that 
it is universally accessible or equally beneficial. The government policy agenda and private 
market imperative of ever-increasing homeownership has generated financial and social benefits 
for some, but it has also deepened and perpetuated race and class inequality in the United States.  
Somehow, the appeal of homeownership continues in spite of the socioeconomic 
disparities that the housing market reflects and reproduces. I attribute this characteristic to the 
housing value chain’s power to continually attract new participants, whether they are aspiring 
home buyers, homeowners, real estate brokers, mortgage lending professionals, real estate 
investors, or housing policymakers.  As these diverse stakeholders access and tap into the 
housing value chain, they become a part of the homeownership complex and materially and 
ideologically invested in homeownership’s perpetuation.  Mortgage lending professionals and 
 
 234 
real estate brokers work to convince their customers that buying a home makes financial success 
at a household level and a national one.  Real estate investment seminars hawk residential real 
estate investment as a clear pathway to “financial freedom” in the midst of an unstable economy.  
And housing policymakers and not-for-profit staff use the government’s ideological and political 
investments in homeownership to draw resources to their communities in the name of 
homeownership.  While many of the housing stakeholders that were my interlocutors had 
weathered the mortgage crisis and knew that increasing homeownership was not and could never 
be the solution to the myriad problems that households, local and national governments, and 
financial markets faced, there were also too deeply committed to sustaining homeownership as a 
value-generating institution to critique or dismantle it. 
As Anne Shlay notes in this chapter’s epigraph, housing market problems such as the 
mortgage crisis of 2007 to 2009 are not aberrant events, but rather “epitomize how housing 
routinely functions in people’s lives” (2015: 563). In the United States, housing routinely 
functions in ways that benefit privileged, home-owning households and well-connected and 
financed housing market mediators (Desmond 2016; Perin 1977; Salamon and MacTavish 2016).  
In Chicago, for example, homeownership was ripped from the grasp of immigrant households 
who sought to use their properties productively to weather uncertain economic conditions and 
build household wealth, then denied and restricted for African American and other non-white 
households through government-sanctioned redlining practices, racist restrictive covenants, and 
predatory lending (Drake and Cayton 2015 [1945]; Garb 2005; Satter 2010). Unfortunately, 
Chicago’s housing history indexes that inequality is as deeply embedded in the doxa of the 





Deconstructing and Reconfiguring the U.S. Housing Market 
 I have worked to counter the idea that homeownership is a universal and equally 
accessible good through an ethnographic analysis of key stakeholders in the U.S. homeownership 
complex and housing value chain. In my observations, interviews, and shared activities with the 
mortgage lenders, real estate brokers, investors, housing organizers, and policymakers, I 
discovered that the scope and scale of the housing market, and my interlocutors’ sense of their 
own marginality within it, created a kind of “silo effect” (Tett 2016). While the work my 
interlocutors did to produce and extract value from the housing market kept the homeownership 
complex in motion, they often insisted that real market-defining work happened elsewhere, 
upstream from them, and that they were powerless in the face of it. This reading of the housing 
market could be bewildering, such as when the mortgage brokers’ whose experiences I 
highlighted in Chapter 3 struggled to understand how flawed risk assessment on Wall Street had 
destroyed their ability to secure financing for their customers and brought the housing market to 
a halt.  But it also gave them a convenient alibi. Instead of taking responsibility for the parts they 
played in housing market’s creation, meteoric growth, and crash or for the perpetuation of 
homeownership as a universal good, they foisted the blame elsewhere—to their naïve or greedy 
customers, to “Wall Street,” or to overly permissive government-backed mortgage financing 
parameters.   
But my findings from mesoscale, mid-level research and analysis on the remaking of the 
housing market in Chicago ran counter to my interlocutors’ insistence that the reasons for the 
housing crash lay entirely elsewhere.  First, some interlocutors willingly accepted that they and 
their industries did play an integral role in sustaining the housing market and bolstering the 
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economy as a whole.  “When you mortgage a home,” mortgage lender Mario Abruzzo told me, 
“[you are doing] something that’s really great for the economy. It takes at least ten people on our 
side: appraisers, title companies, real estate agents… It creates jobs. It keeps people moving.” 
Second, I witnessed how ideas about the value of property ownership circulated amongst housing 
professionals and were transmitted to their customers through affirmations, encouragement, and 
threats of what their futures might look like if they missed out on the opportunity to buy low, sell 
high, and achieve “financial freedom” through the housing value chain. Whether they saw 
themselves as powerful actors or “whipping boys” the work that my interlocutors did mattered.  
It drove the housing market forward and it shaped the aspirations and the behavior of a wide 
range of market participants.   
There is another reason to push back against my interlocutors’ protestations that they 
bore little to no responsibility for what happened in the housing market.  As Paul Langley (2008, 
2009), Philip Mirowski (2016), and Janet Roitman (2013) cautioned with regard to the deflecting 
qualities of “crisis” narratives, it is dangerous to assume that catastrophic miscalculations, 
perverse incentives, and faulty risk assessment schemes are aberrant, singular occurrences that 
are the fault of a few bad actors.  Such framings suggest straightforward fixes: more regulation, 
stricter licensing requirements, or more disclosure requirements.  But they do not demand a 
reconfiguring of the market where the “crisis” events took place nor a deconstruction of the 
practices, agencies, and relationships through which they were created.  
I have argued that deconstruction and reconfiguration are necessary and important for 
ensuring a more equitable and sustainable U.S. housing market.  While the homeownership 
complex is a powerful force, I also, following Pierre Bourdieu, believe that all social actors 
participate in the making of their worlds and have some degree of power to impact the 
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“structuring structures” therein (1990: 53). Below, I consider how housing stakeholders might 
reconfigure the homeownership complex to make the housing market’s “routine” function more 
equitable, open, and sustainable in the United States.   
 
Preparing Consumers to Navigate the U.S. Housing Market 
 In Chapter 6, I describe how a well-intentioned, neighborhood-focused housing and 
economic recovery program, the PCR, failed to address the underlying, systemic inequalities that 
are manifest in urban housing markets in the United States.  The PCR needed to recruit willing 
buyers to achieve its building reoccupation goals. But it did not have the resources to address the 
stumbling blocks that those buyers might face in neighborhoods that had been devastated by red 
lining, white flight, commercial disinvestment, population loss, and foreclosure.  In the PCR’s 
figuring, recruiting new homeowners would increase property values and, by extension, tax 
bases, because the new owners would take over financial and legal responsibility for the vacant 
buildings and make improvements to them that would bolster property values across the 
surrounding neighborhood.  But this plan required that new homeowners also assume a great 
deal of financial and personal risk by laying down their social and economic capital in places that 
“the market” had largely abandoned.    
The PCR’s sister agencies did offer events, such as the home buying fairs I describe, and 
services, such as pre-purchase classes and counseling, to prepare prospective home buyers for 
some aspects of the home buying process.  But these offerings did not prepare buyers to navigate 
the complexities of the housing market or to deal with the different housing professionals they 
would encounter along their path. And they also did not speak to the particular challenges of 
first-time urban homeownership in areas already struggling with housing vacancy. While I found 
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much of the financial literacy and pre-purchase curricula to be informative, federal housing 
agencies and the local housing not-for-profit organizations they fund could do more to prepare 
consumers for the conflicting interests, priorities and particular power dynamics in play in the 
their local housing market.  
For example, as I describe in Chapter 4, real estate brokers who work with buyers 
actually work for sellers in the sense that they only receive compensation for their time and effort 
when the buyer successfully purchases a home from a seller.  This means that although they may 
present themselves as expert housing market mediators and guides, their interests are distinct 
from those of the customers they serve. The home-buying customer may be seeking the perfect 
home in the perfect neighborhood for the lowest possible price. The goal of the housing 
professionals with whom they work, in contrast, is a quick, straightforward sale that will 
generate future business, either from their customer or from the other housing professionals with 
whom they successfully work to close the deal.   
An understanding of how real estate professionals are compensated through the housing 
value chain, and how that compensation scheme might affect the advice and counsel they give to 
their home buying clients, seems like it should be a foundational piece of knowledge for all 
people entering the housing market.  The U.S. economy is predicated on consumer spending, 
much of it facilitated by consumer debt, yet most people understand very little about the financial 
commitments they make, beginning, for many, with the assumption of student loan or auto loan 
debt in their late teens or early twenties, and continuing through the purchase of home, providing 
for a family, and saving for retirement (Graeber 2011; Williams 2005).  The financialization of 
daily life has been upon us for quite some time, and yet most of us remain ill-equipped to 
manage what that means individually or as a society (Aalbers 2008; Joseph 2014; Martin 2002).  
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Financial education, much like preventative public health measures such as communicable 
disease vaccinations and health education, needs to happen before people are confronted with 
whether or not to take on thousands of dollars of debt to make major purchase such as a college 
education, a car, or a home.   Home pre-purchase and financial literacy classes and workshops 
make sense as refreshers to prepare people for dealing with particular economic events, but 
people need to acquire a base line knowledge of the economic landscape to effectively advocate 
for themselves and make informed financial decisions.  Once they are ready to purchase a home 
or take on another major financial commitment, additional educational opportunities should be 
readily available to them.  
 
Real Estate Broker Commissions and Ethics 
 One of the reasons why consumer education is so important is that although real estate 
professionals may say that they live to “serve” their clients, in reality, they must constantly 
balance their client’s interests with their own short-term financial needs and long-term reputation 
in their field and with customers.  While real estate brokers have a fiduciary duty to represent 
their client’s interests above their own, and pleasing clients also matters for referrals and repeat 
business, this duty can run counter to their immediate economic interest in closing deals so that 
they can receive compensation.  
Real estate brokers rely on commissions they receive when a property is sold and 
“closed.”  Brokers who work for buyers may pressure their clients into purchasing properties, or 
push them to ignore negative home inspection reports, so that they can be paid.  They may also 
recommend that buyers use home inspectors and lenders who will be sure to get their mutual 
client to the closing table but may not be as thorough or offer as much information as other 
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housing professionals might.  This can cause a dilemma, as real estate brokers are constantly 
facing financial pressure to close deals in order to be successful even when doing so may go 
against their client’s long-term best interest.   
As I describe in Chapter 4, real estate brokers must establish themselves as successful 
housing market gatekeepers who expertly manage the buying and selling of homes in order to 
generate an income from the housing value chain.  On the one hand, real estate brokerage 
services are helpful for buyers, especially when they are purchasing a home for the first time.  
But real estate brokers who take up the mantle of market expert sometimes conceal the ways in 
which their interests and their clients’ interests diverge. This also comes into play when real 
estate brokers witness or learn of other housing professionals’ misconduct, and choose not to 
report it.  Even though unchecked misconduct hurts their customers, they may avoid reporting on 
fellow housing professionals due to the insular, referral-based nature of their field.  
Compared to the mortgage lending professionals whose challenges I address below, real 
estate brokers emerged from the mortgage crisis with few new regulatory strictures on their 
industry. Yet as the gatekeepers of the housing market, their decisions, actions, and advice shape 
consumers’ experiences, negative and positive, in the housing market. As such, real estate 
brokers’ compensation structure and its ethical implications merit further scrutiny.   
Although it would involve a major industry shift, commission-based real estate broker 
compensation could be reconfigured so that the interests of brokers and buyers coincide more 
directly.  Some not-for-profit housing agencies have hired real estate brokers on a salaried basis 
to guide their first-time home buyer clients through the home buying process.  These real estate 
brokers keep a small portion of the traditional commission, as well, which may motivate them to 
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find properties quickly, but they are not beholden to commission-based compensation to make 
ends meet.   
The new real estate search engine brokerage hybrid, Redfin, offers another possible 
model.  Similarly, Redfin real estate brokers are paid a salary and receive only a small portion of 
the traditional real estate commission.  Redfin does not have designated brokers who work 
exclusively with one home buying or selling client. Instead, a team shares client representation 
responsibilities and tasks, such as property showings and open houses.  When sellers use Redfin 
to list their home, they pay less commission than they would if they used a traditional brokerage 
service because of Redfin’s shared compensation structure.  While there are certainly many real 
estate brokers who are able to act ethically and treat their fiduciary duty to their clients’ 
seriously, I argue that the perverse incentives that existing commissions structures create need to 
be addressed.  Changing how real estate brokers are compensated would fundamentally change 
their relationship to the housing value chain. If they no longer worked for commissions received 
at the closing table, they might be more capable of putting their client’s needs above their own 
and ensuring that the housing market is more accessible and transparent for all. 
 
Mortgage Lending, Risk, and Responsibility 
After the U.S. mortgage crisis, intense scrutiny on the role of housing finance and 
mortgage securitization in the financial crash brought about the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which provided for the establishment of a new financial services regulatory and enforcement 
agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), in 2010.  The CFPB did much to 
curtail the worst excesses of predatory and subprime mortgage lending and establish a lending 
process that was more transparent and intelligible to ordinary consumers.  Currently, the CFPB’s 
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regulatory and enforcement powers are under threat from within as acting-CFPB director Mick 
Mulvaney cuts his agency’s operating budget and enforcement capacities, but during my 
research with mortgage lending professionals, the CFPB was a powerful, market-redefining 
force.  I support the CFPB’s mission and the need for tighter regulation of the mortgage lending 
industry, particularly non-banks that are not subjected to other forms of federal regulation from 
the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or the Federal Reserve Bank. But I also 
came to understand the frustration that many mortgage loan officers experienced with respect to 
the regulation of their industry.   
As I described in Chapter 3, mortgage lenders felt themselves to be constrained by 
heightened compliance, disclosure, and licensing requirements and lamented that their 
opportunities to receive compensation in the form of commissions and fees from lenders and 
borrowers had become far more narrow. My interlocutors who worked for mortgage brokerages 
tended to complain more than those who worked at mortgage banks, in part because they were 
more structurally vulnerable and had likely experienced a more extreme decline in their 
compensation with the advent of new regulatory restrictions on mortgage compensation schemes.  
But loan originators who worked for non-banks were also more likely to be oblivious to, and 
disconnected from, those above and below them in the mortgage securitization chain.  They did 
not understand why they were being punished with stricter regulations and compensation 
parameters after the mortgage crisis because they did not seem to have fully understood their 
own crucial role within the housing market as market middlemen who connected individual 
borrowers to the circuits of global finance.   
The existence of affordable, widely accessible mortgage loans in the United States is, in 
part, the product of a robust mortgage-backed securities market.  At this point, that market 
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depends on non-bank entities, such as mortgage brokerages, to connect consumers with the 
financial products they need to become homeowners.  But the advent of one-touch, online only, 
non-bank mortgage lenders and digital mortgage purveyors also further extenuates the value 
chain of debt, credit, and obligation that stretches between homeowners and the diverse mix of 
private lenders and investors and government agencies that currently make their home purchases 
possible. Further, it obscures the mediating work that mortgage professionals do to connect the 
links of that chain in ways that make it difficult for loan originators and brokers to feel a sense of 
empowered responsibility for the financial lives and futures that pass through their hands.   
We cannot roll back the evolution of mortgage finance without disrupting a crucial 
source of housing market capital and liquidity, but we can find ways to tie the professional 
successes and compensation streams of lending professionals to long-term borrower wellbeing.  
This already happens in mortgage banks, such as Darden, that underwrite and originate their own 
loans and in community banks that also portfolio and service the loans they make. However, as 
the share of loans made by non-bank entities grows, we should find alternative ways of ensuring 
shared long-term success for lenders and borrowers.  As with the changes to commission 
structures for real estate brokers, changes that tie the financial wellbeing of mortgage lenders, 
loan originators, and homeowners together would alter how the housing value chain functions 
and generates value for differently positioned housing stakeholders. This could create greater 
stability for the U.S. housing market.     
 
Changing Perceptions of Homeownership 
 The last dimension of homeownership in need of reconfiguration is how it is promoted 
and perceived. In real estate investment seminars, housing and community development 
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meetings, and conversations with real estate brokers, mortgage lenders, and housing 
policymakers, I heard again and again about the promise of homeownership.  In real estate 
investment seminars, for example, audience members were urged to do whatever it took to “tap 
into” the housing value chain, even if it meant over-leveraging themselves to become amateur 
house flippers, landlords, or property tax lien investors. In real estate development community 
meetings across Chicago, local homeowners critiqued mixed-income development proposals 
because they believed that the renting households would surely overcrowd schools, strain public 
services, and generate crime. A real estate broker I was interviewing looked askance at me when 
I told him that some Northern European countries provide long-term affordable rental housing 
for middle-class households rather than only offer public housing as a last resort for the 
desperately poor (Hirsch 1998).  “Who would want that?” he asked me incredulously. “Isn’t that 
just socialism?”  The vast majority of the housing stakeholders I met saw the housing market as 
necessarily oriented toward the production of new homeownership.    
Time and again over the course of my research, I heard about the economic and social 
value that homeownership brings to households, neighborhoods, cities, and the nation.  Initially, 
all that pro-homeownership rhetoric seemed disingenuous, particularly from housing 
stakeholders who had seen and experienced the consequences of the mortgage crisis of 2007-
2009.  But eventually, I began to see the ubiquity of a homeownership agenda as indicative of 
both my interlocutors deep investment in the recovery of the U.S. housing market and their 
recognition of the lack of alternatives for building household wealth and providing housing in a 
sustainable and accessible fashion.   
Due to the success of the homeownership complex and the importance of the housing 
value chain for individual households as well as local and national economies, this may be the 
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current housing reality in the United States, but it need not be the preordained future.  We can 
imagine and create other mechanisms to both meet households’ diverse housing needs and offer 
reliable paths to invest in their own economic futures. It is true that in the current moment, 
owning a home is often the most obvious and sometimes the best way of accomplishing both of 
these ends.  But it need not always be so.   
The homeownership complex works and will continue to define U.S. housing policy and 
practice as long as homeownership remains culturally compelling and financially promising.  If a 
different type of framework is required to meet the shifting housing needs, goals, and preferences 
of U.S. residents, we must imagine it and bring it into being.  As Ronald Martin, a long-time 
housing activist and staff member at one of the not-for-profit housing agencies that partnered 
with Chicago’s Program for Community Revitalization told me, “the goal should always be safe, 
secure, and affordable neighborhoods.  Ownership is not a prerequisite for that.”  
Homeownership is an enduring, hegemonic institution in the United States, but that does not 
mean it can never be reconfigured.  With this dissertation, I have begun the analysis and 
deconstruction that are necessary precursors to change. I look toward a systemic transformation 
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